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305 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
fd10167985
Fix listings and session print 2023-12-10 20:46:16 +01:00
cb3fe622ae
Fix 3ds build 2023-12-09 14:48:21 +01:00
Hubert Chathi
7e0c827703 release 3.2.16 2023-11-23 12:38:51 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
972faaadd5 use pypa/build instead of setup.py when building sdist 2023-11-21 21:25:55 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
807b252331 update Python versions in CI 2023-11-21 21:25:02 -05:00
parona' via Olm
bbdac4045d Fix breakage in setuptools-69.0.0 by cleaning up setup.py
Hello,

Setuptools 69.0.0 deprecated a bunch stuff leading to a nasty errors during install.

> File "/tmp/pip-build-env-w815o5v3/overlay/lib/python3.11/site-packages/setuptools/config/_apply_pyprojecttoml.py", line 183, in _license
>          _set_config(dist, "license", val["text"])
>                                       ~~~^^^^^^^^
> KeyError: 'text'
> [end of output]

__version__.py wasn't used anywhere except setup.py so removing and setting it all pyproject.toml is safe.

During this decided to move as much as I could out of setup.py, zip-safe has been obsolete for modern setuptools installation methods so dropped it.

From c0be008217350f03de7f856866a402d95b5db2a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alfred Wingate <parona@protonmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 15:13:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Move metadata to project.toml

* Setuptools 69.0.0 deprecated a slew of old style configurations.

Signed-off-by: Alfred Wingate <parona@protonmail.com>
2023-11-21 16:07:46 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
4beb2487ce JS packages are now uploaded to npmjs.com rather than gitlab.matrix.org 2023-11-21 16:06:00 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
b54fa37fae add missing line from changelog 2023-11-21 16:05:27 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
66294cf7f6 release 3.2.15 2023-05-01 11:35:20 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
366520ebfd aha, it's lowercase 2023-04-27 19:53:44 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
d27f162316 attempt to fix js build 2023-04-27 19:48:16 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
4b69958c95 improve compatibility with Windows (though it still doesn't work) 2023-04-27 18:52:39 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
5cfe6c3dbd more packaging improvements 2023-04-27 17:19:53 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
bbdc12c569 Merge branch 'master' of https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm 2023-04-26 10:02:02 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
afb3d403e1 actually remove dependency on future 2023-04-26 10:00:34 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
418656ee9f make sure the headers are up to date when creating the sdist 2023-04-26 09:58:10 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
0d367baa5b add script for creating Python sdist 2023-04-25 18:47:37 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
8cbb60e476 improve Python packaging 2023-04-25 18:47:14 -04:00
Michael Telatynski
0880461134 Correct message_index type in return signature of InboundGroupSession::decrypt 2023-03-29 08:33:55 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
8f4b81b512 remove workaround for closure compiler that is now causing problems
was added in 5a60e543a5
2023-03-17 17:50:10 -04:00
Jon Ringer
ab4cbcd01a Enable darwin builds in Nix for olm
From 04f1249a66e75e91ef009ed04304cbc88dea798d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonathan Ringer <jonringer117@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2023 15:14:23 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Enable darwin builds in Nix

Move most packaging concerns into nix/overlay.nix. Alter packaging
to mostly align with nixpkgs best practices.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Ringer <jonringer117@gmail.com>
2023-03-17 16:53:50 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
704b198f5a we are already living in the future, part 2 2023-01-19 13:46:34 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
0eb4550a8f we are already living in the future 2023-01-09 09:51:37 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
249acc9e0b fix tox config to work with newer version 2022-12-23 17:50:09 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
5efd38c990 release 3.2.14 2022-12-05 17:58:00 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
ad76fc1570 allow multiple arguments to be passed when linking Python library 2022-12-02 19:38:45 -05:00
Michael Telatynski
b5d68376b5 Improve Typescript typing 2022-12-01 18:36:00 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
dbd8a44fa2 add documentation for installation, and other doc improvements 2022-11-28 18:39:49 -05:00
Michael Telatynski
722f4df4aa Update javascript/index.d.ts 2022-11-18 16:09:55 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
6d767aaf29 release 3.2.13 2022-10-07 11:00:05 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
21e84095e6 pkgconfig improvements 2022-10-06 22:22:56 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
464e193dad update nix info 2022-10-06 15:26:39 -04:00
Brendan Abolivier
df2cfcb6d0 Python bindings: add py.typed to wheels 2022-10-06 17:59:11 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
ed94b56d16 fix compatibility with newer versions of emscripten 2022-10-06 13:14:38 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
f52d179c18 and update URL for Trixnity 2022-09-12 09:14:01 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
85c0be5fbc update license for Trixnity 2022-09-12 09:11:50 -04:00
Denis Kasak
203083cdd4 fix(megolm spec): Correct the version for the session export format.
It was mistakenly claimed to be 2 when it's supposed to be 1.
2022-09-01 14:58:16 +02:00
David Robertson
983e78dc53 Fix dead link to e2ee guide in the README 2022-06-22 16:47:15 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
92769cec71 release 3.2.12 2022-05-30 13:55:34 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
d18d12d379 minor documentation fixes 2022-05-30 13:55:10 -04:00
Denis Kasak
14c5ea70d4 Describe the session export format.
This is the Megolm session format used for `m.forwarded_room_key`, the
server-side room key backups and Megolm key file exports in the Matrix
specification and implementations.
2022-05-26 14:14:44 +02:00
Denis Kasak
ee1b0c8a9a Update megolm.md: Fix broken section link. 2022-05-26 10:43:28 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
84807125c0 allow memory to grow in wasm 2022-05-13 16:28:04 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
eb21951124 allow passing linker flag to link to standard C++ library 2022-05-13 16:23:58 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
39252b012b re-add olm-python3 rule that was accidentally removed 2022-05-13 16:21:54 -04:00
Brendan Abolivier
86a3d95855 Fix type hints on the PkDecryption class 2022-05-13 11:39:44 +01:00
Faye Duxovni
81f5c4a3cd Make sure checks actually run 2022-05-12 20:56:17 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
d0b2b8702f fix deprecated output attribute 2022-05-12 20:55:00 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
e000c33a58 don't try to harden unoptimized debug builds, it just causes errors 2022-05-12 20:55:00 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
43672251e4 ensure use of gcc/clang at stdenv level for checks 2022-05-12 19:42:47 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
e116efa752 Add check to nix flake: compile C library with gcc and clang 2022-05-12 17:05:22 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
a4a700739e ignore nix build result symlinks 2022-05-11 14:39:17 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
b8990d90f0 remove now-unused yarn, replace with nodejs 2022-05-11 14:35:37 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
99d635779c include version in derivation name 2022-05-11 14:29:53 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
b65ab350f0 let pinning of nixos-unstable commit happen in flake.lock rather than flake.nix 2022-05-11 14:15:37 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
c9e6bf9263 use npmlock2nix to provide node_modules 2022-05-11 13:59:33 -04:00
Faye Duxovni
727722d7a8 patch shebangs in build scripts 2022-05-11 13:07:57 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
8510b2f601 initial attempt at nix flake 2022-05-11 11:26:20 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
7bf6fb553e improve documentation for Python function 2022-05-02 12:12:31 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
1c7df35c5f exposed olm_sas_calculate_mac_fixed_base64 in the bindings 2022-04-21 21:45:19 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
2f23d99424 Release 3.2.11 2022-04-08 16:00:24 -04:00
ganfra
0a6a5a5caf Add public pickle/unpickle methods to java bindings 2022-04-08 14:28:24 +00:00
Valere
b5dfa28f3b code review 2022-04-08 13:16:37 +00:00
Valere
3c91c66ee2 Unpublished fallback key bindings + forget 2022-04-08 13:16:37 +00:00
Alex Baker
dcf5582f8a Add Java wrapper for olm_session_describe
Signed-off-by: Alex Baker <alex@beeper.com>
2022-02-25 10:19:11 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
9d66965962 add Trixnity to list of bindings 2022-02-17 10:08:01 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
dd1905454b fix doc building. Thanks to Jonas Smedegaard. 2022-01-14 11:08:58 -05:00
Benoit Marty
9908862979 release 3.2.10 2022-01-10 11:00:49 +01:00
Benoit Marty
7d0a69a099 Ensure the Android library includes the native olm libraries 2022-01-07 22:03:28 +01:00
Benoît Marty
2c6b9d5e3a Fix typo in the url 2022-01-07 18:55:53 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
0dde38bd4f release 3.2.9 2022-01-07 10:56:06 -05:00
Benoit Marty
b3478a526b Update POM_SCM_CONNECTION and POM_SCM_DEV_CONNECTION values 2022-01-07 00:13:43 +01:00
Benoit Marty
b11f555b01 Do not upload source and Javadoc
Only empty jars will be uploaded
2022-01-06 10:05:37 +01:00
Benoit Marty
23380ca331 Release the library on MavenCentral
Delete stuff added for Jitpack
2022-01-06 10:04:40 +01:00
Benoit Marty
1c3af112c8 Compile and target API 31 2022-01-05 16:28:04 +01:00
Benoit Marty
55c976d4f6 Use Java 11 source compat 2022-01-05 16:12:24 +01:00
Benoit Marty
db90ce6b62 Upgrade dependencies of test libraries 2022-01-05 16:12:13 +01:00
Benoit Marty
96407493d1 New notation for the different Int 2022-01-05 16:11:59 +01:00
Benoit Marty
9b2c116fbd Upgrade AGP from 4.2.3 to 7.0.4 2022-01-05 16:11:40 +01:00
Benoit Marty
cbc6886a37 Upgrade from gradle-7.0 to gradle-7.3.3 2022-01-05 16:10:31 +01:00
Benoit Marty
c172ab6236 Remove unnecessary file 2022-01-05 16:08:52 +01:00
Tulir Asokan
9946acac23 Add Python wrapper for olm_session_describe
Signed-off-by: Tulir Asokan <tulir@beeper.com>
2022-01-03 09:43:21 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
60122a2c2d switch to jasmine (instead of jasmine-node) for JavaScript tests 2021-12-22 13:51:47 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
8475061136 switch to doctest for unit testing
thanks to Nico Werner, who did most of the porting work
2021-12-22 13:45:33 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
e197cd76d6 some cleanup 2021-12-21 13:24:34 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
797183f27f release 3.2.8 2021-12-13 08:42:39 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
21dc11ecbf update location of Nim binding 2021-12-13 08:42:14 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
8519ce0269 clear out random arrays 2021-12-10 16:15:22 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
c23ce70fc6 improve handling of olm_session_describe when buffer is too short 2021-12-10 16:14:46 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
2dbeea2f1d release 3.2.7 2021-12-06 11:01:21 -05:00
Valere
e854c0f907 Quick fixes 2021-12-02 21:46:32 +00:00
valere
f647747d27 fallback key java bindings 2021-12-02 21:46:32 +00:00
Benjamin Kampmann
f6309f0281 Disable forced exports (introduced in 72b8bf53) for wasm. 2021-12-02 12:27:37 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
4b2f68d11e add missing word 2021-12-01 15:36:46 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
fb162258ab add function to TypeScript declaration 2021-12-01 14:34:41 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
ee76674f03 remove duplicate definition 2021-12-01 14:34:29 -05:00
Damir Jelić
701f9c765d python: Expose the method to forget the old fallback key 2021-11-24 20:06:24 +01:00
Damir Jelić
85a2f47088 python: Use the unpublished fallback key lenght when outputing fallback keys 2021-11-24 20:06:24 +01:00
Damir Jelić
8c62046392 python: Add support to generate fallback keys 2021-11-24 20:06:24 +01:00
Damir Jelić
845e7cb43b python: Remove Python 2 from the makefile 2021-11-24 20:06:24 +01:00
Hubert Chathi
69ca6cd5ca publish to gitlab.matrix.org Maven repository 2021-11-24 16:06:51 +00:00
Benjamin Kampmann
336e1d56a8 disable DEBUG symbols for emscripten build 2021-11-24 10:43:23 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
6f59e16b58 update function documentation 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Denis Kasak
5e5e32fe83 fix typo 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
631f050554 add a test for fallback keys, and clear memory when we forget the old fallback 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
29e0287ef3 add function to forget the old fallback key 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
c5eff859cb add JavaScript function for getting unpublished fallback key 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
4127a84b3d add function for getting length of unpublished fallback keys
and fix a typo
2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
3b6ff327c0 keep testing logs 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
b989db0117 track if fallback keys were published 2021-11-23 22:35:10 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
5039c0cc3a fix python build 2021-11-19 15:49:12 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
98b8e35a7c fix symbol exporting again 2021-11-19 15:28:43 -05:00
Denis Kasak
2430e9bb9a Add link to the Security Disclosure Policy to the README. 2021-11-19 10:17:37 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
609e7e8d40 make sure we have enough space for the encrypted and encoded version of the junk 2021-11-17 14:18:03 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
06b723db6e add note about telling olm how to find wasm file 2021-11-11 14:05:07 -05:00
Johannes Marbach
bce4f007b1 Use classic instead of semantic import
This replaces the semantic import for the Security framework with a
classic one. Semantic imports are currently not compatible with Kotlin
Multiplatform Mobile projects which makes OLMKit (and consequently
the iOS Matrix SDK) unusable in KMM.

Fixes: https://github.com/matrix-org/olm/issues/67
Signed-off-by: Johannes Marbach <n0-0ne@mailbox.org>
2021-11-08 15:15:46 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
0e7c0a5613 recommend using cmake more strongly 2021-11-02 16:16:07 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
201f139523 also install olm_export.h when using make 2021-11-02 12:49:52 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
03c5523aac fix typo 2021-09-29 18:33:30 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
8656f1463c release 3.2.6 2021-09-16 17:16:56 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
c81dfd0718 fix Python build 2021-09-16 17:06:45 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
4fb723cad3 install the export header too 2021-09-16 15:09:42 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
72b8bf5334 use visibility annotation rather than version file with CMake 2021-09-16 13:45:10 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
904e80b75f release 3.2.5 2021-09-15 19:15:58 -04:00
Onuray Sahin
06407aa08d Generate and retrieve fallback key functions added. 2021-09-14 22:19:13 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
6a63a5bfa9 use full path to externs.js because it's failing to find it 2021-09-14 18:18:26 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
e1aa1b3277 add jOlm binding 2021-08-25 21:50:33 -04:00
Stefan Ceriu
91a619b745 Added ObjC fallbackKey support and updated tests. 2021-08-18 16:44:34 +03:00
Stefan Ceriu
8ddb72cfed Updated podfile and added Xcode schemes for both iOS and macOS. 2021-08-18 16:40:32 +03:00
Hubert Chathi
6c552dd7eb use the right size in the tests 2021-08-09 16:21:13 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
d84c1af882 East const for consistency 2021-08-06 17:36:01 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
4d6c3ba8d1 make account const in create_outbound_session 2021-08-06 17:29:56 -04:00
Denis Kasak
b70e0b06df Differentiate between malformed pickle objects and trailing junk data.
Adds the OLM_PICKLE_EXTRA_DATA error code. We fail with this code when
the pickle object looks right except for some unexpected trailing bytes
which we didn't process.
2021-07-31 01:27:43 +00:00
Denis Kasak
d704f4bd3c Fail when an unpickle succeeds but has extra junk data at the end.
Also adds tests to ensure this is working.
2021-07-31 01:27:43 +00:00
Denis Kasak
131f7cfd71 Fix off-by-one comparison error when unpickling uint32_t. 2021-07-31 01:27:43 +00:00
Denis Kasak
bdd73c5c32 Fix unpickling error handling. 2021-07-31 01:27:43 +00:00
Denis Kasak
34974551ab unpickle_account: Add error checking to the harness. 2021-07-31 01:27:43 +00:00
Denis Kasak
0a8bbde361 Support building a "disarmed" target via the OLM_FUZZING macro.
Like other crypto libs, libolm contains many obstacles which a fuzzer is
unlikely to be able to surmount but which are not important for the end
goal of fuzzing. The easiest and most robust way around this is to remove
these obstacles conditionally when building the fuzzer binaries.

This commit adds a preprocessor macro OLM_FUZZING which can be used to
conditionally disables problematic bits of code during compile-time for
easier fuzzing.

Currently the only thing it disables is the encryption/decryption and
base64 encoding/decoding when processing pickled Megolm keys. This
allows the fuzzers to fuzz the unpickling functionality directly without
inadvertently fuzzing the base64 encoder and encryption (which should be
fuzzed separately).

The macro is set in the Makefile *only* when building fuzzer binaries.
2021-07-13 13:51:16 +02:00
Denis Kasak
b38e282f3a fuzzing: Add script for starting fuzzers on a given harness. 2021-07-13 13:49:18 +02:00
Denis Kasak
ceed90922a fuzzing: Add readme. 2021-07-13 13:49:18 +02:00
Denis Kasak
4d14750c38 Move fuzzers under fuzzing/ dir. 2021-07-13 13:49:18 +02:00
Denis Kasak
e06ac20558 Add unpickle_megolm_outbound fuzzer. Enable C harness support. 2021-07-13 11:13:15 +00:00
Denis Kasak
811e56a0f0 Add lib_exports.sh for printing list of exported functions.
Prints the list of exported functions from a built library object.
Useful for sanity checking.
2021-07-13 10:50:27 +02:00
Denis Kasak
583f8b761b Add some more files to .gitignore
- `compile_commands.json`: clang compilation database
- `.ccls-cache`: Cache directory for the ccls language server
- `.clang-format`: clang formatting description
2021-07-12 16:58:11 +02:00
Denis Kasak
84dbba8e1c Makefile: Remove debugging flag from the release target. 2021-07-12 16:50:34 +02:00
Denis Kasak
a44fc368f2 Makefile: Fix passing optimization flag to fuzzing builds. 2021-07-12 16:50:06 +02:00
Denis Kasak
93352b55e7 fuzz_group_decrypt: Enable AFL++ persistent mode. 2021-07-12 15:48:27 +02:00
Denis Kasak
7dd4c77c19 Add .editorconfig.
See https://editorconfig.org/ for more information.
2021-07-08 14:28:40 +00:00
Denis Kasak
4901435a0e Improve cleanup in fuzzing harnesses 2021-07-08 14:23:55 +00:00
Johannes Hayeß
254a4a5619 Fix building of tests with MSVC
Hi,

currently tests don't build with MSVC, because the Base64 test tries to initialize multiple arrays with a length value that was derived from a non-const context. I have fixed this by using vectors instead.

Sincerely

Johannes Hayeß

From 2d76972a862f0aa04b5011537bef71a49aa82a03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Johannes=20Haye=C3=9F?= <jhaye@mailbox.org>
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 17:46:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix compiling with MSVC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Previously attempts to initialize arrays with non-const value. This
seemingly works on GCC/clang due to their static code analysis, but
fails with MSVC. This switches to dynamic memory allocation with
std::vector, to solve the problem.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Hayeß <jhaye@mailbox.org>
2021-06-29 13:14:05 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
abf8f97491 fix JavaScript build 2021-06-18 13:12:11 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
0f7c13334f install error.h when using make too 2021-06-17 15:26:46 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
2aad86ea84 fix Python build 2021-06-17 11:56:08 -04:00
Denis Kasak
9a8b421903 Update dart-olm URL. 2021-06-17 16:20:48 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
37c8e14e53 make functions const where possible 2021-06-16 23:22:25 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
7263c4221b add functions to get the error codes rather than error strings 2021-06-16 22:40:14 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
60be1ca55f add support file for cross-compiling Windows library 2021-06-16 15:28:30 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
1b7973626e only export olm functions to avoid colliding with other libraries 2021-06-16 15:05:19 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
d47c2a92b8 make new pickle/unpickle function 2021-06-09 14:59:31 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
4803f4192d make (de)serialize methods public in OlmAccount 2021-06-09 14:59:31 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
3612ac7ae7 add missing dependency in Makefile for javascript/olm_prefix.js 2021-06-08 14:57:05 -04:00
Denis Kasak
b90f9ee7d3 Fix typo in docstring (repeated word). 2021-06-04 22:24:15 +00:00
Denis Kasak
6ed8d687e8 Document olm_create_inbound_session_from properly.
The old docstring was the same as olm_create_inbound_session and didn't
explain the difference between them.
2021-06-04 22:24:15 +00:00
Denis Kasak
3e6592e445 Compile ASAN and MSAN versions of fuzzer harnesses too. 2021-06-02 14:02:19 +02:00
Denis Kasak
56df2613f3 Switch to afl-clang-fast(++).
This type of instrumentation is much faster (several times over) and
supports much more features than afl-gcc/afl-g++, though it requires
a LLVM/clang installation.
2021-06-02 14:02:19 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
64afab9364 prepare for release 2021-06-01 13:44:45 -04:00
Benoit Marty
995def932e Fix issue with Jitpack build 2021-05-28 18:12:50 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
d856c441b6 use Python 3 2021-05-24 10:32:57 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
22bc1155ed prepare for release 2021-05-24 10:29:24 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
891a5f22c8 fix path 2021-05-24 10:27:28 -04:00
Denis Kasak
ccc0d122ee olm_pk_decrypt: Ensure inputs are of correct length. 2021-05-24 15:50:14 +02:00
Denis Kasak
2f35e0bc61 olm_sas_set_their_key: Fail early on invalid base64. 2021-05-24 15:50:14 +02:00
Denis Kasak
e82f2601b0 Fail decoding base64 of invalid length.
olm::decode_base64 now returns the length of the raw decoded data on
success. When given input with an invalid base64 length, it fails early
(before decoding any input) and returns -1.

This also makes the C function _olm_decode_base64 an actual binding of
olm::decode_base64 instead of a wrapper with slightly different
behaviour.
2021-05-24 15:50:14 +02:00
Denis Kasak
a5efc08ef3 olm: Also initialize all fields when decoding Olm messages.
As a precaution.
2021-05-11 13:32:23 +02:00
Denis Kasak
c325db02fc megolm: Fix use of uninitialized value in group message decoding.
_olm_decode_group_message should initialize all fields of the results
struct before returning. This is because its caller
_decrypt_max_plaintext_length relies on it having initialized these
fields.

Luckily, this only allows one to subvert the version check in
_decrypt_max_plaintext_length, but not the following check that the
ciphertext field is non-null because that field *is* initialized.
2021-05-11 13:23:19 +02:00
Denis Kasak
0a7b6da9a0 Slightly refactor/comment the harness for clarity. 2021-05-10 21:04:44 +00:00
Denis Kasak
8d1cfd207a Fix a fuzzing harness double free when input is of size 0.
Consider the case when the input is size 0. In this case, `count` and
`buffer_pos` will be 0 as well. The `realloc` call in the `count == 0`
branch will then effectively become a free.

However, `realloc` can sometimes return `NULL` when a 0 is passed for
the size. The current code assumes that this only happens on a memory
allocation error and breaks out of the loop. This then becomes a double
free because the buffer is freed a second time, causing an abort.

The intent of the `realloc` is probably to downsize the buffer to fit
the data exactly in order to make incorrect memory access more obvious.
This commit skips this downsizing if the size of the input data is 0.
2021-05-10 21:04:44 +00:00
Arun Babu Neelicattu
15f65283c7 make: Replace deprecated emcc configuration
EXTRA_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS is deprecated. Replace with
EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS.
2021-05-10 20:40:42 +00:00
Arun Babu Neelicattu
0684eb4564 ci: add initial build pipeline 2021-05-10 20:40:42 +00:00
Arun Babu Neelicattu
b0a05976ea python: remove tox basepython configuration 2021-05-10 20:40:42 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
18ad6cb067 Merge branch 'fix-ncc-audit-url' into 'master'
Fix URL to the NCC Group audit.

See merge request matrix-org/olm!22
2021-05-04 21:58:35 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
d7c3971f9a update release instructions 2021-05-04 17:54:05 -04:00
Denis Kasak
c95677611c Fix URL to the NCC Group audit.
The original URL is now redirecting to a generic listing page and there
are no links to the actual Olm audit paper there.
2021-05-04 15:09:29 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
7f53dedca6 Declare olm_sas_calculate_mac_fixed_base64 in header
Signed-off-by: Lukas Lihotzki <lukas@lihotzki.de>
2021-04-27 16:18:33 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
3b3f2c71dc Merge branch 'bma/upgrade_gradle' into 'master'
Update gradle wrapper and build tools

See merge request matrix-org/olm!20
2021-04-16 20:17:51 +00:00
Benoit Marty
f1d8efd821 Simplify assertions using suggestion from IDE 2021-04-16 21:57:57 +02:00
Benoit Marty
1694f15ffb Fix test compilation and run test with success
Using command `./gradlew connectedAndroidTest` on an API 21 emulator
2021-04-16 21:50:13 +02:00
Benoit Marty
4d2522a65c Update gradle wrapper and build tools
BuildConfig.VERSION_NAME is not available anymore when building library
Also replace JCenter by MavenCentral
2021-04-16 21:08:55 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
dbbf467075 Merge branch 'manu/swift_package_manager' into 'master'
Xcode: Add support of Swift Package Manager

See merge request matrix-org/olm!19
2021-04-06 18:22:51 +00:00
manuroe
26bd2fc35d Swift package: Update instructions 2021-04-06 17:18:50 +02:00
manuroe
09fbb9e966 Xcode: Add support of Swift Package Manager
Made by Johennes at https://github.com/matrix-org/olm/issues/51#issuecomment-809128833
2021-04-02 19:16:11 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
f16377822f Add LibreJS license tag 2021-03-31 16:11:41 -04:00
Matthew Hodgson
09384b4d45 spell ephemeral correctly... 2021-03-18 01:29:23 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
bcb89bcc24 add Common Lisp bindings 2021-03-02 16:13:39 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
3745ea57bb bump version number and add changelog 2021-02-22 17:06:13 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
0bb0f85e18 don't use variables that haven't been set yet 2021-02-22 16:54:35 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
21ba95ade5 create and install a pkg-config file on Unix-like systems 2021-02-22 16:54:26 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
cabefb17dc rename npm package to @matrix-org/olm
to be published via our gitlab repository
2021-02-22 15:41:29 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
a07e27cfa5 Merge branch 'sas-base64-fix' into 'master'
sas: Fix the base64 encoding of the MAC.

See merge request matrix-org/olm!16
2021-02-19 22:18:28 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
23e0486007 Merge branch 'manu/olmkit_pickling_v2' into 'master'
OLMKit:  New pickle version using a pickle key provided externally

See merge request matrix-org/olm!17
2021-02-19 19:23:21 +00:00
manuroe
4be7cc367b OLMKit: Forgot to implement pickle v2 for OLMSession 2021-02-19 12:00:03 +01:00
manuroe
b69b56d0bb OLMKit: New pickle version using a pickle key provided externally
Improve ObjC wrappers so that they can use a pickle key provided by the olm lib user.

This new behavior is optional to not break existing usage.

It is retro compatible and use pickle versioning already in place. 
Existing key will be unpickled with pickle v1 and pickled with pickle v2 if an external pickle key is provided.
2021-02-19 09:23:36 +01:00
Damir Jelić
f46577a06a sas: Introduce a new calculate mac function to fix the base64 issue
Since it's important to keep backwards compatibility introduce a new
function to calculate the MAC using a SAS object.

Modifying the existing functions would break compatibility with older
releases of libolm.
2021-02-02 16:58:28 +01:00
Damir Jelić
4e927eb1cf sas: Fix the base64 encoding of the MAC.
When calculating the MAC for a message using olm_sas_calculate_mac() and
olm_sas_calculate_mac_long_kdf() the resulting MAC will be base64
encoded using _olm_encode_base64().

The _olm_encode_base64() method requires an input buffer and output
buffer to be passed alongside the input length. The method is called
with the same buffer, containing the MAC, for the input buffer as well
as for the output buffer. This results in an incorrectly base64 encoded
MAC.

For example the byte array:
    [121, 105, 187, 19, 37, 94, 119, 248, 224, 34, 94, 29, 157, 5,
     15, 230, 246, 115, 236, 217, 80, 78, 56, 200, 80, 200, 82, 158,
     168, 179, 10, 230]

will be encoded as  eWm7NyVeVmXgbVhnYlZobllsWm9ibGxzV205aWJHeHo
instead of as       eWm7EyVed/jgIl4dnQUP5vZz7NlQTjjIUMhSnqizCuY

Notice the different value at the 10th character.

The correct result can be independently checked using Python for
example:

>>> from base64 import b64encode
>>> mac = [121, 105, 187, 19, 37, 94, 119, 248, 224, 34, 94, 29, 157, \
           5, 15, 230, 246, 115, 236, 217, 80, 78, 56, 200, 80, 200, \
           82, 158, 168, 179, 10, 230]
>>> b64encode(bytearray(mac)).rstrip(b"=")
>>> b'eWm7EyVed/jgIl4dnQUP5vZz7NlQTjjIUMhSnqizCuY'

This happens because the encode_base64() method that is used does not support
in-place encoding in the general case. This is because the remainder for a 32
bit input will always be 2 (32 % 6 == 2).

The remainder will be used over here:
c01164f001/src/base64.cpp (L74)

The logic that gets executed if a remainder exists depends on the original input
values, since those already got in-place encoded the whole block will behave
differently if the input buffer is the same as the output buffer.
2021-01-31 12:56:32 +01:00
Hubert Chathi
c01164f001 add link to nim binding 2021-01-14 12:40:52 -05:00
Tobias Furuholm
541a2bf6fd Fix length calculation of fallback key json 2020-11-24 13:47:27 -05:00
Richard van der Hoff
b9771dae61 DH ratchet sequence diagram 2020-11-23 18:33:26 +00:00
Richard van der Hoff
11d34f79af update double-ratchet diagrams 2020-11-23 18:33:26 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
1fd8d2978f fix typo 2020-11-23 13:17:08 -05:00
Hubert Chathi
64b8bc11cb use the right version in the changelog 2020-10-29 16:35:17 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
8efa0ec17d Use current source directory in CMake. Thanks to Gorgurov Alexey. 2020-10-29 16:26:06 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
c5ab3ecbf2 Merge branch 'patch-1' into 'master'
Update index.d.ts; specify PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH const export

See merge request matrix-org/olm!15
2020-10-14 01:43:31 +00:00
Michael Telatynski
7768c3219f Update index.d.ts; specify PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH const export 2020-10-13 21:44:20 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
c4d737c86c bump version numbers and update changelog 2020-10-06 17:39:48 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
60d451bbbe all the (un)pickles take a Uint8Array 2020-10-06 17:28:52 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
4d17aa4f05 bump version numbers and update changelog 2020-10-06 15:08:10 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
d4afebc883 fix typo 2020-10-06 14:47:43 -04:00
Lukas Lihotzki
030e506c00 use stackAlloc instead of allocate 2020-10-06 12:02:17 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
22f85d3f3d simplify Makefile (olm_legacy.js) 2020-10-06 09:48:15 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
6611165bff do not pollute the global object 2020-10-03 03:46:15 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
add885c874 add test_mem target for valgrind memcheck 2020-10-01 15:40:22 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
be0c31894a fix memory leaks in tests 2020-10-01 15:39:48 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
73a9ced64e simplify Makefile 2020-09-26 18:24:58 +02:00
Lukas Lihotzki
ac61190bb3 fix build with emscripten 2.0.4 2020-09-26 18:23:50 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
0fd315d54c Merge branch 'python_other_key_set' into 'master'
remove other_key checks from Python binding since it's done in C now

See merge request matrix-org/olm!14
2020-09-24 18:56:19 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
0e6ec3062d remove other_key checks from Python binding since it's done in C now 2020-09-24 18:56:19 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
ec5ff1e032 also check that the pubkey is set when calculating the MAC 2020-09-23 16:47:00 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
78d9cbabb7 set their_key_set flag explicitly on init 2020-09-23 16:11:37 -04:00
Saúl Ibarra Corretgé
2ef1f6f4fc SAS: add olm_sas_is_their_key_set
Also make olm_sas_generate_bytes fail if their key wasn't set.
2020-09-23 15:27:55 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
4bae4134eb partially unindent R_{i,j} derivation
so that we're under GitLab's 1000 character limit for rendering maths
2020-09-17 17:46:37 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
84841a19e2 fix exponents in megolm spec 2020-09-17 17:43:00 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
3cd6b15853 Merge branch 'uhoreg/fallback' into 'master'
add support for fallback keys

See merge request matrix-org/olm!13
2020-09-17 21:42:25 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
c47c6ca399 fix style 2020-09-16 16:14:23 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
c45f19f12d Merge branch 'master' into uhoreg/fallback 2020-09-01 15:57:20 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
89050dc0b6 allow some things to be Uint8Array, and fix some TypeScript declarations 2020-08-31 10:50:33 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
171044f3fc add support for fallback keys 2020-08-14 17:29:41 -04:00
Saúl Ibarra Corretgé
a0284c2ba3 Fix group demo to work with > 2 users
Add 4 by default, and make sure OT keys are not reused.
2020-07-04 16:59:26 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
8a958beb48 bump version info for release 2020-06-11 11:47:50 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
9349c1b82b changelog for release 2020-06-11 11:47:39 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
6fea6898d4 update release instructions 2020-06-11 11:47:24 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
c9a183a7c5 add list of bindings 2020-06-11 11:25:52 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
efd17631b1 move -o option before source files, for better compatibility with LLVM 2020-05-19 15:10:24 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
ad173bc798 Merge branch 'matthew/js-fixes' into 'master'
Fix JS demos, which had bitrotted

See merge request matrix-org/olm!12
2020-05-19 15:08:27 +00:00
Matthew Hodgson
ddd140b23d fix group demo to work with Olm.init() 2020-05-16 17:11:54 +01:00
Matthew Hodgson
14c1db02fe fix 1:1 demo to work with Olm.init() 2020-05-16 17:10:32 +01:00
Matthew Hodgson
fdf25eb3ba spell out error msg if you don't Olm.init 2020-05-16 17:10:18 +01:00
Matthew Hodgson
83bf351a34 fix build on latest emscripten 2020-05-16 17:10:02 +01:00
Matthew Hodgson
5a9fdd85cb remove overzealous -D param to install which breaks build on macOS 2020-05-15 03:06:08 +01:00
Hubert Chathi
05a7af8db1 add a note about calling Olm.init 2020-05-13 19:05:19 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
281c5aac21 fix type signature of unpickle in Inbound/OutboundGroupSession
Thanks to Dominic Fischer for spotting.
2020-05-07 18:01:52 -04:00
stoically
611d3949cb Add wasm target to Makefile
Allows building an WASM-ready archive with emscripten.

This allows e.g. to compile to the `wasm32-unknown-unknown`
target with Rust.

Related matrix-rust-sdk PR:
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/31

Signed-off-by: stoically <stoically@protonmail.com>
2020-05-07 15:58:24 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
9cc2394672 Merge branch 'uhoreg/typescript' into 'master'
Add TypeScript definition file

See merge request matrix-org/olm!11
2020-04-29 16:42:25 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
e6f8a99b34 add missing declaration for PkDecryption#decrypt and SAS class 2020-04-29 12:39:41 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
f409b69e88 add declarations for Inbound/OutboundGroupSession 2020-04-24 17:44:28 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
954d6f98eb initial TypeScript definition file 2020-04-24 17:27:55 -04:00
Richard van der Hoff
930c467754 Update signing.md to use operatorname 2019-11-08 14:11:05 +00:00
Richard van der Hoff
0469065855 Merge branch 'rav/fix_math' into 'master'
Fix some math blocks

See merge request matrix-org/olm!10
2019-11-08 14:09:12 +00:00
Richard van der Hoff
5bcfeaffe3 Update olm.md 2019-11-08 14:00:59 +00:00
Richard van der Hoff
a9c7bde457 Update signing.md 2019-11-08 13:48:34 +00:00
Richard van der Hoff
52098b3af7 Update megolm.md 2019-11-08 13:34:16 +00:00
Alexey Rusakov
baaf002663 CMakeLists.txt: export include directories in install(TARGETS)
Without that, if olm is installed to a non-standard location, the user code might run CMake configuration fine but further building will fail.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Rusakov <Alexey.Rusakov@pm.me>
2019-10-23 16:48:14 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
6753595300 release 3.1.4 2019-10-09 12:33:47 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
387deeea8f Merge branch 'dbkr/olm_session_describe' into 'master'
Add olm_session_describe

See merge request matrix-org/olm!9
2019-10-09 15:37:56 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
fc423fad15 check return value of snprintf, fix typo, add clarification 2019-10-08 17:44:09 -04:00
David Baker
b482321213 Pass in a buffer to olm_session_describe
instead of having a static one, as that could end up taking up a
lot of memory if your app keeps olm sessions hanging about.
2019-10-04 11:43:40 +01:00
David Baker
e73a208fb2 doc string 2019-10-01 11:18:05 +01:00
David Baker
39a1ee0b18 Add olm_session_describe
As a way to dump the state of an olm session, ie. the chain indicies,
so we can debug why olm sessions break and get out of sync.
2019-10-01 11:14:16 +01:00
Hubert Chathi
3568060570 Merge branch 'dbkr/emscripten_is_picky_about_pic' into 'master'
Build the js objects without PIC

See merge request matrix-org/olm!8
2019-09-30 13:12:38 +00:00
Hubert Chathi
44c2e47a3e Merge branch 'dbkr/wrong_comment_breaks_everything' into 'master'
Fix comment and also js build

See merge request matrix-org/olm!7
2019-09-30 13:08:23 +00:00
David Baker
72df5301e0 Build the js objects without PIC
This confuses emscripten now
2019-09-30 13:50:35 +01:00
David Baker
b83a0c0992 Fix comment and also js build
The python that searches the header files for exports isn't smart
enough to know what is a comment and what isn't, so it picks this
up too and emscripten then complains about it being undefined.
2019-09-30 13:19:23 +01:00
Hubert Chathi
57b6839c25 Merge branch 'rav/megolm_doc_format' into 'master'
Update megolm.md

See merge request matrix-org/olm!6
2019-08-22 04:30:45 +00:00
Richard van der Hoff
32f3a82bf9 Update megolm.md 2019-08-22 04:30:45 +00:00
Trygve Aaberge
e267825bb7 Makefile: Overwrite symlinks in install and install-debug
Without this, it's not possible to run the install or install-debug
rules multiple times.

Signed-off-by: Trygve Aaberge <trygveaa@gmail.com>
2019-08-08 09:29:14 -07:00
Hubert Chathi
c463d8b55b Merge branch 'python/drop-hypothesis' into 'master'
tests: Drop hypothesis from the python tests.

See merge request matrix-org/olm!5
2019-07-03 19:27:30 +00:00
Alexey Andreyev
aa0c9ab6b5 CMakeLists.txt: add env vars to target_include_directories 2019-07-03 15:24:13 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
ebd3ba6cc1 release 3.1.3 2019-06-24 17:09:41 -04:00
Matthew Hodgson
ae38f2c5a0 Merge branch 'python/unicode_decode_errors' into 'master'
Python unicode decode errors when decrypting.

See merge request matrix-org/olm!4
2019-06-22 17:06:02 +00:00
Damir Jelić
61175c969b tests: Simplify the input parameter for the Unicode decoding tests. 2019-06-20 14:08:21 +02:00
Damir Jelić
28350d612e tests: Use Unicode literals in the Unicode decoding tests.
This is needed because the function returns Unicode strings and the
comparison will fail under python2 unless Unicode literals are used.
2019-06-20 14:07:14 +02:00
Damir Jelić
5d7070d2f3 tests: Simplify the sha256 tests for python.
Hypothesis isn't used anymore and the strings are now constants, meaning
that the hashes should never match.
2019-06-20 13:55:03 +02:00
Damir Jelić
125c62098c tests: Drop hypothesis from the tests.
Hypothesis recently had some problems with the typing module breaking
the tox tests.

Since Hypothesis isn't really used much in the test this patch removes
it from them as well as from the test-requirements.
2019-06-20 13:45:33 +02:00
Damir Jelić
c4d703ac3d _compat: Make the encoding argument explicit in to_unicode_str(). 2019-06-20 12:24:08 +02:00
Damir Jelić
7538a1eccf olm: Rename the errors function argument in the decryption functions. 2019-06-20 12:16:37 +02:00
Matthew Hodgson
25662564d4 Merge branch 'matthew/define-secrecy' into 'master'
explicitly define backward & forward secrecy

See merge request matrix-org/olm!3
2019-06-19 23:25:56 +00:00
Matthew Hodgson
cfd1450b0e fix typo & more wording from luca 2019-06-20 00:21:47 +01:00
Damir Jelić
fec41f9540 _compat: Remove the now unused native_str. 2019-06-19 15:07:14 +02:00
Damir Jelić
5e24c605d2 _compat: Change the to_native_str into a to_unicode_str function.
The to_native_str function was supposed to produce Unicode decoded
native strings for python2 and python3.

Upon further consideration this doesn't make much sense since under
python2 it would need to decode the bytes into a Unicode string and turn
it back into a python2 str.

The ability to use the replacement character requires us to use a
Unicode string under python2 as well.
2019-06-19 15:03:57 +02:00
Damir Jelić
ba65551d5f _compat: Remove unused import. 2019-06-19 14:42:58 +02:00
Matthew Hodgson
27f5c25fe8 incorporate review from vdh & luca 2019-06-18 23:47:42 +01:00
Damir Jelić
9faa100c6a Makefile: Add an isort target. 2019-06-18 13:52:02 +02:00
Damir Jelić
2f5590bf38 olm: Allow decryption functions to define how to handle unicode decode errors.
This patch changes the decryption functions not to fail if there was an
unicode decode error while converting the decrypted bytes plaintext into
a native python string.

Characters that cannot be decoded as unicode are now replaced with the
unicode replacement character (U+FFFD).

The old behaviour of raising an UnicodeDecodeError can be achieved by
passing the "strict" error handling scheme to the decrypt function.
2019-06-18 13:50:46 +02:00
Matthew Hodgson
f8abaf9e2f explicitly define backward & forward secrecy
as it repeatedly trips people up, including me
2019-06-18 12:45:31 +01:00
Damir Jelić
e1a4e6ebf1 compat: Add a method to convert bytes to a string that handles unicode errors. 2019-06-18 13:44:22 +02:00
Hubert Chathi
4bb039a98e fix another incorrect comment 2019-06-12 16:22:15 -04:00
Hubert Chathi
3ed150edf7 use the right error in the comment 2019-06-12 11:22:28 -04:00
Matthew Hodgson
a18a4e8eb4 remove megolm.rst 2019-05-20 21:39:54 +01:00
Matthew Hodgson
cab1edb6da Merge branch 'markdown' into 'master'
Convert docs from RST to Markdown

See merge request matrix-org/olm!2
2019-05-20 20:38:57 +00:00
Matthew Hodgson
b6cd1690f2 merge 2019-05-20 21:38:16 +01:00
Matthew Hodgson
c368898cef Merge branch 'master' into markdown 2019-05-20 21:38:04 +01:00
Aaron Raimist
5b69a1a5cd Convert CONTRIBUTING.rst to markdown
Signed-off-by: Aaron Raimist <aaron@raim.ist>
2019-05-14 12:57:54 -04:00
Aaron Raimist
b46ac91928 Convert README.rst to markdown
Signed-off-by: Aaron Raimist <aaron@raim.ist>
2019-05-14 12:57:48 -04:00
Aaron Raimist
73288e6f2a Convert signing.rst to markdown
Signed-off-by: Aaron Raimist <aaron@raim.ist>
2019-05-14 12:55:48 -04:00
Aaron Raimist
6a72cfd287 Convert olm.rst to markdown
Signed-off-by: Aaron Raimist <aaron@raim.ist>
2019-05-14 12:55:44 -04:00
Aaron Raimist
e273189af3 Convert megolm.rst to markdown
Signed-off-by: Aaron Raimist <aaron@raim.ist>
2019-05-14 12:55:40 -04:00
475 changed files with 48064 additions and 3952 deletions

14
.editorconfig Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
root = true
[*]
charset = utf-8
trim_trailing_whitespace = true
insert_final_newline = true
end_of_line = lf
[*.{c,cpp,h,hh,py,ts,js,java,m}]
indent_style = space
indent_size = 4
[Makefile]
indent_style = tab

16
.gitignore vendored
View file

@ -6,9 +6,20 @@
/olm-*.tgz
/README.html
/tracing/README.html
/python/dist
/javascript/checksums.txt
/javascript/checksums.txt.asc
/javascript/olm_prefix.js
/compile_commands.json
/.clang-format
.ccls-cache/
/python/.eggs
/python/install-temp
/result
# Xcode
build/
.build/
DerivedData/
*.pbxuser
!default.pbxuser
@ -26,4 +37,7 @@ xcuserdata/
*.dSYM.zip
*.dSYM
Pods/
*.xcworkspace
*.xcworkspace
# JetBrains tools
.idea/

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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
default:
image: registry.fedoraproject.org/fedora-minimal:latest
stages:
- build
- test
- trigger
build:lib:
stage: build
tags:
- docker
script:
- microdnf --assumeyes --nodocs install cmake gcc gcc-c++
- cmake . -Bbuild
- cmake --build build
artifacts:
paths:
- build/
test:lib:
stage: test
tags:
- docker
needs:
- build:lib
script:
- microdnf --assumeyes --nodocs install cmake
- pushd build/tests
- ctest .
artifacts:
paths:
- build/tests/Testing/Temporary/
trigger:android:
stage: trigger
trigger:
strategy: depend
include: android/.gitlab-ci.yml
trigger:javascript:
stage: trigger
trigger:
strategy: depend
include: javascript/.gitlab-ci.yml
trigger:python:
stage: trigger
trigger:
strategy: depend
include: python/.gitlab-ci.yml

View file

@ -1,3 +1,211 @@
Changes in `3.2.16 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.16>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.15:
* Fix and modernize the Python packaging (thanks to Alfred Wingate)
Changes in `3.2.15 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.15>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.14:
* Improvements to Python packaging
* No longer depend on ``future`` since Python 2 is no longer supported.
* Improve compatibility with tox 4.
* Add support for making standalone sdist.
* Improvements to Nix flake (Thanks to Jon Ringer)
* Improve structure.
* Enable Darwin builds.
* Typescript type fix.
Changes in `3.2.14 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.14>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.13:
* TypeScript type improvements.
* Improvements to Python packaging
* Documentation improvements.
Changes in `3.2.13 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.13>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.12:
* Fix compilation with newer versions of emscripten.
* The npm package is compiled with emscripten 3.1.17 to fix compatibility with
node 18.
* Add py.typed to Python wheels.
* Some documentation fixes and updates.
* Improve the pkgconfig file.
Changes in `3.2.12 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.12>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.11:
* Expose olm_sas_calculate_mac_fixed_base64 in the bindings.
* Allow memory to grow in wasm. Thanks to benkuly for the suggestion.
* Fix Python type hints.
* Some Python build fixes.
* Initial work on a Nix flake for building and testing.
Changes in `3.2.11 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.11>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.10:
* Fix building documentation. Thanks to Jonas Smedegaard. The documents
written in Markdown are now converted to HTML using Pandoc.
* Add methods for getting unpublished fallback key in Objective-C binding.
* Add public pickle/unpickle methods to Java binding.
* Add wrapper for olm_session_describe to Java binding. Thanks to Alex Baker.
Changes in `3.2.10 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.10>`_
===========================================================================
This release includes no change since 3.2.9, but is created to be able to
publish again the Android library on MavenCentral.
Changes in `3.2.9 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.9>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.8:
* Switch C++ tests to use doctest. Thanks to Nicolas Werner.
* Switch JavaScript tests to use jasmine instead of deprecated jasmine-node.
* Add session describe function to Python binding. Thanks to Tulir Asokan.
Changes in `3.2.8 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.8>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.7:
* Improve handling of olm_session_describe when the buffer is too small.
* Ensure random arrays are blanked in JavaScript bindings.
Changes in `3.2.7 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.7>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.6:
* Fix installation with the Makefile.
* Fix exporting again, so we only export olm symbols.
* Fix WASM build. Thanks to Benjamin Kampmann.
* Add more functions for fallback keys.
Changes in `3.2.6 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.6>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.5:
* Fix building on various platforms when using CMake. Building from the
Makefile still assumes that it is using gcc.
Changes in `3.2.5 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.5>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.4:
* Add functions for getting error codes rather than error strings. Thanks to
Nicolas Werner for the suggestion.
* Only export olm symbols. Thanks to Mohammed Sadiq for the suggestion.
* Improve error handling in unpickle functions.
* Add support for fallback keys to the Objective-C and Android bindings.
Changes in `3.2.4 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.4>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.3:
* Android build fixes.
Changes in `3.2.3 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.3>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.2:
* Add some checks for invalid input and ensure all fields are initialized.
* Include LibreJS license tags. Thanks to Johannes Marbach for the suggestion.
* Support for Swift Package Manager. Thanks to Johannes Marbach.
Changes in `3.2.2 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.2>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.1:
* Fixes in the TypeScript definition file.
* CMake build fixes. Thanks to Gorgurov Alexey.
* Change the JavaScript package name to ``@matrix-org/olm``. Note that
this means that packages will need to change their ``require`` or
``import`` statements to use this new name.
* Include file checksums in the JavaScript package.
* Fix length calculation in fallback key json. Thanks to Tobias Furuholm.
* Add a new function to calculate the correct base64 encoding for SAS.
(Currently only available in the C API.)
* Add the ability to specify a pickle key in the Objective-C binding.
* Add pkg-config file on Unix-like systems.
Changes in `3.2.1 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.1>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.2.0:
* Fixes in the TypeScript definition file.
Changes in `3.2.0 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.2.0>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.1.5:
* Add support for fallback keys (MSC2732).
* Allow some arguments in the JavaScript bindings to be either Uint8Array or
strings.
* Fixes to the TypeScript definition file.
* Improvements to the JavaScript group demo. Thanks to Saúl Ibarra Corretgé.
* Ensure that the other party's public key has been set in SAS module. Thanks
to Saúl Ibarra Corretgé.
* Fix building with newer versions of emscripten, and simplify makefile. Thanks
to Lukas Lihotzki.
* Reduce pollution of the global namespace in the Javascript binding. Thanks to
Lukas Lihotzki.
Changes in `3.1.5 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.1.5>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.1.4:
* Build improvements:
* Fix CMake handling when installing in a non-standard location. Thanks to
Alexey Rusakov.
* Add support in the Makefile for creating a WASM-ready archive. Thanks to
stoically.
* Improve support for LLVM is Makefile. Thanks to caywin25 for reporting.
* Add a TypeScript definition file.
* Some documentation and example fixes.
* Add list of bindings to the README.
Changes in `3.1.4 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.1.4>`_
=========================================================================
This release includes the following changes since 3.1.3:
* Build improvements:
* Install headers in the system-configured include directory with CMake.
* Overwrite symbolic links when installing with make.
* Improve compatibility with more emscripten versions.
* Don't use hypothesis in Python unit tests.
* Some documentation improvements.
Changes in `3.1.3 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.1.3>`_
=========================================================================
This release fixes unicode issues in the Python bindings, and adds some
clarifications to the documentation.
Changes in `3.1.2 <https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/tags/3.1.2>`_
=========================================================================

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.4)
project(olm VERSION 3.1.2 LANGUAGES CXX C)
project(olm VERSION 3.2.16 LANGUAGES CXX C)
option(OLM_TESTS "Build tests" ON)
option(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS "Build as a shared library" ON)
@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ if(NOT CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE)
set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE Release)
endif()
set(CMAKE_C_VISIBILITY_PRESET hidden)
set(CMAKE_CXX_VISIBILITY_PRESET hidden)
set(CMAKE_VISIBILITY_INLINES_HIDDEN 1)
add_library(olm
src/account.cpp
src/base64.cpp
@ -48,10 +52,15 @@ add_library(olm
lib/curve25519-donna/curve25519-donna.c)
add_library(Olm::Olm ALIAS olm)
# restrict the exported symbols
include(GenerateExportHeader)
generate_export_header(olm
EXPORT_FILE_NAME ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/olm_export.h)
target_include_directories(olm
PUBLIC
$<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include>
$<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include>
$<BUILD_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include>
$<INSTALL_INTERFACE:${CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR}>
PRIVATE
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/lib)
@ -60,30 +69,44 @@ set_target_properties(olm PROPERTIES
VERSION ${PROJECT_VERSION})
set_target_properties(olm PROPERTIES
ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}
LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR})
ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}
LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}
RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR})
include(GNUInstallDirs)
# Make a pkg-config file
configure_file(${PROJECT_NAME}.pc.in ${PROJECT_NAME}.pc @ONLY NEWLINE_STYLE UNIX)
#
# Installation
#
include(GNUInstallDirs)
set(INSTALL_CONFIGDIR ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}/cmake/Olm)
install(TARGETS olm
EXPORT olm-targets
LIBRARY DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
ARCHIVE DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR})
ARCHIVE DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
INCLUDES DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR}
)
# The exported target will be named Olm.
set_target_properties(olm PROPERTIES EXPORT_NAME Olm)
install(FILES
${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/olm.h
${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/outbound_group_session.h
${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/inbound_group_session.h
${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/pk.h
${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/sas.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/olm.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/olm_export.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/outbound_group_session.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/inbound_group_session.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/pk.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/sas.h
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/olm/error.h
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR}/olm)
if (UNIX AND NOT APPLE)
install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PROJECT_NAME}.pc
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}/pkgconfig
)
endif ()
# Export the targets to a script.
install(EXPORT olm-targets
FILE OlmTargets.cmake

View file

@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
Contributing code to libolm
===========================
# Contributing code to libolm
To contribute code to this library, the preferred way is to clone the git
repository, create a git patch series (for example via ``git
@ -8,18 +7,16 @@ format-patch --stdout origin/master``), and send this by email to
Naturally, you must be willing to license your contributions under the same
license as the project itself - in this case, Apache Software License v2 (see
`<LICENSE>`_).
[LICENSE](LICENSE)).
Sign off
--------
## Sign off
In order to have a concrete record that your contribution is intentional and
you agree to license it under the same terms as the project's license, we've
adopted the same lightweight approach that the
`Linux Kernel <https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/SubmittingPatches>`_,
`Docker <https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md>`_,
and many other projects use: the DCO
(`Developer Certificate of Origin <http://developercertificate.org/>`_).
[Linux Kernel](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#sign-your-work-the-developer-s-certificate-of-origin),
[Docker](https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md),
and many other projects use: the DCO ([Developer Certificate of Origin](http://developercertificate.org/)).
This is a simple declaration that you wrote the contribution or otherwise have
the right to contribute it to Matrix::

214
Makefile
View file

@ -4,14 +4,12 @@ include common.mk
VERSION := $(MAJOR).$(MINOR).$(PATCH)
PREFIX ?= /usr/local
BUILD_DIR := build
RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -g -O3
DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -g -O0
RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -O3
DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -g -O0 -U_FORTIFY_SOURCE
JS_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -O3
FUZZING_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -O3
CC = gcc
FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS ?= -O3
EMCC = emcc
AFL_CC = afl-gcc
AFL_CXX = afl-g++
EMAR = emar
AR = ar
UNAME := $(shell uname)
@ -29,29 +27,36 @@ STATIC_RELEASE_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/libolm.a
DEBUG_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION)
JS_WASM_TARGET := javascript/olm.js
JS_ASMJS_TARGET := javascript/olm_legacy.js
WASM_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/wasm/libolm.a
JS_EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS := javascript/exported_functions.json
JS_EXTRA_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS := ALLOC_STACK
JS_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS := [ALLOC_STACK,writeAsciiToMemory,intArrayFromString,UTF8ToString,stringToUTF8]
JS_EXTERNS := javascript/externs.js
PUBLIC_HEADERS := include/olm/olm.h include/olm/outbound_group_session.h include/olm/inbound_group_session.h include/olm/pk.h include/olm/sas.h
PUBLIC_HEADERS := include/olm/olm.h include/olm/outbound_group_session.h include/olm/inbound_group_session.h include/olm/pk.h include/olm/sas.h include/olm/error.h include/olm/olm_export.h
SOURCES := $(wildcard src/*.cpp) $(wildcard src/*.c) \
lib/crypto-algorithms/sha256.c \
lib/crypto-algorithms/aes.c \
lib/curve25519-donna/curve25519-donna.c
FUZZER_SOURCES := $(wildcard fuzzers/fuzz_*.cpp) $(wildcard fuzzers/fuzz_*.c)
FUZZER_SOURCES := $(wildcard fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_*.cpp) $(wildcard fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_*.c)
TEST_SOURCES := $(wildcard tests/test_*.cpp) $(wildcard tests/test_*.c)
OBJECTS := $(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(patsubst %.cpp,%.o,$(SOURCES)))
RELEASE_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/release/,$(OBJECTS))
DEBUG_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/debug/,$(OBJECTS))
FUZZER_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/,$(OBJECTS))
FUZZER_BINARIES := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/,$(basename $(FUZZER_SOURCES)))
FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/,$(addprefix asan_,$(OBJECTS)))
FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/,$(addprefix msan_,$(OBJECTS)))
FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/,$(addprefix debug_,$(OBJECTS)))
FUZZER_BINARIES := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/,$(basename $(notdir $(FUZZER_SOURCES))))
FUZZER_ASAN_BINARIES := $(addsuffix _asan,$(FUZZER_BINARIES))
FUZZER_MSAN_BINARIES := $(addsuffix _msan,$(FUZZER_BINARIES))
FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES := $(patsubst $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%,$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/debug_%,$(FUZZER_BINARIES))
TEST_BINARIES := $(patsubst tests/%,$(BUILD_DIR)/tests/%,$(basename $(TEST_SOURCES)))
JS_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/javascript/,$(OBJECTS))
WASM_OBJECTS := $(addprefix $(BUILD_DIR)/wasm/,$(OBJECTS))
# pre & post are the js-pre/js-post options to emcc.
# They are injected inside the modularised code and
@ -81,11 +86,14 @@ CPPFLAGS += -Iinclude -Ilib \
-DOLMLIB_VERSION_PATCH=$(PATCH)
# we rely on <stdint.h>, which was introduced in C99
CFLAGS += -Wall -Werror -std=c99 -fPIC
CXXFLAGS += -Wall -Werror -std=c++11 -fPIC
CFLAGS += -Wall -Werror -std=c99
CXXFLAGS += -Wall -Werror -std=c++11
LDFLAGS += -Wall -Werror
EMCCFLAGS = --closure 1 --memory-init-file 0 -s NO_FILESYSTEM=1 -s INVOKE_RUN=0 -s MODULARIZE=1
CFLAGS_NATIVE = -fPIC
CXXFLAGS_NATIVE = -fPIC
EMCCFLAGS = --closure 1 --memory-init-file 0 -s NO_FILESYSTEM=1 -s INVOKE_RUN=0 -s MODULARIZE=1 -Wno-error=closure
# Olm generally doesn't need a lot of memory to encrypt / decrypt its usual
# payloads (ie. Matrix messages), but we do need about 128K of heap to encrypt
@ -95,41 +103,63 @@ EMCCFLAGS = --closure 1 --memory-init-file 0 -s NO_FILESYSTEM=1 -s INVOKE_RUN=0
# (This can't be changed by the app with wasm since it's baked into the wasm).
# (emscripten also mandates at least 16MB of memory for asm.js now, so
# we don't use this for the legacy build.)
EMCCFLAGS_WASM += -s TOTAL_STACK=65536 -s TOTAL_MEMORY=262144
EMCCFLAGS_WASM += -s TOTAL_STACK=65536 -s TOTAL_MEMORY=262144 -s ALLOW_MEMORY_GROWTH
EMCCFLAGS_ASMJS += -s WASM=0
EMCC.c = $(EMCC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
EMCC.cc = $(EMCC) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
EMCC.c = $(EMCC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c -DNDEBUG -DOLM_STATIC_DEFINE=1
EMCC.cc = $(EMCC) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c -DNDEBUG -DOLM_STATIC_DEFINE=1
EMCC_LINK = $(EMCC) $(LDFLAGS) $(EMCCFLAGS)
AFL_CC = afl-clang-fast
AFL_CXX = afl-clang-fast++
AFL.c = $(AFL_CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
AFL.cc = $(AFL_CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
AFL_LINK.c = $(AFL_CC) $(LDFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)
AFL_LINK.cc = $(AFL_CXX) $(LDFLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)
AFL_ASAN.c = AFL_USE_ASAN=1 $(AFL_CC) -m32 $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
AFL_ASAN.cc = AFL_USE_ASAN=1 $(AFL_CXX) -m32 $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
AFL_LINK_ASAN.c = AFL_USE_ASAN=1 $(AFL_CC) -m32 $(LDFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)
AFL_LINK_ASAN.cc = AFL_USE_ASAN=1 $(AFL_CXX) -m32 $(LDFLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)
AFL_MSAN.c = AFL_USE_MSAN=1 $(AFL_CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
AFL_MSAN.cc = AFL_USE_MSAN=1 $(AFL_CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c
AFL_LINK_MSAN.c = AFL_USE_MSAN=1 $(AFL_CC) $(LDFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)
AFL_LINK_MSAN.cc = AFL_USE_MSAN=1 $(AFL_CXX) $(LDFLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)
# generate .d files when compiling
CPPFLAGS += -MMD
### per-target variables
$(RELEASE_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(RELEASE_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(RELEASE_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS_NATIVE)
$(RELEASE_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS_NATIVE)
$(RELEASE_TARGET): LDFLAGS += $(RELEASE_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(DEBUG_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(DEBUG_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(DEBUG_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS_NATIVE)
$(DEBUG_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS_NATIVE)
$(DEBUG_TARGET): LDFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(TEST_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Itests/include
$(TEST_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -L$(BUILD_DIR)
$(FUZZER_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(FUZZER_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(FUZZER_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Ifuzzers/include
$(FUZZER_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -L$(BUILD_DIR)
$(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Ifuzzers/include
$(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(FUZZER_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS_NATIVE) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS_NATIVE) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -D OLM_FUZZING=1
$(FUZZER_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Ifuzzing/fuzzers/include
$(FUZZER_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -L$(BUILD_DIR) -lstdc++
$(FUZZER_ASAN_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Ifuzzing/fuzzers/include
$(FUZZER_ASAN_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -L$(BUILD_DIR) -lstdc++
$(FUZZER_MSAN_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Ifuzzing/fuzzers/include
$(FUZZER_MSAN_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(FUZZER_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -L$(BUILD_DIR) -lstdc++
$(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES): CPPFLAGS += -Ifuzzing/fuzzers/include
$(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES): LDFLAGS += $(DEBUG_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS) -lstdc++
$(JS_OBJECTS): CFLAGS += $(JS_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
$(JS_OBJECTS): CXXFLAGS += $(JS_OPTIMIZE_FLAGS)
@ -155,6 +185,12 @@ lib: $(RELEASE_TARGET)
.PHONY: lib
$(RELEASE_TARGET): $(RELEASE_OBJECTS)
@echo
@echo '****************************************************************************'
@echo '* WARNING: Building olm with make is deprecated. Please use cmake instead. *'
@echo '****************************************************************************'
@echo
$(CXX) $(LDFLAGS) --shared -fPIC \
$(OLM_LDFLAGS) \
$(OUTPUT_OPTION) $(RELEASE_OBJECTS)
@ -179,32 +215,39 @@ $(STATIC_RELEASE_TARGET): $(RELEASE_OBJECTS)
js: $(JS_WASM_TARGET) $(JS_ASMJS_TARGET)
.PHONY: js
wasm: $(WASM_TARGET)
.PHONY: wasm
$(WASM_TARGET): $(WASM_OBJECTS)
$(EMAR) rcs $@ $^
javascript/olm_prefix.js: javascript/olm_prefix.js.in Makefile common.mk
sed s/@VERSION@/$(VERSION)/ javascript/olm_prefix.js.in > $@
# Note that the output file we give to emcc determines the name of the
# wasm file baked into the js, hence messing around outputting to olm.js
# and then renaming it.
$(JS_WASM_TARGET): $(JS_OBJECTS) $(JS_PRE) $(JS_POST) $(JS_EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS) $(JS_PREFIX) $(JS_SUFFIX)
EMCC_CLOSURE_ARGS="--externs $(JS_EXTERNS)" $(EMCC_LINK) \
EMCC_CLOSURE_ARGS="--externs $(CURDIR)/$(JS_EXTERNS)" $(EMCC_LINK) \
$(EMCCFLAGS_WASM) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_PRE),--pre-js $(f)) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_POST),--post-js $(f)) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_PREFIX),--extern-pre-js $(f)) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_SUFFIX),--extern-post-js $(f)) \
-s "EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS=@$(JS_EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS)" \
-s "EXTRA_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS=$(JS_EXTRA_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS)" \
$(JS_OBJECTS) -o $@
mv $@ javascript/olmtmp.js
cat $(JS_PREFIX) javascript/olmtmp.js $(JS_SUFFIX) > $@
rm javascript/olmtmp.js
-s "EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS=$(JS_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS)" \
-o $@ $(JS_OBJECTS)
$(JS_ASMJS_TARGET): $(JS_OBJECTS) $(JS_PRE) $(JS_POST) $(JS_EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS) $(JS_PREFIX) $(JS_SUFFIX)
EMCC_CLOSURE_ARGS="--externs $(JS_EXTERNS)" $(EMCC_LINK) \
EMCC_CLOSURE_ARGS="--externs $(CURDIR)/$(JS_EXTERNS)" $(EMCC_LINK) \
$(EMCCFLAGS_ASMJS) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_PRE),--pre-js $(f)) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_POST),--post-js $(f)) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_PREFIX),--extern-pre-js $(f)) \
$(foreach f,$(JS_SUFFIX),--extern-post-js $(f)) \
-s "EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS=@$(JS_EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS)" \
-s "EXTRA_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS=$(JS_EXTRA_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS)" \
$(JS_OBJECTS) -o $@
mv $@ javascript/olmtmp.js
cat $(JS_PREFIX) javascript/olmtmp.js $(JS_SUFFIX) > $@
rm javascript/olmtmp.js
-s "EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS=$(JS_EXPORTED_RUNTIME_METHODS)" \
-o $@ $(JS_OBJECTS)
build_tests: $(TEST_BINARIES)
@ -214,7 +257,13 @@ test: build_tests
$$i || exit $$?; \
done
fuzzers: $(FUZZER_BINARIES) $(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES)
test_mem: build_tests
for i in $(TEST_BINARIES); do \
echo $$i; \
valgrind -q --leak-check=yes --exit-on-first-error=yes --error-exitcode=1 $$i || exit $$?; \
done
fuzzers: $(FUZZER_BINARIES) $(FUZZER_ASAN_BINARIES) $(FUZZER_MSAN_BINARIES) $(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES)
.PHONY: fuzzers
$(JS_EXPORTED_FUNCTIONS): $(PUBLIC_HEADERS)
@ -226,21 +275,21 @@ all: test js lib debug doc
install-headers: $(PUBLIC_HEADERS)
test -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/include/olm || $(call mkdir,$(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/include/olm)
install -Dm644 $(PUBLIC_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/include/olm/
install $(PUBLIC_HEADERS) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/include/olm/
.PHONY: install-headers
install-debug: debug install-headers
test -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib || $(call mkdir,$(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib)
install -Dm755 $(DEBUG_TARGET) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION)
ln -s libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm_debug.$(SO).$(MAJOR)
ln -s libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm_debug.$(SO)
install $(DEBUG_TARGET) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION)
ln -sf libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm_debug.$(SO).$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libolm_debug.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm_debug.$(SO)
.PHONY: install-debug
install: lib install-headers
test -d $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib || $(call mkdir,$(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib)
install -Dm755 $(RELEASE_TARGET) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm.$(SO).$(VERSION)
ln -s libolm.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm.$(SO).$(MAJOR)
ln -s libolm.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm.$(SO)
install $(RELEASE_TARGET) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm.$(SO).$(VERSION)
ln -sf libolm.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm.$(SO).$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libolm.$(SO).$(VERSION) $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/lib/libolm.$(SO)
.PHONY: install
clean:;
@ -275,13 +324,21 @@ $(BUILD_DIR)/javascript/%.o: %.cpp
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(EMCC.cc) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/wasm/%.o: %.c
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(EMCC.c) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/wasm/%.o: %.cpp
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(EMCC.cc) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/tests/%: tests/%.c $(DEBUG_OBJECTS)
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(LINK.c) $< $(DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
$(LINK.c) -o $@ $< $(DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/tests/%: tests/%.cpp $(DEBUG_OBJECTS)
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(LINK.cc) $< $(DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
$(LINK.cc) -o $@ $< $(DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/%.o: %.c
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
@ -291,21 +348,61 @@ $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/%.o: %.cpp
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(AFL.cc) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%: fuzzers/fuzz_%.c $(FUZZER_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK.c) $< $(FUZZER_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/asan_%.o: %.c
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(AFL_ASAN.c) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%: fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(FUZZER_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK.cc) $< $(FUZZER_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/asan_%.o: %.cpp
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(AFL_ASAN.cc) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/debug_%: fuzzers/fuzz_%.c $(DEBUG_OBJECTS)
$(LINK.c) $< $(DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/msan_%.o: %.c
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(AFL_MSAN.c) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/debug_%: fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(DEBUG_OBJECTS)
$(LINK.cc) $< $(DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS) -o $@
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/msan_%.o: %.cpp
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(AFL_MSAN.cc) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/debug_%.o: %.c
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(COMPILE.c) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/objects/debug_%.o: %.cpp
$(call mkdir,$(dir $@))
$(COMPILE.cc) $(OUTPUT_OPTION) $<
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.c $(FUZZER_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK.c) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(FUZZER_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK.cc) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/debug_%: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.c $(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS)
$(LINK.c) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/debug_%: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS)
$(LINK.cc) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%_asan: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.c $(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK_ASAN.c) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%_asan: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK_ASAN.cc) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%_msan: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.c $(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK_MSAN.c) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
$(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/fuzz_%_msan: fuzzing/fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS)
$(AFL_LINK_MSAN.cc) -o $@ $< $(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS) $(LOADLIBES) $(LDLIBS)
%.html: %.rst
rst2html $< $@
%.html: %.md
pandoc --from markdown --to html5 --standalone --lua-filter gitlab-math.lua --katex -o $@ $<
### dependencies
-include $(RELEASE_OBJECTS:.o=.d)
@ -313,5 +410,10 @@ $(BUILD_DIR)/fuzzers/debug_%: fuzzers/fuzz_%.cpp $(DEBUG_OBJECTS)
-include $(JS_OBJECTS:.o=.d)
-include $(TEST_BINARIES:=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_OBJECTS:.o=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_DEBUG_OBJECTS:.o=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_ASAN_OBJECTS:.o=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_MSAN_OBJECTS:.o=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_BINARIES:=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_ASAN_BINARIES:=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_MSAN_BINARIES:=.d)
-include $(FUZZER_DEBUG_BINARIES:=.d)

View file

@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ Pod::Spec.new do |s|
# The libolm version
MAJOR = 3
MINOR = 1
PATCH = 2
MINOR = 2
PATCH = 16
s.name = "OLMKit"
s.version = "#{MAJOR}.#{MINOR}.#{PATCH}"

52
Package.swift Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
// swift-tools-version:5.3
import PackageDescription
let major = 3, minor = 2, patch = 16
let package = Package(
name: "Olm",
platforms: [.iOS(.v8), .macOS(.v10_10)],
products: [
.library(name: "libolm", targets: ["libolm"]),
.library(name: "OLMKit", targets: ["OLMKit"])
],
targets: [
.target(
name: "libolm",
path: ".",
sources: [
"src",
"lib/crypto-algorithms/aes.c",
"lib/crypto-algorithms/sha256.c",
"lib/curve25519-donna/curve25519-donna.c"
],
cSettings: [
.headerSearchPath("lib"),
.define("OLMLIB_VERSION_MAJOR", to: "\(major)"),
.define("OLMLIB_VERSION_MINOR", to: "\(minor)"),
.define("OLMLIB_VERSION_PATCH", to: "\(patch)")
]
),
.target(
name: "OLMKit",
dependencies: ["libolm"],
path: "xcode/OLMKit",
exclude: ["Info.plist"],
cSettings: [
.headerSearchPath("..")
]
),
.testTarget(
name: "OLMKitTests",
dependencies: ["OLMKit"],
path: "xcode/OLMKitTests",
exclude: ["Info.plist"],
cSettings: [
.headerSearchPath("..")
]
)
],
cLanguageStandard: .c99,
cxxLanguageStandard: .cxx11
)

328
README.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
# Olm
An implementation of the Double Ratchet cryptographic ratchet described by
https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/, written in C and
C++11 and exposed as a C API.
The specification of the Olm ratchet can be found in [docs/olm.md](docs/olm.md).
This library also includes an implementation of the Megolm cryptographic
ratchet, as specified in [docs/megolm.md](docs/megolm.md).
## Installing
### Linux and other Unix-like systems
Your distribution may have pre-compiled packages available. If not, or if you
need a newer version, you will need to compile from source. See the "Building"
section below for more details.
### macOS
The easiest way to install on macOS is via Homebrew. If you do not have
Homebrew installed, follow the instructions at https://brew.sh/ to install it.
You can then install libolm by running
```bash
brew install libolm
```
If you also need the Python packages, you can run
```bash
pip3 install python-olm --global-option="build_ext" --global-option="--include-dirs="`brew --prefix libolm`"/include" --global-option="--library-dirs="`brew --prefix libolm`"/lib"
```
Note that this will install an older version of the Python bindings, which may
be missing some functions. If you need the latest version, you will need to
build from source.
### Windows
You will need to build from source. See the "Building" section below for more
details.
### Bindings
#### JavaScript
You can use pre-built npm packages, available at
<https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/-/packages?type=npm>.
#### Python
A Python source package and pre-built packages for certain architectures from
<https://pypi.org/project/python-olm/>. If a pre-built package is not
available for your architecture, you will need:
- cmake (recommended) or GNU make
- a C/C++ compiler
to build the source package.
You can then run `pip install python-olm`.
Currently, we try to provide packages for all supported versions of Python on
x86-64, i686, and aarch64, but we cannot guarantee that packages for all
versions will be available on all architectures.
#### Android
Pre-built Android bindings are available at
<https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/-/packages?type=Maven>.
## Building
To build olm as a shared library run:
```bash
cmake . -Bbuild
cmake --build build
```
To run the tests, run:
```bash
cd build/tests
ctest .
```
To build olm as a static library (which still needs libstdc++ dynamically) run:
```bash
cmake . -Bbuild -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=NO
cmake --build build
```
The library can also be used as a dependency with CMake using:
```cmake
find_package(Olm::Olm REQUIRED)
target_link_libraries(my_exe Olm::Olm)
```
### Bindings
#### JavaScript
The recommended way to build the JavaScript bindings is using
[Nix](https://nixos.org/). With Nix, you can run
```bash
nix build .\#javascript
```
to build the bindings.
If you do not have Nix you can, install emscripten from https://emscripten.org/
and then run:
```bash
make js
```
Emscripten can also be run via Docker, in which case, you need to pass through
the EMCC_CLOSURE_ARGS environment variable.
#### Android
To build the android project for Android bindings, run:
```bash
cd android
./gradlew clean build
```
#### Objective-C
To build the Xcode workspace for Objective-C bindings, run:
```bash
cd xcode
pod install
open OLMKit.xcworkspace
```
#### Python
To build the Python 3 bindings, first build olm as a library as above, and
then run:
```bash
cd python
make
```
### Using make instead of cmake
**WARNING:** Using cmake is the preferred method for building the olm library;
the Makefile may be removed in the future or have functionality removed. In
addition, the Makefile may make certain assumptions about your system and is
not as well tested.
To build olm as a dynamic library, run:
```bash
make
```
To run the tests, run:
```bash
make test
```
To build olm as a static library, run:
```bash
make static
```
## Bindings
libolm can be used in different environments using bindings. In addition to the
JavaScript, Python, Java (Android), and Objective-C bindings included in this
repository, some bindings are (in alphabetical order):
- [cl-megolm](https://github.com/K1D77A/cl-megolm) (MIT) Common Lisp bindings
- [dart-olm](https://gitlab.com/famedly/company/frontend/libraries/dart-olm) (AGPLv3) Dart bindings
- [Dhole/go-olm](https://github.com/Dhole/go-olm) (Apache-2.0) Go bindings
- [jOlm](https://github.com/brevilo/jolm) (Apache-2.0) Java bindings
- [libQtOlm](https://gitlab.com/b0/libqtolm/) (GPLv3) Qt bindings
- [matrix-kt](https://github.com/Dominaezzz/matrix-kt) (Apache-2.0) Kotlin
library for Matrix, including Olm methods
- [maunium.net/go/mautrix/crypto/olm](https://github.com/tulir/mautrix-go/tree/master/crypto/olm)
(Apache-2.0) fork of Dhole/go-olm
- [nim-olm](https://codeberg.org/BarrOff/nim-olm) (MIT) Nim bindings
- [olm-sys](https://gitlab.gnome.org/BrainBlasted/olm-sys) (Apache-2.0) Rust
bindings
- [Trixnity](https://gitlab.com/trixnity/trixnity) (Apache-2.0) Kotlin SDK for
Matrix, including Olm bindings
Note that bindings may have a different license from libolm, and are *not*
endorsed by the Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
## Release process
First: bump version numbers in ``common.mk``, ``CMakeLists.txt``,
``javascript/package.json``, ``python/pyproject.toml``, ``OLMKit.podspec``,
``Package.swift``, and ``android/gradle.properties``.
Also, ensure the changelog is up to date, and that everything is committed to
git.
It's probably sensible to do the above on a release branch (``release-vx.y.z``
by convention), and merge back to master once the release is complete.
```bash
make clean
# build and test C library
make test
# build and test JS wrapper
make js
(cd javascript && \
npm run test && \
sha256sum olm.js olm_legacy.js olm.wasm > checksums.txt && \
gpg -b -a -u F75FDC22C1DE8453 checksums.txt && \
npm publish)
VERSION=x.y.z
git tag $VERSION -s
git push --tags
# OLMKit CocoaPod release
# Make sure the version OLMKit.podspec is the same as the git tag
# (this must be checked before git tagging)
pod spec lint OLMKit.podspec --use-libraries --allow-warnings
pod trunk push OLMKit.podspec --use-libraries --allow-warnings
# Check the pod has been successully published with:
pod search OLMKit
```
Python and JavaScript packages are published to the registry at
<https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/-/packages>. The GitLab
documentation contains instructions on how to set up twine (Python) and npm
(JavaScript) to upload to the registry.
To publish the Android library to MavenCentral (you will need some secrets), in the /android folder:
- Run the command `./gradlew clean build publish --no-daemon --no-parallel --stacktrace`. The generated AAR must be approx 500 kb.
- Connect to https://s01.oss.sonatype.org
- Click on Staging Repositories and check the the files have been uploaded
- Click on close
- Wait (check Activity tab until step "Repository closed" is displayed)
- Click on release. The staging repository will disappear
- Check that the release is available in https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/matrix/android/olm-sdk/ (it can take a few minutes)
## Design
Olm is designed to be easy port to different platforms and to be easy
to write bindings for.
It was originally implemented in C++, with a plain-C layer providing the public
API. As development has progressed, it has become clear that C++ gives little
advantage, and new functionality is being added in C, with C++ parts being
rewritten as the need ariases.
### Error Handling
All C functions in the API for olm return ``olm_error()`` on error.
This makes it easy to check for error conditions within the language bindings.
### Random Numbers
Olm doesn't generate random numbers itself. Instead the caller must
provide the random data. This makes it easier to port the library to different
platforms since the caller can use whatever cryptographic random number
generator their platform provides.
### Memory
Olm avoids calling malloc or allocating memory on the heap itself.
Instead the library calculates how much memory will be needed to hold the
output and the caller supplies a buffer of the appropriate size.
### Output Encoding
Binary output is encoded as base64 so that languages that prefer unicode
strings will find it easier to handle the output.
### Dependencies
Olm uses pure C implementations of the cryptographic primitives used by
the ratchet. While this decreases the performance it makes it much easier
to compile the library for different architectures.
## Contributing
Please see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) when making contributions to the library.
## Security assessment
Olm 1.3.0 was independently assessed by NCC Group's Cryptography Services
Practive in September 2016 to check for security issues: you can read all
about it at
https://www.nccgroup.com/globalassets/our-research/us/public-reports/2016/november/ncc_group_olm_cryptogrpahic_review_2016_11_01.pdf
and https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last/
## Security issues
If you think you found a security issue in libolm, any of its bindings or the Olm/Megolm protocols, please follow our [Security Disclosure Policy](https://matrix.org/security-disclosure-policy/) to report.
## Bug reports
For non-sensitive bugs, please file bug reports at https://github.com/matrix-org/olm/issues.
## What's an olm?
It's a really cool species of European troglodytic salamander.
http://www.postojnska-jama.eu/en/come-and-visit-us/vivarium-proteus/
## Legal Notice
The software may be subject to the U.S. export control laws and regulations
and by downloading the software the user certifies that he/she/it is
authorized to do so in accordance with those export control laws and
regulations.

View file

@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
Olm
===
An implementation of the Double Ratchet cryptographic ratchet described by
https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/, written in C and
C++11 and exposed as a C API.
The specification of the Olm ratchet can be found in `<docs/olm.rst>`_.
This library also includes an implementation of the Megolm cryptographic
ratchet, as specified in `<docs/megolm.rst>`_.
Building
--------
To build olm as a shared library run either:
.. code:: bash
cmake . -Bbuild
cmake --build build
or:
.. code:: bash
make
Using cmake is the preferred method for building the shared library; the
Makefile may be removed in the future.
To run the tests when using cmake, run:
.. code:: bash
cd build/tests
ctest .
To run the tests when using make, run:
.. code:: bash
make test
To build the JavaScript bindings, install emscripten from http://kripken.github.io/emscripten-site/ and then run:
.. code:: bash
make js
Note that if you run emscripten in a docker container, you need to pass through
the EMCC_CLOSURE_ARGS environment variable.
To build the android project for Android bindings, run:
.. code:: bash
cd android
./gradlew clean assembleRelease
To build the Xcode workspace for Objective-C bindings, run:
.. code:: bash
cd xcode
pod install
open OLMKit.xcworkspace
To build the Python bindings, first build olm as a shared library as above, and
then run:
.. code:: bash
cd python
make
to make both the Python 2 and Python 3 bindings. To make only one version, use
``make olm-python2`` or ``make olm-python3`` instead of just ``make``.
To build olm as a static library (which still needs libstdc++ dynamically) run
either:
.. code:: bash
cmake . -Bbuild -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=NO
cmake --build build
or
.. code:: bash
make static
The library can also be used as a dependency with CMake using:
.. code:: cmake
find_package(Olm::Olm REQUIRED)
target_link_libraries(my_exe Olm::Olm)
Release process
---------------
First: bump version numbers in ``common.mk``, ``CMakeLists.txt``,
``javascript/package.json``, ``python/olm/__version__.py``, ``OLMKit.podspec``,
and ``android/olm-sdk/build.gradle`` (``versionCode``, ``versionName`` and
``version``).
Also, ensure the changelog is up to date, and that everyting is committed to
git.
It's probably sensible to do the above on a release branch (``release-vx.y.z``
by convention), and merge back to master once the release is complete.
.. code:: bash
make clean
# build and test C library
make test
# build and test JS wrapper
make js
(cd javascript && npm run test)
npm pack javascript
VERSION=x.y.z
scp olm-$VERSION.tgz packages@ares.matrix.org:packages/npm/olm/
git tag $VERSION -s
git push --tags
# OLMKit CocoaPod release
# Make sure the version OLMKit.podspec is the same as the git tag
# (this must be checked before git tagging)
pod spec lint OLMKit.podspec --use-libraries --allow-warnings
pod trunk push OLMKit.podspec --use-libraries --allow-warnings
# Check the pod has been successully published with:
pod search OLMKit
Design
------
Olm is designed to be easy port to different platforms and to be easy
to write bindings for.
It was originally implemented in C++, with a plain-C layer providing the public
API. As development has progressed, it has become clear that C++ gives little
advantage, and new functionality is being added in C, with C++ parts being
rewritten as the need ariases.
Error Handling
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
All C functions in the API for olm return ``olm_error()`` on error.
This makes it easy to check for error conditions within the language bindings.
Random Numbers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olm doesn't generate random numbers itself. Instead the caller must
provide the random data. This makes it easier to port the library to different
platforms since the caller can use whatever cryptographic random number
generator their platform provides.
Memory
~~~~~~
Olm avoids calling malloc or allocating memory on the heap itself.
Instead the library calculates how much memory will be needed to hold the
output and the caller supplies a buffer of the appropriate size.
Output Encoding
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Binary output is encoded as base64 so that languages that prefer unicode
strings will find it easier to handle the output.
Dependencies
~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olm uses pure C implementations of the cryptographic primitives used by
the ratchet. While this decreases the performance it makes it much easier
to compile the library for different architectures.
Contributing
------------
Please see `<CONTRIBUTING.rst>`_ when making contributions to the library.
Security assessment
-------------------
Olm 1.3.0 was independently assessed by NCC Group's Cryptography Services
Practive in September 2016 to check for security issues: you can read all
about it at
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/matrix-olm-cryptographic-review/
and https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last/
Bug reports
-----------
Please file bug reports at https://github.com/matrix-org/olm/issues
What's an olm?
--------------
It's a really cool species of European troglodytic salamander.
http://www.postojnska-jama.eu/en/come-and-visit-us/vivarium-proteus/
Legal Notice
------------
The software may be subject to the U.S. export control laws and regulations
and by downloading the software the user certifies that he/she/it is
authorized to do so in accordance with those export control laws and
regulations.

29
Windows64.cmake Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# Cross-compile for Windows (64-bit) using Mingw-w64
# Build using:
# cmake . -Bbuild -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=Windows64.cmake
# cmake --build build
# from @ticho:cyberdi.sk
# https://paste.debian.net/1201338/
# the name of the target operating system
SET(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME Windows)
# which compilers to use for C and C++
SET(CMAKE_C_COMPILER x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc-posix)
SET(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++-posix)
SET(CMAKE_RC_COMPILER x86_64-w64-mingw32-windres)
# here is the target environment located
SET(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH /usr/x86_64-w64-mingw32)
# adjust the default behaviour of the FIND_XXX() commands:
# search headers and libraries in the target environment, search
# programs in the host environment
set(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH_MODE_PROGRAM NEVER)
set(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH_MODE_LIBRARY ONLY)
set(CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH_MODE_INCLUDE ONLY)
# static-link against the standard libraries
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD_LIBRARIES "-static-libgcc -static-libstdc++")

BIN
android/.DS_Store vendored

Binary file not shown.

46
android/.gitlab-ci.yml Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# TODO: consider replacing this with a smaller image
image: docker.io/inovex/gitlab-ci-android
stages:
- build
- test
variables:
GRADLE_OPTS: "-Dorg.gradle.daemon=false"
before_script:
- export GRADLE_USER_HOME=$(pwd)/.gradle
- export ANDROID_HOME=${ANDROID_SDK_HOME}
- echo "sdk.dir=${ANDROID_SDK_HOME}" > ./android/local.properties
- echo "ndk.dir=${ANDROID_NDK_HOME}" >> ./android/local.properties
- cp -R $ANDROID_SDK_ROOT/licenses ./android/.
- chmod +x ./android/gradlew
cache:
key: ${CI_PROJECT_ID}
paths:
- android/.gradle/
build:android:aar:
stage: build
tags:
- docker
script:
- pushd android
- ./gradlew clean assembleRelease
artifacts:
expire_in: 1 weeks
paths:
- android/olm-sdk/build/outputs/aar/*.aar
- android/local.properties
test:android:aar:
stage: test
tags:
- docker
script:
- pushd android
- ./gradlew assembleAndroidTest
# TODO: Add emulator to run tests
needs:
- build:android:aar

View file

@ -5,25 +5,21 @@ OlmLibSdk exposes an android wrapper to libolm.
Installation
------------
Create a libs directory in your project directory
Copy the olm-sdk.aar into it.
In your build.gradle file, add in the android section::
Android Olm library is released on MavenCentral.
repositories {
flatDir {
dir 'libs'
}
}
Add this dependency to your project:
Add in the dependencies category::
```groovy
implementation "org.matrix.android:olm:3.2.8"
```
compile(name: 'olm-sdk', ext: 'aar')
Latest version: ![Latest version](https://img.shields.io/maven-central/v/org.matrix.android/olm)
Development
-----------
import the project from the ``android/`` path.
The project contains some JNI files and some Java wraper files.
The project contains some JNI files and some Java wrapper files.
The project contains some tests under AndroidTests package.

View file

@ -2,12 +2,14 @@
buildscript {
repositories {
jcenter()
mavenCentral()
google()
}
dependencies {
classpath 'com.android.tools.build:gradle:3.1.3'
// Release notes of Android Gradle Plugin (AGP):
// https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/gradle-plugin
classpath 'com.android.tools.build:gradle:7.0.4'
classpath 'com.vanniktech:gradle-maven-publish-plugin:0.18.0'
// NOTE: Do not place your application dependencies here; they belong
// in the individual module build.gradle files
}
@ -15,9 +17,20 @@ buildscript {
allprojects {
repositories {
jcenter()
mavenCentral()
google()
}
plugins.withId("com.vanniktech.maven.publish.base") {
group = project.getProperties().getOrDefault("GROUP", "0.0.0")
version = project.getProperties().getOrDefault("VERSION_NAME", "name")
mavenPublishing {
publishToMavenCentral("S01")
pomFromGradleProperties()
signAllPublications()
}
}
}
task clean(type: Delete) {

View file

@ -19,4 +19,31 @@
#systemProp.https.proxyHost=batproxy
#systemProp.http.proxyPort=8080
android.useAndroidX=true
org.gradle.configureondemand=false
# Maven publication
# Ref: https://github.com/vanniktech/gradle-maven-publish-plugin
GROUP=org.matrix.android
POM_ARTIFACT_ID=olm
VERSION_NAME=3.2.16
POM_PACKAGING=aar
POM_NAME=Olm Android wrapper
POM_DESCRIPTION=An Android wrapper to libolm.
POM_INCEPTION_YEAR=2021
POM_URL=https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm
POM_LICENSE_NAME=The Apache Software License, Version 2.0
POM_LICENCE_URL=https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txt
POM_LICENCE_DIST=repo
POM_SCM_URL=https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm
POM_SCM_CONNECTION=scm:git:https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm.git
POM_SCM_DEV_CONNECTION=scm:git:ssh://git@gitlab.int.matrix.org:matrix-org/olm.git
POM_DEVELOPER_ID=matrixdev
POM_DEVELOPER_NAME=matrixdev
POM_DEVELOPER_URL=https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org
POM_DEVELOPER_EMAIL=android@element.io

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#Thu Oct 13 09:38:01 CEST 2016
distributionBase=GRADLE_USER_HOME
distributionPath=wrapper/dists
distributionSha256Sum=c9490e938b221daf0094982288e4038deed954a3f12fb54cbf270ddf4e37d879
distributionUrl=https\://services.gradle.org/distributions/gradle-7.3.3-all.zip
zipStoreBase=GRADLE_USER_HOME
zipStorePath=wrapper/dists
distributionUrl=https\://services.gradle.org/distributions/gradle-4.7-all.zip

View file

@ -1,17 +1,26 @@
import org.apache.tools.ant.taskdefs.condition.Os
import com.vanniktech.maven.publish.AndroidLibrary
import com.vanniktech.maven.publish.JavadocJar
apply plugin: 'com.android.library'
apply plugin: "com.vanniktech.maven.publish.base"
android {
compileSdkVersion 28
compileSdk 31
defaultConfig {
minSdkVersion 11
targetSdkVersion 28
versionCode 312
versionName "3.1.2"
version "3.1.2"
testInstrumentationRunner "android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner"
minSdk 14
targetSdk 31
testInstrumentationRunner "androidx.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner"
buildConfigField "String", "OLM_VERSION", "\"${project.getProperties().getOrDefault("VERSION_NAME", "0.0.0")}\""
// The following argument makes the Android Test Orchestrator run its
// "pm clear" command after each test invocation. This command ensures
// that the app's state is completely cleared between tests.
testInstrumentationRunnerArguments clearPackageData: 'true'
buildConfigField "String", "OLM_VERSION", "\"${project.getProperties().getOrDefault("VERSION_NAME", "0.0.0")}\""
}
buildTypes {
debug {
@ -34,7 +43,7 @@ android {
jni.srcDirs = []
}
task buildJavaDoc(type: Javadoc) {
task buildJavaDoc(type: Javadoc) {
source = android.sourceSets.main.java.srcDirs
classpath += project.files(android.getBootClasspath().join(File.pathSeparator))
destinationDir = file("./doc/")
@ -60,14 +69,36 @@ android {
}
tasks.withType(JavaCompile) {
compileTask -> if (compileTask.name.startsWith('compileDebugJava')) {
println 'test compile: Debug'
compileTask.dependsOn ndkBuildNativeDebug
} else if (compileTask.name.startsWith('compileReleaseJava')) {
println 'test compile: Release'
compileTask.dependsOn ndkBuildNativeRelease
compileTask ->
if (compileTask.name.startsWith('compileDebugJava')) {
println 'test compile: Debug'
compileTask.dependsOn ndkBuildNativeDebug
} else if (compileTask.name.startsWith('compileReleaseJava')) {
println 'test compile: Release'
compileTask.dependsOn ndkBuildNativeRelease
}
compileTask.dependsOn buildJavaDoc
}
task androidJavadocs(type: Javadoc) {
source = android.sourceSets.main.java.srcDirs
classpath += project.files(android.getBootClasspath().join(File.pathSeparator))
android.libraryVariants.all { variant ->
if (variant.name == 'release') {
owner.classpath += variant.javaCompileProvider.get().classpath
}
}
compileTask.dependsOn buildJavaDoc
exclude '**/R.html', '**/R.*.html', '**/index.html'
}
task androidJavadocsJar(type: Jar, dependsOn: androidJavadocs) {
archiveClassifier.set('javadoc')
from androidJavadocs.destinationDir
}
task androidSourcesJar(type: Jar) {
archiveClassifier.set('sources')
from android.sourceSets.main.java.srcDirs
}
clean.dependsOn cleanNative
@ -81,6 +112,11 @@ android {
}
}
}
compileOptions {
sourceCompatibility JavaVersion.VERSION_11
targetCompatibility JavaVersion.VERSION_11
}
}
def getNdkFolder() {
@ -117,9 +153,15 @@ def gitRevisionDate() {
}
dependencies {
testImplementation 'junit:junit:4.12'
androidTestImplementation 'junit:junit:4.12'
androidTestImplementation 'com.android.support:support-annotations:28.0.0'
androidTestImplementation 'com.android.support.test:runner:1.0.2'
androidTestImplementation 'com.android.support.test:rules:1.0.2'
testImplementation 'junit:junit:4.13.2'
androidTestImplementation 'junit:junit:4.13.2'
androidTestImplementation 'androidx.test:core:1.4.0'
androidTestImplementation 'androidx.test:runner:1.4.0'
androidTestImplementation 'androidx.test:rules:1.4.0'
androidTestImplementation 'androidx.test.ext:junit:1.1.3'
}
mavenPublishing {
configure(new AndroidLibrary(new JavadocJar.Empty(), false))
}

View file

@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
package org.matrix.olm;
import android.content.Context;
import android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnit4;
import android.text.TextUtils;
import android.util.Log;
import org.json.JSONException;
import org.json.JSONObject;
import androidx.test.core.app.ApplicationProvider;
import androidx.test.ext.junit.runners.AndroidJUnit4;
import org.junit.After;
import org.junit.AfterClass;
import org.junit.Before;
@ -41,11 +41,13 @@ import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.util.Map;
import static android.support.test.InstrumentationRegistry.getInstrumentation;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
@RunWith(AndroidJUnit4.class)
@FixMethodOrder(MethodSorters.NAME_ASCENDING)
@ -59,15 +61,15 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
private final String FILE_NAME = "SerialTestFile";
@BeforeClass
public static void setUpClass(){
public static void setUpClass() {
// load native lib
mOlmManager = new OlmManager();
String olmLibVersion = mOlmManager.getOlmLibVersion();
assertNotNull(olmLibVersion);
String olmSdkVersion = mOlmManager.getDetailedVersion(getInstrumentation().getContext());
String olmSdkVersion = mOlmManager.getDetailedVersion(ApplicationProvider.getApplicationContext());
assertNotNull(olmLibVersion);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## setUpClass(): Versions - Android Olm SDK = "+olmSdkVersion+" Olm lib ="+olmLibVersion);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## setUpClass(): Versions - Android Olm SDK = " + olmSdkVersion + " Olm lib =" + olmLibVersion);
}
@AfterClass
@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
@Before
public void setUp() {
if(mIsAccountCreated) {
if (mIsAccountCreated) {
assertNotNull(mOlmAccount);
}
}
@ -96,12 +98,12 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
mOlmAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("OlmAccount failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmAccount failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mOlmAccount);
mOlmAccount.releaseAccount();
assertTrue(0 == mOlmAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertEquals(0, mOlmAccount.getOlmAccountId());
}
@Test
@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
mOlmAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("OlmAccount failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmAccount failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mOlmAccount);
mIsAccountCreated = true;
@ -119,8 +121,8 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
@Test
public void test04GetOlmAccountId() {
long olmNativeInstance = mOlmAccount.getOlmAccountId();
Log.d(LOG_TAG,"## testGetOlmAccountId olmNativeInstance="+olmNativeInstance);
assertTrue(0!=olmNativeInstance);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## testGetOlmAccountId olmNativeInstance=" + olmNativeInstance);
assertTrue(0 != olmNativeInstance);
}
/**
@ -134,18 +136,18 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
identityKeys = mOlmAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(identityKeys);
Log.d(LOG_TAG,"## testIdentityKeys Keys="+identityKeys);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## testIdentityKeys Keys=" + identityKeys);
// is JSON_KEY_FINGER_PRINT_KEY present?
String fingerPrintKey = TestHelper.getFingerprintKey(identityKeys);
assertTrue("fingerprint key missing",!TextUtils.isEmpty(fingerPrintKey));
assertFalse("fingerprint key missing", TextUtils.isEmpty(fingerPrintKey));
// is JSON_KEY_IDENTITY_KEY present?
String identityKey = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys);
assertTrue("identity key missing",!TextUtils.isEmpty(identityKey));
assertFalse("identity key missing", TextUtils.isEmpty(identityKey));
}
//****************************************************
@ -154,9 +156,9 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
@Test
public void test06MaxOneTimeKeys() {
long maxOneTimeKeys = mOlmAccount.maxOneTimeKeys();
Log.d(LOG_TAG,"## testMaxOneTimeKeys(): maxOneTimeKeys="+maxOneTimeKeys);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## testMaxOneTimeKeys(): maxOneTimeKeys=" + maxOneTimeKeys);
assertTrue(maxOneTimeKeys>0);
assertTrue(maxOneTimeKeys > 0);
}
/**
@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
error = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null == error);
assertNull(error);
}
/**
@ -186,21 +188,21 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
oneTimeKeysJson = mOlmAccount.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(oneTimeKeysJson);
try {
Map<String, String> map = oneTimeKeysJson.get(OlmAccount.JSON_KEY_ONE_TIME_KEY);
assertTrue(OlmAccount.JSON_KEY_ONE_TIME_KEY +" object is missing", null!=map);
assertNotNull(OlmAccount.JSON_KEY_ONE_TIME_KEY + " object is missing", map);
// test the count of the generated one time keys:
oneTimeKeysCount = map.size();
assertTrue("Expected count="+GENERATION_ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER+" found="+oneTimeKeysCount,GENERATION_ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER==oneTimeKeysCount);
assertEquals("Expected count=" + GENERATION_ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER + " found=" + oneTimeKeysCount, GENERATION_ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER, oneTimeKeysCount);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("Exception MSg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception MSg=" + e.getMessage());
}
}
@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
olmSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
long sessionId = olmSession.getOlmSessionId();
assertTrue(0 != sessionId);
@ -222,11 +224,11 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null != errorMessage);
assertNotNull(errorMessage);
olmSession.releaseSession();
sessionId = olmSession.getOlmSessionId();
assertTrue(0 == sessionId);
assertEquals(0, sessionId);
}
@Test
@ -234,19 +236,19 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
mOlmAccount.markOneTimeKeysAsPublished();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
}
@Test
public void test12SignMessage() {
String clearMsg = "String to be signed by olm";
String signedMsg = null;
String signedMsg = null;
try {
signedMsg = mOlmAccount.signMessage(clearMsg);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(signedMsg);
@ -263,18 +265,18 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
FileOutputStream fileOutput;
ObjectOutputStream objectOutput;
OlmAccount accountRef = null;
OlmAccount accountDeserial = null;
OlmAccount accountDeserial;
try {
accountRef = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
try {
accountRef.generateOneTimeKeys(GENERATION_ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// get keys references
@ -283,7 +285,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
identityKeysRef = accountRef.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, Map<String, String>> oneTimeKeysRef = null;
@ -291,14 +293,14 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
oneTimeKeysRef = accountRef.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(identityKeysRef);
assertNotNull(oneTimeKeysRef);
try {
Context context = getInstrumentation().getContext();
Context context = ApplicationProvider.getApplicationContext();
//context.getFilesDir();
fileOutput = context.openFileOutput(FILE_NAME, Context.MODE_PRIVATE);
@ -316,38 +318,34 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
assertNotNull(accountDeserial);
// get de-serialized keys
Map<String, String> identityKeysDeserial = accountDeserial.identityKeys();
Map<String, String> identityKeysDeserial = accountDeserial.identityKeys();
Map<String, Map<String, String>> oneTimeKeysDeserial = accountDeserial.oneTimeKeys();
assertNotNull(identityKeysDeserial);
assertNotNull(oneTimeKeysDeserial);
// compare identity keys
assertTrue(identityKeysDeserial.toString().equals(identityKeysRef.toString()));
assertEquals(identityKeysDeserial.toString(), identityKeysRef.toString());
// compare onetime keys
assertTrue(oneTimeKeysDeserial.toString().equals(oneTimeKeysRef.toString()));
assertEquals(oneTimeKeysDeserial.toString(), oneTimeKeysRef.toString());
accountRef.releaseAccount();
accountDeserial.releaseAccount();
}
catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test13Serialization(): Exception FileNotFoundException Msg=="+e.getMessage());
assertTrue("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
}
catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test13Serialization(): Exception FileNotFoundException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
fail("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage());
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test13Serialization(): Exception ClassNotFoundException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
}
catch (IOException e) {
fail("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage());
} catch (IOException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test13Serialization(): Exception IOException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage());
}
/*catch (OlmException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test13Serialization(): Exception OlmException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
}*/
catch (Exception e) {
}*/ catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test13Serialization(): Exception Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("test13Serialization failed " + e.getMessage());
}
}
@ -367,7 +365,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null == errorMessage);
assertNull(errorMessage);
// keys number = negative value
errorMessage = null;
@ -377,7 +375,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null != errorMessage);
assertNotNull(errorMessage);
}
@Test
@ -386,13 +384,13 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
olmAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
try {
olmAccount.removeOneTimeKeys(null);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
olmAccount.releaseAccount();
@ -404,7 +402,7 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
try {
olmAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
String signedMsg = null;
@ -449,31 +447,31 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
String identityKey1 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys1);
String identityKey2 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys2);
assertFalse(identityKey1.equals(identityKey2));
assertNotEquals(identityKey1, identityKey2);
String identityKey3 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys3);
assertFalse(identityKey2.equals(identityKey3));
assertNotEquals(identityKey2, identityKey3);
String identityKey4 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys4);
assertFalse(identityKey3.equals(identityKey4));
assertNotEquals(identityKey3, identityKey4);
String identityKey5 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys5);
assertFalse(identityKey4.equals(identityKey5));
assertNotEquals(identityKey4, identityKey5);
String identityKey6 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys6);
assertFalse(identityKey5.equals(identityKey6));
assertNotEquals(identityKey5, identityKey6);
String identityKey7 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys7);
assertFalse(identityKey6.equals(identityKey7));
assertNotEquals(identityKey6, identityKey7);
String identityKey8 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys8);
assertFalse(identityKey7.equals(identityKey8));
assertNotEquals(identityKey7, identityKey8);
String identityKey9 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys9);
assertFalse(identityKey8.equals(identityKey9));
assertNotEquals(identityKey8, identityKey9);
String identityKey10 = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(identityKeys10);
assertFalse(identityKey9.equals(identityKey10));
assertNotEquals(identityKey9, identityKey10);
account1.releaseAccount();
account2.releaseAccount();
@ -487,7 +485,22 @@ public class OlmAccountTest {
account10.releaseAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
}
@Test
public void test18GenerateFallbackKey() {
try {
OlmAccount account1 = new OlmAccount();
account1.generateFallbackKey();
Map<String, Map<String, String>> fallbackKeyMap = account1.fallbackKey();
assertNotNull(fallbackKeyMap);
assertEquals(1, fallbackKeyMap.size());
} catch (OlmException e) {
fail(e.getMessage());
}
}
}

View file

@ -18,10 +18,12 @@
package org.matrix.olm;
import android.content.Context;
import android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnit4;
import android.text.TextUtils;
import android.util.Log;
import androidx.test.core.app.ApplicationProvider;
import androidx.test.ext.junit.runners.AndroidJUnit4;
import org.junit.BeforeClass;
import org.junit.FixMethodOrder;
import org.junit.Test;
@ -36,10 +38,12 @@ import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import static android.support.test.InstrumentationRegistry.getInstrumentation;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
@RunWith(AndroidJUnit4.class)
@FixMethodOrder(MethodSorters.NAME_ASCENDING)
@ -83,7 +87,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
mAliceOutboundGroupSession = new OlmOutboundGroupSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
}
@ -95,7 +99,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
mAliceSessionIdentifier = mAliceOutboundGroupSession.sessionIdentifier();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mAliceSessionIdentifier);
@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
mAliceOutboundSessionKey = mAliceOutboundGroupSession.sessionKey();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mAliceOutboundSessionKey);
assertTrue(mAliceOutboundSessionKey.length() > 0);
@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
public void test04GetOutboundGroupMessageIndex() {
// test message index before any encryption
mAliceMessageIndex = mAliceOutboundGroupSession.messageIndex();
assertTrue(0 == mAliceMessageIndex);
assertEquals(0, mAliceMessageIndex);
}
@Test
@ -129,13 +133,13 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
mAliceToBobMessage = mAliceOutboundGroupSession.encryptMessage(CLEAR_MESSAGE1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("Exception in bob encryptMessage, Exception code=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception in bob encryptMessage, Exception code=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(mAliceToBobMessage));
// test message index after encryption is incremented
mAliceMessageIndex = mAliceOutboundGroupSession.messageIndex();
assertTrue(1 == mAliceMessageIndex);
assertEquals(1, mAliceMessageIndex);
}
@Test
@ -144,7 +148,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
mBobInboundGroupSession = new OlmInboundGroupSession(mAliceOutboundSessionKey);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in bob OlmInboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in bob OlmInboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
}
@ -156,7 +160,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
mBobSessionIdentifier = mBobInboundGroupSession.sessionIdentifier();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(mBobSessionIdentifier));
}
@ -164,7 +168,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
@Test
public void test09SessionIdentifiersAreIdentical() {
// check both session identifiers are equals: alice vs bob
assertTrue(mAliceSessionIdentifier.equals(mBobSessionIdentifier));
assertEquals(mAliceSessionIdentifier, mBobSessionIdentifier);
}
@Test
@ -175,19 +179,19 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
result = mBobInboundGroupSession.decryptMessage(mAliceToBobMessage);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// test decrypted message
mBobDecryptedMessage = result.mDecryptedMessage;
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(mBobDecryptedMessage));
assertTrue(0 == result.mIndex);
assertEquals(0, result.mIndex);
}
@Test
public void test11InboundDecryptedMessageIdentical() {
// test decrypted message
assertTrue(mBobDecryptedMessage.equals(CLEAR_MESSAGE1));
assertEquals(mBobDecryptedMessage, CLEAR_MESSAGE1);
}
@Test
@ -217,13 +221,13 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
outboundGroupSessionRef = new OlmOutboundGroupSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
assertNotNull(outboundGroupSessionRef);
// serialize alice session
Context context = getInstrumentation().getContext();
Context context = ApplicationProvider.getApplicationContext();
try {
FileOutputStream fileOutput = context.openFileOutput(FILE_NAME_SERIAL_OUT_SESSION, Context.MODE_PRIVATE);
ObjectOutputStream objectOutput = new ObjectOutputStream(fileOutput);
@ -245,7 +249,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(sessionKeySerial));
// session keys comparison
assertTrue(sessionKeyRef.equals(sessionKeySerial));
assertEquals(sessionKeyRef, sessionKeySerial);
// get sessions IDs
String sessionIdRef = outboundGroupSessionRef.sessionIdentifier();
@ -254,7 +258,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(sessionIdSerial));
// session IDs comparison
assertTrue(sessionIdRef.equals(sessionIdSerial));
assertEquals(sessionIdRef, sessionIdSerial);
outboundGroupSessionRef.releaseSession();
outboundGroupSessionSerial.releaseSession();
@ -263,19 +267,19 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
assertTrue(outboundGroupSessionSerial.isReleased());
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test15SerializeOutboundSession(): Exception FileNotFoundException Msg=="+e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test15SerializeOutboundSession(): Exception ClassNotFoundException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (OlmException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test15SerializeOutboundSession(): Exception OlmException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (IOException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test15SerializeOutboundSession(): Exception IOException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test15SerializeOutboundSession(): Exception Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
}
@ -289,7 +293,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
aliceOutboundGroupSession = new OlmOutboundGroupSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
assertNotNull(aliceOutboundGroupSession);
@ -299,7 +303,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
sessionKeyRef = aliceOutboundGroupSession.sessionKey();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(sessionKeyRef);
@ -307,12 +311,12 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
bobInboundGroupSessionRef = new OlmInboundGroupSession(sessionKeyRef);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in OlmInboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in OlmInboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
assertNotNull(bobInboundGroupSessionRef);
// serialize alice session
Context context = getInstrumentation().getContext();
Context context = ApplicationProvider.getApplicationContext();
try {
FileOutputStream fileOutput = context.openFileOutput(FILE_NAME_SERIAL_IN_SESSION, Context.MODE_PRIVATE);
ObjectOutputStream objectOutput = new ObjectOutputStream(fileOutput);
@ -336,8 +340,8 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(sessionIdSerial));
// session IDs comparison
assertTrue(aliceSessionId.equals(sessionIdSerial));
assertTrue(sessionIdRef.equals(sessionIdSerial));
assertEquals(aliceSessionId, sessionIdSerial);
assertEquals(sessionIdRef, sessionIdSerial);
aliceOutboundGroupSession.releaseSession();
bobInboundGroupSessionRef.releaseSession();
@ -348,19 +352,19 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
assertTrue(bobInboundGroupSessionSerial.isReleased());
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test16SerializeInboundSession(): Exception FileNotFoundException Msg=="+e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test16SerializeInboundSession(): Exception ClassNotFoundException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (OlmException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test16SerializeInboundSession(): Exception OlmException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (IOException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test16SerializeInboundSession(): Exception IOException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test16SerializeInboundSession(): Exception Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
}
@ -392,48 +396,48 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
// get the session key from the outbound group sessions
String sessionKey1 = outboundGroupSession1.sessionKey();
String sessionKey2 = outboundGroupSession2.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey1.equals(sessionKey2));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey1, sessionKey2);
String sessionKey3 = outboundGroupSession3.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey2.equals(sessionKey3));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey2, sessionKey3);
String sessionKey4 = outboundGroupSession4.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey3.equals(sessionKey4));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey3, sessionKey4);
String sessionKey5 = outboundGroupSession5.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey4.equals(sessionKey5));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey4, sessionKey5);
String sessionKey6 = outboundGroupSession6.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey5.equals(sessionKey6));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey5, sessionKey6);
String sessionKey7 = outboundGroupSession7.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey6.equals(sessionKey7));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey6, sessionKey7);
String sessionKey8 = outboundGroupSession8.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionKey7.equals(sessionKey8));
assertNotEquals(sessionKey7, sessionKey8);
// get the session IDs from the outbound group sessions
String sessionId1 = outboundGroupSession1.sessionIdentifier();
String sessionId2 = outboundGroupSession2.sessionIdentifier();
assertFalse(sessionId1.equals(sessionId2));
assertNotEquals(sessionId1, sessionId2);
String sessionId3 = outboundGroupSession3.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionId2.equals(sessionId3));
assertNotEquals(sessionId2, sessionId3);
String sessionId4 = outboundGroupSession4.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionId3.equals(sessionId4));
assertNotEquals(sessionId3, sessionId4);
String sessionId5 = outboundGroupSession5.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionId4.equals(sessionId5));
assertNotEquals(sessionId4, sessionId5);
String sessionId6 = outboundGroupSession6.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionId5.equals(sessionId6));
assertNotEquals(sessionId5, sessionId6);
String sessionId7 = outboundGroupSession7.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionId6.equals(sessionId7));
assertNotEquals(sessionId6, sessionId7);
String sessionId8 = outboundGroupSession8.sessionKey();
assertFalse(sessionId7.equals(sessionId8));
assertNotEquals(sessionId7, sessionId8);
outboundGroupSession1.releaseSession();
outboundGroupSession2.releaseSession();
@ -453,7 +457,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
assertTrue(outboundGroupSession7.isReleased());
assertTrue(outboundGroupSession8.isReleased());
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in OlmOutboundGroupSession, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
}
@ -476,7 +480,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
bobInboundGroupSession = new OlmInboundGroupSession(sessionKeyRef);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in test18TestBadCharacterCrashInDecrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in test18TestBadCharacterCrashInDecrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
OlmInboundGroupSession.DecryptMessageResult result = null;
@ -484,11 +488,11 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
result = bobInboundGroupSession.decryptMessage(msgToDecryptWithEmoji);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("Exception in test18TestBadCharacterCrashInDecrypt, Exception code=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception in test18TestBadCharacterCrashInDecrypt, Exception code=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(result.mDecryptedMessage);
assertTrue(13 == result.mIndex);
assertEquals(13, result.mIndex);
}
/**
@ -508,7 +512,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
bobInboundGroupSession = new OlmInboundGroupSession(sessionKeyRef);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in test19TestErrorMessageReturnedInDecrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in test19TestErrorMessageReturnedInDecrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
String exceptionMessage = null;
@ -518,8 +522,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
exceptionMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(0!=EXPECTED_ERROR_MESSAGE.length());
assertTrue(EXPECTED_ERROR_MESSAGE.equals(exceptionMessage));
assertEquals(EXPECTED_ERROR_MESSAGE, exceptionMessage);
}
@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
inboundGroupSession = new OlmInboundGroupSession(sessionKey);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("OlmInboundGroupSession failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmInboundGroupSession failed " + e.getMessage());
}
boolean isVerified = false;
@ -552,7 +555,7 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
isVerified = inboundGroupSession.isVerified();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("isVerified failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("isVerified failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(isVerified);
@ -562,26 +565,26 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
result = inboundGroupSession.decryptMessage(message);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("decryptMessage failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("decryptMessage failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(TextUtils.equals(result.mDecryptedMessage, "Message"));
assertTrue(0 == result.mIndex);
assertEquals(0, result.mIndex);
String export = null;
try {
export = inboundGroupSession.export(0);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("export failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("export failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(!TextUtils.isEmpty(export));
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(export));
long index = -1;
try {
index = inboundGroupSession.getFirstKnownIndex();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("getFirstKnownIndex failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("getFirstKnownIndex failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(index >=0);
@ -593,13 +596,13 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
inboundGroupSession2 = inboundGroupSession.importSession(export);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("OlmInboundGroupSession failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmInboundGroupSession failed " + e.getMessage());
}
try {
isVerified = inboundGroupSession2.isVerified();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("isVerified failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("isVerified failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertFalse(isVerified);
@ -608,16 +611,16 @@ public class OlmGroupSessionTest {
try {
result = inboundGroupSession2.decryptMessage(message);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("decryptMessage failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("decryptMessage failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(TextUtils.equals(result.mDecryptedMessage, "Message"));
assertTrue(0 == result.mIndex);
assertEquals(0, result.mIndex);
try {
isVerified = inboundGroupSession2.isVerified();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("isVerified failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("isVerified failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(isVerified);

View file

@ -16,21 +16,22 @@
package org.matrix.olm;
import android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnit4;
import android.util.Log;
import java.util.Arrays;
import androidx.test.ext.junit.runners.AndroidJUnit4;
import org.junit.BeforeClass;
import org.junit.FixMethodOrder;
import org.junit.Test;
import org.junit.runner.RunWith;
import org.junit.runners.MethodSorters;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertFalse;
import java.util.Arrays;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
@RunWith(AndroidJUnit4.class)
@FixMethodOrder(MethodSorters.NAME_ASCENDING)
@ -47,13 +48,13 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
mOlmPkEncryption = new OlmPkEncryption();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("OlmPkEncryption failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmPkEncryption failed " + e.getMessage());
}
try {
mOlmPkDecryption = new OlmPkDecryption();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("OlmPkEncryption failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmPkEncryption failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mOlmPkEncryption);
@ -63,13 +64,13 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
try {
key = mOlmPkDecryption.generateKey();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in generateKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in generateKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "Ephemeral Key: " + key);
try {
mOlmPkEncryption.setRecipientKey(key);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in setRecipientKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in setRecipientKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
String clearMessage = "Public key test";
@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
try {
message = mOlmPkEncryption.encrypt(clearMessage);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in encrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in encrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "message: " + message.mCipherText + " " + message.mMac + " " + message.mEphemeralKey);
@ -85,9 +86,9 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
try {
decryptedMessage = mOlmPkDecryption.decrypt(message);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in decrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in decrypt, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
assertTrue(clearMessage.equals(decryptedMessage));
assertEquals(clearMessage, decryptedMessage);
mOlmPkEncryption.releaseEncryption();
mOlmPkDecryption.releaseDecryption();
@ -101,28 +102,28 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
mOlmPkDecryption = new OlmPkDecryption();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("OlmPkEncryption failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmPkEncryption failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mOlmPkDecryption);
byte[] privateKey = {
(byte)0x77, (byte)0x07, (byte)0x6D, (byte)0x0A,
(byte)0x73, (byte)0x18, (byte)0xA5, (byte)0x7D,
(byte)0x3C, (byte)0x16, (byte)0xC1, (byte)0x72,
(byte)0x51, (byte)0xB2, (byte)0x66, (byte)0x45,
(byte)0xDF, (byte)0x4C, (byte)0x2F, (byte)0x87,
(byte)0xEB, (byte)0xC0, (byte)0x99, (byte)0x2A,
(byte)0xB1, (byte)0x77, (byte)0xFB, (byte)0xA5,
(byte)0x1D, (byte)0xB9, (byte)0x2C, (byte)0x2A
(byte) 0x77, (byte) 0x07, (byte) 0x6D, (byte) 0x0A,
(byte) 0x73, (byte) 0x18, (byte) 0xA5, (byte) 0x7D,
(byte) 0x3C, (byte) 0x16, (byte) 0xC1, (byte) 0x72,
(byte) 0x51, (byte) 0xB2, (byte) 0x66, (byte) 0x45,
(byte) 0xDF, (byte) 0x4C, (byte) 0x2F, (byte) 0x87,
(byte) 0xEB, (byte) 0xC0, (byte) 0x99, (byte) 0x2A,
(byte) 0xB1, (byte) 0x77, (byte) 0xFB, (byte) 0xA5,
(byte) 0x1D, (byte) 0xB9, (byte) 0x2C, (byte) 0x2A
};
assertTrue(privateKey.length == OlmPkDecryption.privateKeyLength());
assertEquals(privateKey.length, OlmPkDecryption.privateKeyLength());
try {
mOlmPkDecryption.setPrivateKey(privateKey);
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in setPrivateKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in setPrivateKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
byte[] privateKeyCopy = null;
@ -130,10 +131,10 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
try {
privateKeyCopy = mOlmPkDecryption.privateKey();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception in privateKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode(), false);
fail("Exception in privateKey, Exception code=" + e.getExceptionCode());
}
assertTrue(Arrays.equals(privateKey, privateKeyCopy));
assertArrayEquals(privateKey, privateKeyCopy);
mOlmPkDecryption.releaseDecryption();
assertTrue(mOlmPkDecryption.isReleased());
@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
mOlmPkSigning = new OlmPkSigning();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("OlmPkSigning failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmPkSigning failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(mOlmPkSigning);
@ -155,17 +156,17 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
seed = OlmPkSigning.generateSeed();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("generateSeed failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("generateSeed failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(seed.length == OlmPkSigning.seedLength());
assertEquals(seed.length, OlmPkSigning.seedLength());
String pubkey = null;
try {
pubkey = mOlmPkSigning.initWithSeed(seed);
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("initWithSeed failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("initWithSeed failed " + e.getMessage());
}
String message = "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.";
@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
signature = mOlmPkSigning.sign(message);
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("sign failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("sign failed " + e.getMessage());
}
OlmUtility olmUtility = null;
@ -183,14 +184,14 @@ public class OlmPkTest {
olmUtility = new OlmUtility();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("olmUtility failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("olmUtility failed " + e.getMessage());
}
try {
olmUtility.verifyEd25519Signature(signature, pubkey, message);
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue("Signature verification failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Signature verification failed " + e.getMessage());
}
mOlmPkSigning.releaseSigning();

View file

@ -16,10 +16,10 @@
package org.matrix.olm;
import android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnit4;
import android.util.Log;
import androidx.test.ext.junit.runners.AndroidJUnit4;
import org.junit.BeforeClass;
import org.junit.FixMethodOrder;
import org.junit.Test;
@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import org.junit.runners.MethodSorters;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
@RunWith(AndroidJUnit4.class)
@FixMethodOrder(MethodSorters.NAME_ASCENDING)
@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ public class OlmSasTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("OlmSas init failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("OlmSas init failed " + e.getMessage());
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
if (aliceSas != null) {

View file

@ -18,11 +18,12 @@
package org.matrix.olm;
import android.content.Context;
import android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnit4;
import android.text.TextUtils;
import android.util.Log;
import org.json.JSONObject;
import androidx.test.core.app.ApplicationProvider;
import androidx.test.ext.junit.runners.AndroidJUnit4;
import org.junit.BeforeClass;
import org.junit.FixMethodOrder;
import org.junit.Test;
@ -37,10 +38,12 @@ import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.util.Map;
import static android.support.test.InstrumentationRegistry.getInstrumentation;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
@RunWith(AndroidJUnit4.class)
@FixMethodOrder(MethodSorters.NAME_ASCENDING)
@ -53,13 +56,13 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
private static OlmManager mOlmManager;
@BeforeClass
public static void setUpClass(){
public static void setUpClass() {
// load native lib
mOlmManager = new OlmManager();
String version = mOlmManager.getOlmLibVersion();
assertNotNull(version);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## setUpClass(): lib version="+version);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## setUpClass(): lib version=" + version);
}
/**
@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
public void test01AliceToBob() {
final int ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER = 5;
String bobIdentityKey = null;
String bobOneTimeKey=null;
String bobOneTimeKey = null;
OlmAccount bobAccount = null;
OlmAccount aliceAccount = null;
@ -84,12 +87,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// test accounts creation
assertTrue(0!=bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0!=aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
// get bob identity key
Map<String, String> bobIdentityKeys = null;
@ -97,17 +100,17 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobIdentityKeys = bobAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
bobIdentityKey = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(bobIdentityKeys);
assertTrue(null!=bobIdentityKey);
assertNotNull(bobIdentityKey);
// get bob one time keys
try {
bobAccount.generateOneTimeKeys(ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, Map<String, String>> bobOneTimeKeys = null;
@ -115,10 +118,10 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobOneTimeKeys = bobAccount.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys,1);
bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys, 1);
assertNotNull(bobOneTimeKey);
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
@ -126,58 +129,58 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
// CREATE ALICE OUTBOUND SESSION and encrypt message to bob
try {
aliceSession.initOutboundSession(aliceAccount, bobIdentityKey, bobOneTimeKey);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
String clearMsg = "Heloo bob , this is alice!";
OlmMessage encryptedMsgToBob = null;
try {
encryptedMsgToBob = aliceSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsgToBob);
assertNotNull(encryptedMsgToBob.mCipherText);
Log.d(LOG_TAG,"## test01AliceToBob(): encryptedMsg="+encryptedMsgToBob.mCipherText);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## test01AliceToBob(): encryptedMsg=" + encryptedMsgToBob.mCipherText);
// CREATE BOB INBOUND SESSION and decrypt message from alice
OlmSession bobSession = null;
try {
bobSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
try {
bobSession.initInboundSession(bobAccount, encryptedMsgToBob.mCipherText);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage());
}
String decryptedMsg = null;
try {
decryptedMsg = bobSession.decryptMessage(encryptedMsgToBob);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg);
// MESSAGE COMPARISON: decrypted vs encrypted
assertTrue(clearMsg.equals(decryptedMsg));
assertEquals(clearMsg, decryptedMsg);
// clean objects..
try {
bobAccount.removeOneTimeKeys(bobSession);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// release accounts
@ -220,12 +223,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// test accounts creation
assertTrue(0!=bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0!=aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
// get bob identity key
Map<String, String> bobIdentityKeys = null;
@ -233,17 +236,17 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobIdentityKeys = bobAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
bobIdentityKey = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(bobIdentityKeys);
assertTrue(null!=bobIdentityKey);
assertNotNull(bobIdentityKey);
// get bob one time keys
try {
bobAccount.generateOneTimeKeys(ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, Map<String, String>> bobOneTimeKeys = null;
@ -251,10 +254,10 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobOneTimeKeys = bobAccount.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys,1);
bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys, 1);
assertNotNull(bobOneTimeKey);
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
@ -262,15 +265,15 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
// CREATE ALICE OUTBOUND SESSION and encrypt message to bob
try {
aliceSession.initOutboundSession(aliceAccount, bobIdentityKey, bobOneTimeKey);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
String helloClearMsg = "Hello I'm Alice!";
@ -280,7 +283,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedAliceToBobMsg1 = aliceSession.encryptMessage(helloClearMsg);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedAliceToBobMsg1);
@ -291,15 +294,15 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
try {
bobSession.initInboundSession(bobAccount, encryptedAliceToBobMsg1.mCipherText);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage());
}
// DECRYPT MESSAGE FROM ALICE
@ -307,12 +310,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg01 = bobSession.decryptMessage(encryptedAliceToBobMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg01);
// MESSAGE COMPARISON: decrypted vs encrypted
assertTrue(helloClearMsg.equals(decryptedMsg01));
assertEquals(helloClearMsg, decryptedMsg01);
// BACK/FORTH MESSAGE COMPARISON
String clearMsg1 = "Hello I'm Bob!";
@ -324,7 +327,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg1 = bobSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg1);
@ -332,7 +335,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg2 = bobSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg2);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg2);
@ -341,7 +344,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg3 = bobSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg3);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg3);
@ -350,7 +353,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg1 = aliceSession.decryptMessage(encryptedMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg1);
@ -358,7 +361,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg2 = aliceSession.decryptMessage(encryptedMsg2);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg2);
@ -366,14 +369,14 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg3 = aliceSession.decryptMessage(encryptedMsg3);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg3);
// comparison tests
assertTrue(clearMsg1.equals(decryptedMsg1));
assertTrue(clearMsg2.equals(decryptedMsg2));
assertTrue(clearMsg3.equals(decryptedMsg3));
assertEquals(clearMsg1, decryptedMsg1);
assertEquals(clearMsg2, decryptedMsg2);
assertEquals(clearMsg3, decryptedMsg3);
// and one more from alice to bob
clearMsg1 = "another message from Alice to Bob!!";
@ -382,7 +385,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg1 = aliceSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg1);
@ -390,20 +393,20 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg1 = bobSession.decryptMessage(encryptedMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg1);
assertTrue(clearMsg1.equals(decryptedMsg1));
assertEquals(clearMsg1, decryptedMsg1);
// comparison test
assertTrue(clearMsg1.equals(decryptedMsg1));
assertEquals(clearMsg1, decryptedMsg1);
// clean objects..
try {
bobAccount.removeOneTimeKeys(bobSession);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
bobAccount.releaseAccount();
@ -427,12 +430,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// test accounts creation
assertTrue(0!=bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0!=aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
@ -440,9 +443,9 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
OlmSession bobSession = null;
@ -450,15 +453,15 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
bobSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
String aliceSessionId = null;
try {
aliceSessionId = aliceSession.sessionIdentifier();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(aliceSessionId);
@ -467,12 +470,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobSessionId = bobSession.sessionIdentifier();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(bobSessionId);
// must be the same for both ends of the conversation
assertTrue(aliceSessionId.equals(bobSessionId));
assertEquals(aliceSessionId, bobSessionId);
aliceAccount.releaseAccount();
bobAccount.releaseAccount();
@ -487,7 +490,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
@Test
public void test04MatchInboundSession() {
OlmAccount aliceAccount=null, bobAccount=null;
OlmAccount aliceAccount = null, bobAccount = null;
OlmSession aliceSession = null, bobSession = null;
// ACCOUNTS CREATION
@ -495,7 +498,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
@ -503,7 +506,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
bobSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
// get bob/luke identity key
@ -512,7 +515,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobIdentityKeys = bobAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, String> aliceIdentityKeys = null;
@ -520,7 +523,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceIdentityKeys = aliceAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
String bobIdentityKey = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(bobIdentityKeys);
@ -530,13 +533,13 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobAccount.generateOneTimeKeys(ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
try {
aliceAccount.generateOneTimeKeys(ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, Map<String, String>> bobOneTimeKeys = null;
@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobOneTimeKeys = bobAccount.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
String bobOneTimeKey1 = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys, 1);
@ -553,7 +556,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceSession.initOutboundSession(aliceAccount, bobIdentityKey, bobOneTimeKey1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
String aliceClearMsg = "hello helooo to bob!";
@ -562,7 +565,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedAliceToBobMsg1 = aliceSession.encryptMessage(aliceClearMsg);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertFalse(bobSession.matchesInboundSession(encryptedAliceToBobMsg1.mCipherText));
@ -571,7 +574,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobSession.initInboundSession(bobAccount, encryptedAliceToBobMsg1.mCipherText);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage());
}
// test matchesInboundSession() and matchesInboundSessionFrom()
@ -584,7 +587,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobAccount.removeOneTimeKeys(bobSession);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
aliceAccount.releaseAccount();
@ -601,6 +604,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
// ********************************************************
// ************* SERIALIZATION TEST ***********************
// ********************************************************
/**
* Same as {@link #test02AliceToBobBackAndForth()}, but alice's session
* is serialized and de-serialized before performing the final
@ -620,12 +624,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// test accounts creation
assertTrue(0!=bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0!=aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
// get bob identity key
Map<String, String> bobIdentityKeys = null;
@ -633,17 +637,17 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobIdentityKeys = bobAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
bobIdentityKey = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(bobIdentityKeys);
assertTrue(null!=bobIdentityKey);
assertNotNull(bobIdentityKey);
// get bob one time keys
try {
bobAccount.generateOneTimeKeys(ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, Map<String, String>> bobOneTimeKeys = null;
@ -651,10 +655,10 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobOneTimeKeys = bobAccount.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys,1);
bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys, 1);
assertNotNull(bobOneTimeKey);
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
@ -662,15 +666,15 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
// CREATE ALICE OUTBOUND SESSION and encrypt message to bob
try {
aliceSession.initOutboundSession(aliceAccount, bobIdentityKey, bobOneTimeKey);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
String helloClearMsg = "Hello I'm Alice!";
@ -679,7 +683,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedAliceToBobMsg1 = aliceSession.encryptMessage(helloClearMsg);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedAliceToBobMsg1);
assertNotNull(encryptedAliceToBobMsg1.mCipherText);
@ -689,15 +693,15 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0!=bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
assertTrue(0 != bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
// init bob session with alice PRE KEY
try {
bobSession.initInboundSession(bobAccount, encryptedAliceToBobMsg1.mCipherText);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("initInboundSessionWithAccount failed " + e.getMessage());
}
// DECRYPT MESSAGE FROM ALICE
@ -706,13 +710,13 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg01 = bobSession.decryptMessage(encryptedAliceToBobMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg01);
// MESSAGE COMPARISON: decrypted vs encrypted
assertTrue(helloClearMsg.equals(decryptedMsg01));
assertEquals(helloClearMsg, decryptedMsg01);
// BACK/FORTH MESSAGE COMPARISON
String clearMsg1 = "Hello I'm Bob!";
@ -724,7 +728,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg1 = bobSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg1);
@ -732,7 +736,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg2 = bobSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg2);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg2);
@ -740,12 +744,12 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
encryptedMsg3 = bobSession.encryptMessage(clearMsg3);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsg3);
// serialize alice session
Context context = getInstrumentation().getContext();
Context context = ApplicationProvider.getApplicationContext();
try {
FileOutputStream fileOutput = context.openFileOutput(FILE_NAME_SERIAL_SESSION, Context.MODE_PRIVATE);
ObjectOutputStream objectOutput = new ObjectOutputStream(fileOutput);
@ -771,15 +775,15 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
assertNotNull(decryptedMsg3);
// comparison tests
assertTrue(clearMsg1.equals(decryptedMsg1));
assertTrue(clearMsg2.equals(decryptedMsg2));
assertTrue(clearMsg3.equals(decryptedMsg3));
assertEquals(clearMsg1, decryptedMsg1);
assertEquals(clearMsg2, decryptedMsg2);
assertEquals(clearMsg3, decryptedMsg3);
// clean objects..
try {
bobAccount.removeOneTimeKeys(bobSession);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
bobAccount.releaseAccount();
@ -793,25 +797,21 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
assertTrue(bobSession.isReleased());
assertTrue(aliceSession.isReleased());
assertTrue(aliceSessionDeserial.isReleased());
}
catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test03SessionSerialization(): Exception FileNotFoundException Msg=="+e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
}
catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test03SessionSerialization(): Exception FileNotFoundException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test03SessionSerialization(): Exception ClassNotFoundException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
}
catch (IOException e) {
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (IOException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test03SessionSerialization(): Exception IOException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
/*catch (OlmException e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test03SessionSerialization(): Exception OlmException Msg==" + e.getMessage());
}*/
catch (Exception e) {
}*/ catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## test03SessionSerialization(): Exception Msg==" + e.getMessage());
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
}
@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// get bob identity key
@ -840,17 +840,17 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobIdentityKeys = bobAccount.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
String bobIdentityKey = TestHelper.getIdentityKey(bobIdentityKeys);
assertTrue(null != bobIdentityKey);
assertNotNull(bobIdentityKey);
// get bob one time keys
try {
bobAccount.generateOneTimeKeys(ONE_TIME_KEYS_NUMBER);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
Map<String, Map<String, String>> bobOneTimeKeys = null;
@ -858,11 +858,11 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
bobOneTimeKeys = bobAccount.oneTimeKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(bobOneTimeKeys);
String bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys,1);
String bobOneTimeKey = TestHelper.getOneTimeKey(bobOneTimeKeys, 1);
assertNotNull(bobOneTimeKey);
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
// SANITY CHECK TESTS FOR: initOutboundSessionWithAccount()
@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null != errorMessage);
assertNotNull(errorMessage);
errorMessage = null;
try {
@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null != errorMessage);
assertNotNull(errorMessage);
errorMessage = null;
try {
@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null != errorMessage);
assertNotNull(errorMessage);
errorMessage = null;
try {
@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null != errorMessage);
assertNotNull(errorMessage);
// init properly
errorMessage = null;
@ -913,23 +913,23 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(null == errorMessage);
assertNull(errorMessage);
// SANITY CHECK TESTS FOR: encryptMessage()
OlmMessage message = null;
try {
message = aliceSession.encryptMessage(null);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(null==message);
assertNull(message);
// encrypt properly
OlmMessage encryptedMsgToBob = null;
try {
encryptedMsgToBob = aliceSession.encryptMessage("A message for bob");
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(encryptedMsgToBob);
@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(!TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
errorMessage = null;
try {
@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(!TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
errorMessage = null;
try {
@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
errorMessage = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(!TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
// init properly
errorMessage = null;
@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
assertTrue(TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMessage));
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg="+e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
// SANITY CHECK TESTS FOR: decryptMessage()
@ -982,22 +982,22 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
try {
decryptedMsg = aliceSession.decryptMessage(null);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(null==decryptedMsg);
assertNull(decryptedMsg);
// SANITY CHECK TESTS FOR: matchesInboundSession()
assertTrue(!aliceSession.matchesInboundSession(null));
assertFalse(aliceSession.matchesInboundSession(null));
// SANITY CHECK TESTS FOR: matchesInboundSessionFrom()
assertTrue(!aliceSession.matchesInboundSessionFrom(null,null));
assertFalse(aliceSession.matchesInboundSessionFrom(null, null));
// release objects
try {
bobAccount.removeOneTimeKeys(bobSession);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
aliceAccount.releaseAccount();
@ -1011,4 +1011,75 @@ public class OlmSessionTest {
assertTrue(bobSession.isReleased());
}
@Test
public void test07AliceBobSessionDescribe() {
// creates alice & bob accounts
OlmAccount aliceAccount = null;
OlmAccount bobAccount = null;
try {
aliceAccount = new OlmAccount();
bobAccount = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// test accounts creation
assertTrue(0 != bobAccount.getOlmAccountId());
assertTrue(0 != aliceAccount.getOlmAccountId());
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
OlmSession aliceSession = null;
try {
aliceSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0 != aliceSession.getOlmSessionId());
// CREATE ALICE SESSION
OlmSession bobSession = null;
try {
bobSession = new OlmSession();
} catch (OlmException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertTrue(0 != bobSession.getOlmSessionId());
String aliceSessionDescribe = null;
try {
aliceSessionDescribe = aliceSession.sessionDescribe();
} catch (Exception e) {
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(aliceSessionDescribe);
String bobSessionDescribe = null;
try {
bobSessionDescribe = bobSession.sessionDescribe();
} catch (Exception e) {
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(bobSessionDescribe);
// must be the same for both ends of the conversation
assertEquals(aliceSessionDescribe, bobSessionDescribe);
assertEquals(
"sender chain index: 0 receiver chain indices: skipped message keys:",
aliceSessionDescribe
);
aliceAccount.releaseAccount();
bobAccount.releaseAccount();
assertTrue(aliceAccount.isReleased());
assertTrue(bobAccount.isReleased());
bobSession.releaseSession();
aliceSession.releaseSession();
assertTrue(bobSession.isReleased());
assertTrue(aliceSession.isReleased());
}
}

View file

@ -17,11 +17,11 @@
package org.matrix.olm;
import android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnit4;
import android.text.TextUtils;
import android.util.Log;
import org.json.JSONObject;
import androidx.test.ext.junit.runners.AndroidJUnit4;
import org.junit.BeforeClass;
import org.junit.FixMethodOrder;
import org.junit.Test;
@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
@RunWith(AndroidJUnit4.class)
@FixMethodOrder(MethodSorters.NAME_ASCENDING)
@ -43,13 +44,13 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
private static OlmManager mOlmManager;
@BeforeClass
public static void setUpClass(){
public static void setUpClass() {
// load native lib
mOlmManager = new OlmManager();
String version = mOlmManager.getOlmLibVersion();
assertNotNull(version);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## setUpClass(): lib version="+version);
Log.d(LOG_TAG, "## setUpClass(): lib version=" + version);
}
/**
@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
try {
account = new OlmAccount();
} catch (OlmException e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(),false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(account);
@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
try {
messageSignature = account.signMessage(message);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue(e.getMessage(), false);
fail(e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(messageSignature);
@ -87,12 +88,12 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
try {
identityKeys = account.identityKeys();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("identityKeys failed " + e.getMessage());
}
assertNotNull(identityKeys);
fingerPrintKey = TestHelper.getFingerprintKey(identityKeys);
assertTrue("fingerprint key missing",!TextUtils.isEmpty(fingerPrintKey));
assertFalse("fingerprint key missing", TextUtils.isEmpty(fingerPrintKey));
// instantiate utility object
OlmUtility utility = null;
@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
try {
utility = new OlmUtility();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("failed to create OlmUtility", false);
fail("failed to create OlmUtility");
}
// verify signature
@ -121,10 +122,10 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMsg = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(!TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMsg));
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMsg));
// check bad fingerprint size => errorMsg = INVALID_BASE64
String badSizeFingerPrintKey = fingerPrintKey.substring(fingerPrintKey.length()/2);
String badSizeFingerPrintKey = fingerPrintKey.substring(fingerPrintKey.length() / 2);
errorMsg = null;
try {
@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
} catch (Exception e) {
errorMsg = e.getMessage();
}
assertTrue(!TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMsg));
assertFalse(TextUtils.isEmpty(errorMsg));
utility.releaseUtility();
assertTrue(utility.isReleased());
@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ public class OlmUtilityTest {
try {
utility = new OlmUtility();
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("OlmUtility creation failed", false);
fail("OlmUtility creation failed");
}
String msgToHash = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog";

View file

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull;
import static org.junit.Assert.assertTrue;
import static org.junit.Assert.fail;
/**
* Helper class providing helper methods used in the Olm Android SDK unit tests.
@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ public class TestHelper {
try {
idKey = aIdentityKeysMap.get(OlmAccount.JSON_KEY_IDENTITY_KEY);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("Exception MSg=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception MSg=" + e.getMessage());
}
return idKey;
}
@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ public class TestHelper {
try {
fingerprintKey = aIdentityKeysMap.get(OlmAccount.JSON_KEY_FINGER_PRINT_KEY);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("Exception MSg=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception MSg=" + e.getMessage());
}
return fingerprintKey;
}
@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ public class TestHelper {
firstOneTimeKey = (new ArrayList<>(generatedKeys.values())).get(aKeyPosition - 1);
} catch (Exception e) {
assertTrue("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage(), false);
fail("Exception Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
return firstOneTimeKey;
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1 @@
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
package="org.matrix.olm">
<application
android:allowBackup="true"
android:label="@string/app_name">
</application>
</manifest>
<manifest package="org.matrix.olm" />

View file

@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ public class OlmAccount extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Serializable {
/**
* Return the identity keys (identity and fingerprint keys) in a dictionary.<br>
* Public API for {@link #identityKeysJni()}.<br>
* Ex:<tt>
* Ex:<code>
* {
* "curve25519":"Vam++zZPMqDQM6ANKpO/uAl5ViJSHxV9hd+b0/fwRAg",
* "ed25519":"+v8SOlOASFTMrX3MCKBM4iVnYoZ+JIjpNt1fi8Z9O2I"
* }</tt>
* }</code>
* @return identity keys dictionary if operation succeeds, null otherwise
* @exception OlmException the failure reason
*/
@ -195,14 +195,14 @@ public class OlmAccount extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Serializable {
/**
* Return the "one time keys" in a dictionary.<br>
* The number of "one time keys", is specified by {@link #generateOneTimeKeys(int)}<br>
* Ex:<tt>
* Ex:<code>
* { "curve25519":
* {
* "AAAABQ":"qefVZd8qvjOpsFzoKSAdfUnJVkIreyxWFlipCHjSQQg",
* "AAAABA":"/X8szMU+p+lsTnr56wKjaLgjTMQQkCk8EIWEAilZtQ8",
* "AAAAAw":"qxNxxFHzevFntaaPdT0fhhO7tc7pco4+xB/5VRG81hA",
* }
* }</tt><br>
* }</code><br>
* Public API for {@link #oneTimeKeysJni()}.<br>
* Note: these keys are to be published on the server.
* @return one time keys in string dictionary.
@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ public class OlmAccount extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Serializable {
/**
* Get the public parts of the unpublished "one time keys" for the account.<br>
* The returned data is a JSON-formatted object with the single property
* <tt>curve25519</tt>, which is itself an object mapping key id to
* <code>curve25519</code>, which is itself an object mapping key id to
* base64-encoded Curve25519 key.<br>
* @return byte array containing the one time keys or throw an exception if it fails
*/
@ -417,4 +417,99 @@ public class OlmAccount extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Serializable {
* @return the deserialized account
**/
private native long deserializeJni(byte[] aSerializedDataBuffer, byte[] aKeyBuffer);
/**
* Return a pickled account as a bytes buffer.<br>
* The account is serialized and encrypted with aKey.
* In case of failure, an error human readable
* description is provide in aErrorMsg.
* @param aKey encryption key
* @param aErrorMsg error message description
* @return the pickled account as bytes buffer
*/
public byte[] pickle(byte[] aKey, StringBuffer aErrorMsg) {
return serialize(aKey, aErrorMsg);
}
/**
* Loads an account from a pickled bytes buffer.<br>
* See {@link #serialize(byte[], StringBuffer)}
* @param aSerializedData bytes buffer
* @param aKey key used to encrypted
* @exception Exception the exception
*/
public void unpickle(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey) throws Exception {
deserialize(aSerializedData, aKey);
}
/**
* Generates a new fallback key.
* @throws OlmException exception with a reason.
*/
public void generateFallbackKey() throws OlmException {
try {
generateFallbackKeyJni();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new OlmException(OlmException.EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_GENERATE_FALLBACK_KEY, e.getMessage());
}
}
private native void generateFallbackKeyJni();
/**
* Return the "fallback key" in a dictionary.<br>
* Ex:<code>
* { "curve25519":
* {
* "AAAABQ":"qefVZd8qvjOpsFzoKSAdfUnJVkIreyxWFlipCHjSQQg"
* }
* }</code><br>
* Public API for {@link #fallbackKeyJni()}.<br>
* Note: the key is to be published on the server.
* @return fallback key in string dictionary.
* @exception OlmException the failure reason
*/
public Map<String, Map<String, String>> fallbackKey() throws OlmException {
JSONObject fallbackKeyJsonObj = null;
byte[] fallbackKeyBuffer;
try {
fallbackKeyBuffer = fallbackKeyJni();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new OlmException(OlmException.EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_FALLBACK_KEY, e.getMessage());
}
if( null != fallbackKeyBuffer) {
try {
fallbackKeyJsonObj = new JSONObject(new String(fallbackKeyBuffer, "UTF-8"));
} catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## fallbackKey(): Exception - Msg=" + e.getMessage());
}
} else {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## fallbackKey(): Failure - identityKeysJni()=null");
}
return OlmUtility.toStringMapMap(fallbackKeyJsonObj);
}
private native byte[] fallbackKeyJni();
/**
* Forget about the old fallback key.
*
* This should be called once you are reasonably certain that you will not
* receive any more messages that use the old fallback key (e.g. 5 minutes
* after the new fallback key has been published).
* @throws OlmException the failure reason
**/
public void forgetFallbackKey() throws OlmException {
try {
forgetFallbackKeyJni();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new OlmException(OlmException.EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_FORGET_FALLBACK_KEY, e.getMessage());
}
}
private native void forgetFallbackKeyJni();
}

View file

@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ public class OlmException extends IOException {
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_REMOVE_ONE_TIME_KEYS = 105;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_MARK_ONE_KEYS_AS_PUBLISHED = 106;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_SIGN_MESSAGE = 107;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_GENERATE_FALLBACK_KEY = 108;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_FALLBACK_KEY = 109;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_ACCOUNT_FORGET_FALLBACK_KEY = 110;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_CREATE_INBOUND_GROUP_SESSION = 200;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_INIT_INBOUND_GROUP_SESSION = 201;
@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ public class OlmException extends IOException {
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_SESSION_ENCRYPT_MESSAGE = 404;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_SESSION_DECRYPT_MESSAGE = 405;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_SESSION_SESSION_IDENTIFIER = 406;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_SESSION_SESSION_DESCRIBE = 407;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_UTILITY_CREATION = 500;
public static final int EXCEPTION_CODE_UTILITY_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 501;

View file

@ -369,4 +369,29 @@ public class OlmInboundGroupSession extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Seri
* @return the deserialized session
**/
private native long deserializeJni(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey);
/**
* Return a pickled inbound group session as a bytes buffer.<br>
* The session is serialized and encrypted with aKey.
* In case of failure, an error human readable
* description is provide in aErrorMsg.
* @param aKey encryption key
* @param aErrorMsg error message description
* @return the pickled inbound group session as bytes buffer
*/
public byte[] pickle(byte[] aKey, StringBuffer aErrorMsg) {
return serialize(aKey, aErrorMsg);
}
/**
* Loads an inbound group session from a pickled bytes buffer.<br>
* See {@link #serialize(byte[], StringBuffer)}
* @param aSerializedData bytes buffer
* @param aKey key used to encrypted
* @exception Exception the exception
*/
public void unpickle(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey) throws Exception {
deserialize(aSerializedData, aKey);
}
}

View file

@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ public class OlmManager {
* @return the library version
*/
public String getVersion() {
return BuildConfig.VERSION_NAME;
return BuildConfig.OLM_VERSION;
}
/**

View file

@ -293,4 +293,28 @@ public class OlmOutboundGroupSession extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Ser
**/
private native long deserializeJni(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey);
/**
* Return a pickled outbound group session as a bytes buffer.<br>
* The session is serialized and encrypted with aKey.
* In case of failure, an error human readable
* description is provide in aErrorMsg.
* @param aKey encryption key
* @param aErrorMsg error message description
* @return the pickled outbound group session as bytes buffer
*/
public byte[] pickle(byte[] aKey, StringBuffer aErrorMsg) {
return serialize(aKey, aErrorMsg);
}
/**
* Loads an outbound group session from a pickled bytes buffer.<br>
* See {@link #serialize(byte[], StringBuffer)}
* @param aSerializedData bytes buffer
* @param aKey key used to encrypted
* @exception Exception the exception
*/
public void unpickle(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey) throws Exception {
deserialize(aSerializedData, aKey);
}
}

View file

@ -106,6 +106,16 @@ public class OlmSAS {
return null;
}
public String calculateMacFixedBase64(String message, String info) throws OlmException {
try {
byte[] bytes = calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(message.getBytes("UTF-8"), info.getBytes("UTF-8"));
if (bytes != null) return new String(bytes, "UTF-8");
} catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
throw new OlmException(OlmException.EXCEPTION_CODE_SAS_ERROR, e.getMessage());
}
return null;
}
public String calculateMacLongKdf(String message, String info) throws OlmException {
try {
byte[] bytes = calculateMacLongKdfJni(message.getBytes("UTF-8"), info.getBytes("UTF-8"));
@ -140,6 +150,8 @@ public class OlmSAS {
private native byte[] calculateMacJni(byte[] message, byte[] info);
private native byte[] calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(byte[] message, byte[] info);
private native byte[] calculateMacLongKdfJni(byte[] message, byte[] info);
/**

View file

@ -223,6 +223,23 @@ public class OlmSession extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Serializable {
*/
private native byte[] getSessionIdentifierJni();
public String sessionDescribe() throws OlmException {
try {
byte[] buffer = olmSessionDescribeJni();
if (null != buffer) {
return new String(buffer, "UTF-8");
}
} catch (Exception e) {
Log.e(LOG_TAG, "## sessionDescribe(): " + e.getMessage());
throw new OlmException(OlmException.EXCEPTION_CODE_SESSION_SESSION_DESCRIBE, e.getMessage());
}
return null;
}
private native byte[] olmSessionDescribeJni();
/**
* Checks if the PRE_KEY({@link OlmMessage#MESSAGE_TYPE_PRE_KEY}) message is for this in-bound session.<br>
* This API may be used to process a "m.room.encrypted" event when type = 1 (PRE_KEY).
@ -448,5 +465,30 @@ public class OlmSession extends CommonSerializeUtils implements Serializable {
* @return the deserialized session
**/
private native long deserializeJni(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey);
/**
* Return a pickled session as a bytes buffer.<br>
* The session is serialized and encrypted with aKey.
* In case of failure, an error human readable
* description is provide in aErrorMsg.
* @param aKey encryption key
* @param aErrorMsg error message description
* @return the pickled session as bytes buffer
*/
public byte[] pickle(byte[] aKey, StringBuffer aErrorMsg) {
return serialize(aKey, aErrorMsg);
}
/**
* Loads a session from a pickled bytes buffer.<br>
* See {@link #serialize(byte[], StringBuffer)}
* @param aSerializedData bytes buffer
* @param aKey key used to encrypted
* @exception Exception the exception
*/
public void unpickle(byte[] aSerializedData, byte[] aKey) throws Exception {
deserialize(aSerializedData, aKey);
}
}

View file

@ -442,6 +442,161 @@ JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(markOneTimeKeysAsPublishedJni)(JNIEnv *env,
}
}
/**
* Generate "fallback key".
* An exception is thrown if the operation fails.
**/
JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(generateFallbackKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz)
{
const char* errorMessage = NULL;
OlmAccount *accountPtr = getAccountInstanceId(env, thiz);
if (!accountPtr)
{
LOGE("## generateFallbackKeyJni(): failure - invalid Account ptr");
errorMessage = "invalid Account ptr";
}
else
{
// keys memory allocation
size_t randomLength = olm_account_generate_fallback_key_random_length(accountPtr);
LOGD("## generateFallbackKeyJni(): randomLength=%lu", static_cast<long unsigned int>(randomLength));
uint8_t *randomBufferPtr = NULL;
if ((0 != randomLength) && !setRandomInBuffer(env, &randomBufferPtr, randomLength))
{
LOGE("## generateFallbackKeyJni(): failure - random buffer init");
errorMessage = "random buffer init";
}
else
{
LOGD("## generateFallbackKeyJni(): accountPtr =%p", accountPtr);
// retrieve key pairs in keysBytesPtr
size_t result = olm_account_generate_fallback_key(accountPtr, (void*)randomBufferPtr, randomLength);
if (result == olm_error())
{
errorMessage = olm_account_last_error(accountPtr);
LOGE("## generateFallbackKeyJni(): failure - error generating fallback keys Msg=%s", errorMessage);
}
else
{
LOGD("## generateFallbackKeyJni(): success - result=%lu", static_cast<long unsigned int>(result));
}
}
if (randomBufferPtr)
{
memset(randomBufferPtr, 0, randomLength);
free(randomBufferPtr);
}
}
if (errorMessage)
{
env->ThrowNew(env->FindClass("java/lang/Exception"), errorMessage);
}
}
/**
* Get "fallback key".<br>
* Return the public parts of the unpublished "fallback key" for the account
* @return a valid byte array if operation succeed, null otherwise
**/
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(fallbackKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz)
{
const char* errorMessage = NULL;
jbyteArray byteArrayRetValue = NULL;
OlmAccount* accountPtr = getAccountInstanceId(env, thiz);
LOGD("## fallbackKeyJni(): IN");
if (!accountPtr)
{
LOGE("## fallbackKeyJni(): failure - invalid Account ptr");
errorMessage = "invalid Account ptr";
}
else
{
// keys memory allocation
size_t keysLength = olm_account_unpublished_fallback_key_length(accountPtr);
uint8_t *keysBytesPtr = (uint8_t *)malloc(keysLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
if (!keysBytesPtr)
{
LOGE("## fallbackKeyJni(): failure - fallback key OOM");
errorMessage = "fallback key OOM";
}
else
{
// retrieve key pairs in keysBytesPtr
size_t keysResult = olm_account_unpublished_fallback_key(accountPtr, keysBytesPtr, keysLength);
if (keysResult == olm_error()) {
LOGE("## fallbackKeyJni(): failure - error getting fallback key Msg=%s",(const char *)olm_account_last_error(accountPtr));
errorMessage = (const char *)olm_account_last_error(accountPtr);
}
else
{
// allocate the byte array to be returned to java
byteArrayRetValue = env->NewByteArray(keysLength);
if (!byteArrayRetValue)
{
LOGE("## fallbackKeyJni(): failure - return byte array OOM");
errorMessage = "return byte array OOM";
}
else
{
env->SetByteArrayRegion(byteArrayRetValue, 0/*offset*/, keysLength, (const jbyte*)keysBytesPtr);
LOGD("## fallbackKeyJni(): success");
}
}
free(keysBytesPtr);
}
}
if (errorMessage)
{
env->ThrowNew(env->FindClass("java/lang/Exception"), errorMessage);
}
return byteArrayRetValue;
}
/**
* Forget about the old fallback key.
*
* This should be called once you are reasonably certain that you will not
* receive any more messages that use the old fallback key (e.g. 5 minutes
* after the new fallback key has been published).
**/
JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(forgetFallbackKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz)
{
const char* errorMessage = NULL;
OlmAccount *accountPtr = getAccountInstanceId(env, thiz);
if (!accountPtr)
{
LOGE("## forgetFallbackKeyJni(): failure - invalid Account ptr");
errorMessage = "invalid Account ptr";
}
else
{
olm_account_forget_old_fallback_key(accountPtr);
}
if (errorMessage)
{
env->ThrowNew(env->FindClass("java/lang/Exception"), errorMessage);
}
}
/**
* Sign a message with the ed25519 key (fingerprint) for this account.<br>
* The signed message is returned by the function.
@ -495,7 +650,7 @@ JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(signMessageJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject t
else
{
LOGD("## signMessageJni(): success - retCode=%lu signatureLength=%lu", static_cast<long unsigned int>(resultSign), static_cast<long unsigned int>(signatureLength));
signedMsgRetValueBuffer = env->NewByteArray(signatureLength);
env->SetByteArrayRegion(signedMsgRetValueBuffer, 0 , signatureLength, (jbyte*)signedMsgPtr);
}

View file

@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(generateOneTimeKeysJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject
JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(removeOneTimeKeysJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jlong aNativeOlmSessionId);
JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(markOneTimeKeysAsPublishedJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
// fallback keys
JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(generateFallbackKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(fallbackKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
JNIEXPORT void OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(forgetFallbackKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
// signing
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_ACCOUNT_FUNC_DEF(signMessageJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jbyteArray aMessage);

View file

@ -309,6 +309,86 @@ JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz
return returnValue;
}
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacFixedBase64Jni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz,jbyteArray messageBuffer,jbyteArray infoBuffer) {
LOGD("## calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(): IN");
const char* errorMessage = NULL;
jbyteArray returnValue = 0;
OlmSAS* sasPtr = getOlmSasInstanceId(env, thiz);
jbyte *messagePtr = NULL;
jboolean messageWasCopied = JNI_FALSE;
jbyte *infoPtr = NULL;
jboolean infoWasCopied = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sasPtr)
{
LOGE("## calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(): failure - invalid SAS ptr=NULL");
errorMessage = "invalid SAS ptr=NULL";
} else if(!messageBuffer) {
LOGE("## calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(): failure - invalid message");
errorMessage = "invalid info";
}
else if (!(messagePtr = env->GetByteArrayElements(messageBuffer, &messageWasCopied)))
{
LOGE(" ## calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(): failure - message JNI allocation OOM");
errorMessage = "message JNI allocation OOM";
}
else if (!(infoPtr = env->GetByteArrayElements(infoBuffer, &infoWasCopied)))
{
LOGE(" ## calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(): failure - info JNI allocation OOM");
errorMessage = "info JNI allocation OOM";
} else {
size_t infoLength = (size_t)env->GetArrayLength(infoBuffer);
size_t messageLength = (size_t)env->GetArrayLength(messageBuffer);
size_t macLength = olm_sas_mac_length(sasPtr);
void *macPtr = malloc(macLength*sizeof(uint8_t));
size_t result = olm_sas_calculate_mac_fixed_base64(sasPtr,messagePtr,messageLength,infoPtr,infoLength,macPtr,macLength);
if (result == olm_error())
{
errorMessage = (const char *)olm_sas_last_error(sasPtr);
LOGE("## calculateMacFixedBase64Jni(): failure - error calculating SAS mac Msg=%s", errorMessage);
}
else
{
returnValue = env->NewByteArray(macLength);
env->SetByteArrayRegion(returnValue, 0 , macLength, (jbyte*)macPtr);
}
if (macPtr) {
free(macPtr);
}
}
// free alloc
if (infoPtr)
{
if (infoWasCopied)
{
memset(infoPtr, 0, (size_t)env->GetArrayLength(infoBuffer));
}
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(infoBuffer, infoPtr, JNI_ABORT);
}
if (messagePtr)
{
if (messageWasCopied)
{
memset(messagePtr, 0, (size_t)env->GetArrayLength(messageBuffer));
}
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(messageBuffer, messagePtr, JNI_ABORT);
}
if (errorMessage)
{
env->ThrowNew(env->FindClass("java/lang/Exception"), errorMessage);
}
return returnValue;
}
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacLongKdfJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz,jbyteArray messageBuffer,jbyteArray infoBuffer) {
LOGD("## calculateMacLongKdfJni(): IN");
const char* errorMessage = NULL;
@ -387,4 +467,4 @@ JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacLongKdfJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobje
}
return returnValue;
}
}

View file

@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(getPubKeyJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
JNIEXPORT void OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(setTheirPubKey)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz,jbyteArray pubKey);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(generateShortCodeJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jbyteArray infoStringBytes, jint byteNb);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jbyteArray messageBuffer, jbyteArray infoBuffer);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacFixedBase64Jni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jbyteArray messageBuffer, jbyteArray infoBuffer);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SAS_FUNC_DEF(calculateMacLongKdfJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jbyteArray messageBuffer, jbyteArray infoBuffer);
#ifdef __cplusplus

View file

@ -798,6 +798,58 @@ JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(getSessionIdentifierJni)(JNIEnv *env,
return returnValue;
}
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(olmSessionDescribeJni(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz))
{
const char* errorMessage = NULL;
jbyteArray returnValue = 0;
LOGD("## olmSessionDescribeJni(): IN ");
OlmSession *sessionPtr = getSessionInstanceId(env, thiz);
if (!sessionPtr)
{
LOGE("## olmSessionDescribeJni(): failure - invalid Session ptr=NULL");
errorMessage = "invalid Session ptr=NULL";
}
else
{
int maxLength = 600;
char* describePtr = NULL;
describePtr = (char*) malloc(maxLength * sizeof *describePtr);
if (!describePtr)
{
LOGE("## olmSessionDescribeJni(): failure - describe allocation OOM");
errorMessage = "describe allocation OOM";
}
else
{
olm_session_describe(sessionPtr, describePtr, maxLength);
int length = strlen(describePtr);
if (length == 0)
{
LOGE("## olmSessionDescribeJni(): failure - get session describe");
}
else
{
LOGD("## olmSessionDescribeJni(): success - describe=%.*s", (char*)describePtr);
returnValue = env->NewByteArray(length);
env->SetByteArrayRegion(returnValue, 0, length, (jbyte*)describePtr);
}
free(describePtr);
}
}
if (errorMessage)
{
env->ThrowNew(env->FindClass("java/lang/Exception"), errorMessage);
}
return returnValue;
}
/**
* Serialize and encrypt session instance.<br>
* An exception is thrown if the operation fails.

View file

@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(encryptMessageJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobjec
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(decryptMessageJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jobject aEncryptedMsg);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(getSessionIdentifierJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(olmSessionDescribeJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz);
// serialization
JNIEXPORT jbyteArray OLM_SESSION_FUNC_DEF(serializeJni)(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, jbyteArray aKey);

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
<resources>
<string name="app_name">OlmSdk</string>
</resources>

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
MAJOR := 3
MINOR := 1
PATCH := 2
MINOR := 2
PATCH := 16

1
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lifelinestyle ::solid
participantspacing 10
participant :0 " " as p0
lifelinestyle p0 #white
actor "Alice" as A
participant :0 " " as p1
lifelinestyle p1 #white
actor "Bob" as B
participant :0 " " as p2
lifelinestyle p2 #white
parallel
box over A: ""//R[0]//"" = ""HKDF(0, //S//)""
box over B: ""//R[0]//"" = ""HKDF(0, //S//)""
parallel off
box over A: generate new ratchet keypair ""//T[0]//""
A->B: ""//R[0]//(//msg0//)"", ""//T[0]//""
A->B: ""//R[0]//(//msg1//)"", ""//T[0]//""
A->B: ""//R[0]//(//msg2//)"", ""//T[0]//""
box over B: generate new ratchet keypair ""//T[1]//""
box over B: ""//R[1]//"" = ""HKDF(//R[0]//, DH(//T[1]//, //T[0]//))""
B->A: ""//R[1]//(//msg3//)"", ""//T[1]//""
box over A: ""//R[1]//"" = ""HKDF(//R[0]//, DH(//T[0]//, //T[1]//))""
B->A: ""//R[1]//(//msg4//)"", ""//T[1]//""
B->(13)A: ""//R[1]//(//msg5//)"", ""//T[1]//""
space -14
box over A: generate new ratchet keypair ""//T[2]//""
box over A: ""//R[2]//"" = ""HKDF(//R[1]//, DH(//T[2]//, //T[1]//))""
A->(3)B: ""//R[2]//(//msg6//)"", ""//T[2]//""
box over B: ""//R[2]//"" = ""HKDF(//R[1]//, DH(//T[1]//, //T[2]//))""
box over p0,p2 #EDF2AE:<size:10>where:\n ""//S//"" is the shared secret derived from the 3ECDH exchange\n ""//R[n]//"" is a root key\n ""//T[n]//"" is a ratchet keypair\n ""HKDF(//salt//, //key//)"" means performing an HMAC-based key derivation with a salt value of ""//salt//"" and input key material of ""//key//""\n ""DH(//k1//, //k2//)"" means performing Diffie-Hellman with the private half of ""//k1//"" and the public half of ""//k2//""\n ""//R[n]//(//msg//)"" means a message encrypted with a key derived from root key ""//R[n]//""

BIN
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docs/megolm.md Normal file
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# Megolm group ratchet
An AES-based cryptographic ratchet intended for group communications.
## Background
The Megolm ratchet is intended for encrypted messaging applications where there
may be a large number of recipients of each message, thus precluding the use of
peer-to-peer encryption systems such as [Olm][].
It also allows a recipient to decrypt received messages multiple times. For
instance, in client/server applications, a copy of the ciphertext can be stored
on the (untrusted) server, while the client need only store the session keys.
## Overview
Each participant in a conversation uses their own outbound session for
encrypting messages. A session consists of a ratchet and an [Ed25519][] keypair.
Secrecy is provided by the ratchet, which can be wound forwards but not
backwards, and is used to derive a distinct message key for each message.
Authenticity is provided via Ed25519 signatures.
The value of the ratchet, and the public part of the Ed25519 key, are shared
with other participants in the conversation via secure peer-to-peer
channels. Provided that peer-to-peer channel provides authenticity of the
messages to the participants and deniability of the messages to third parties,
the Megolm session will inherit those properties.
## The Megolm ratchet algorithm
The Megolm ratchet $`R_i`$ consists of four parts, $`R_{i,j}`$ for
$`j \in {0,1,2,3}`$. The length of each part depends on the hash function
in use (256 bits for this version of Megolm).
The ratchet is initialised with cryptographically-secure random data, and
advanced as follows:
```math
\begin{aligned}
R_{i,0} &=
\begin{cases}
H_0\left(R_{2^{24}(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^{24}n\\
R_{i-1,0} &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\\
R_{i,1} &=
\begin{cases}
H_1\left(R_{2^{24}(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^{24}n\\
H_1\left(R_{2^{16}(m-1),1}\right) &\text{if }\exists m | i = 2^{16}m\\
R_{i-1,1} &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\\
R_{i,2} &=
\begin{cases}
H_2\left(R_{2^{24}(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^{24}n\\
H_2\left(R_{2^{16}(m-1),1}\right) &\text{if }\exists m | i = 2^{16}m\\
H_2\left(R_{2^8(p-1),2}\right) &\text{if }\exists p | i = 2^8p\\
R_{i-1,2} &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\\
R_{i,3} &=
\begin{cases}
H_3\left(R_{2^{24}(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^{24}n\\
H_3\left(R_{2^{16}(m-1),1}\right) &\text{if }\exists m | i = 2^{16}m\\
H_3\left(R_{2^8(p-1),2}\right) &\text{if }\exists p | i = 2^8p\\
H_3\left(R_{i-1,3}\right) &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
```
where $`H_0`$, $`H_1`$, $`H_2`$, and $`H_3`$ are different hash
functions. In summary: every $`2^8`$ iterations, $`R_{i,3}`$ is
reseeded from $`R_{i,2}`$. Every $`2^{16}`$ iterations, $`R_{i,2}`$
and $`R_{i,3}`$ are reseeded from $`R_{i,1}`$. Every $`2^{24}`$
iterations, $`R_{i,1}`$, $`R_{i,2}`$ and $`R_{i,3}`$ are reseeded
from $`R_{i,0}`$.
The complete ratchet value, $`R_{i}`$, is hashed to generate the keys used
to encrypt each message. This scheme allows the ratchet to be advanced an
arbitrary amount forwards while needing at most 1020 hash computations. A
client can decrypt chat history onwards from the earliest value of the ratchet
it is aware of, but cannot decrypt history from before that point without
reversing the hash function.
This allows a participant to share its ability to decrypt chat history with
another from a point in the conversation onwards by giving a copy of the
ratchet at that point in the conversation.
## The Megolm protocol
### Session setup
Each participant in a conversation generates their own Megolm session. A
session consists of three parts:
* a 32 bit counter, $`i`$.
* an [Ed25519][] keypair, $`K`$.
* a ratchet, $`R_i`$, which consists of four 256-bit values,
$`R_{i,j}`$ for $`j \in {0,1,2,3}`$.
The counter $`i`$ is initialised to $`0`$. A new Ed25519 keypair is
generated for $`K`$. The ratchet is simply initialised with 1024 bits of
cryptographically-secure random data.
A single participant may use multiple sessions over the lifetime of a
conversation. The public part of $`K`$ is used as an identifier to
discriminate between sessions.
### Sharing session data
To allow other participants in the conversation to decrypt messages, the
session data is formatted as described in [Session-sharing format](#session-sharing-format). It is then
shared with other participants in the conversation via a secure peer-to-peer
channel (such as that provided by [Olm][]).
When the session data is received from other participants, the recipient first
checks that the signature matches the public key. They then store their own
copy of the counter, ratchet, and public key.
### Message encryption
This version of Megolm uses [AES-256][] in [CBC][] mode with [PKCS#7][] padding and
[HMAC-SHA-256][] (truncated to 64 bits). The 256 bit AES key, 256 bit HMAC key,
and 128 bit AES IV are derived from the megolm ratchet $`R_i`$:
```math
\begin{aligned}
\mathit{AES\_KEY}_{i}\;\parallel\;\mathit{HMAC\_KEY}_{i}\;\parallel\;\mathit{AES\_IV}_{i}
&= \operatorname{HKDF}\left(0,\,R_{i},\text{"MEGOLM\_KEYS"},\,80\right) \\
\end{aligned}
```
where $`\parallel`$ represents string splitting, and
$`\operatorname{HKDF}\left(\mathit{salt},\,\mathit{IKM},\,\mathit{info},\,L\right)`$
refers to the [HMAC-based key
derivation function][] using using [SHA-256][] as the hash function
([HKDF-SHA-256][]) with a salt value of $`\mathit{salt}`$, input key material of
$`\mathit{IKM}`$, context string $`\mathit{info}`$, and output keying material length of
$`L`$ bytes.
The plain-text is encrypted with AES-256, using the key $`\mathit{AES\_KEY}_{i}`$
and the IV $`\mathit{AES\_IV}_{i}`$ to give the cipher-text, $`X_{i}`$.
The ratchet index $`i`$, and the cipher-text $`X_{i}`$, are then packed
into a message as described in [Message format](#message-format). Then the entire message
(including the version bytes and all payload bytes) are passed through
HMAC-SHA-256. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
Finally, the authenticated message is signed using the Ed25519 keypair; the 64
byte signature is appended to the message.
The complete signed message, together with the public part of $`K`$ (acting
as a session identifier), can then be sent over an insecure channel. The
message can then be authenticated and decrypted only by recipients who have
received the session data.
### Advancing the ratchet
After each message is encrypted, the ratchet is advanced. This is done as
described in [The Megolm ratchet algorithm](#the-megolm-ratchet-algorithm), using the following definitions:
```math
\begin{aligned}
H_0(A) &\equiv \operatorname{HMAC}(A,\text{``\char`\\x00"}) \\
H_1(A) &\equiv \operatorname{HMAC}(A,\text{``\char`\\x01"}) \\
H_2(A) &\equiv \operatorname{HMAC}(A,\text{``\char`\\x02"}) \\
H_3(A) &\equiv \operatorname{HMAC}(A,\text{``\char`\\x03"}) \\
\end{aligned}
```
where $`\operatorname{HMAC}(A, T)`$ is the HMAC-SHA-256 of ``T``, using ``A`` as the
key.
For outbound sessions, the updated ratchet and counter are stored in the
session.
In order to maintain the ability to decrypt conversation history, inbound
sessions should store a copy of their earliest known ratchet value (unless they
explicitly want to drop the ability to decrypt that history - see [Partial
Forward Secrecy](#partial-forward-secrecy)). They may also choose to cache calculated ratchet values,
but the decision of which ratchet states to cache is left to the application.
## Data exchange formats
### Session sharing format
This format is used for the initial sharing of a Megolm session with other
group participants who need to be able to read messages encrypted by this
session.
The session sharing format is as follows:
```
+---+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
| V | i | R(i,0) | R(i,1) | R(i,2) | R(i,3) | Kpub | Signature |
+---+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
0 1 5 37 69 101 133 165 229 bytes
```
The version byte, ``V``, is ``"\x02"``.
This is followed by the ratchet index, $`i`$, which is encoded as a
big-endian 32-bit integer; the ratchet values $`R_{i,j}`$; and the public
part of the Ed25519 keypair $`K`$.
The data is then signed using the Ed25519 keypair, and the 64-byte signature is
appended.
### Session export format
Once the session is initially shared with the group participants, each
participant needs to retain a copy of the session if they want to maintain
their ability to decrypt messages encrypted with that session.
For forward-secrecy purposes, a participant may choose to store a ratcheted
version of the session. But since the ratchet index is covered by the
signature, this would invalidate the signature. So we define a similar format,
called the *session export format*, which is identical to the [session sharing
format](#session-sharing-format) except for dropping the signature.
The Megolm session export format is thus as follows:
```
+---+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+
| V | i | R(i,0) | R(i,1) | R(i,2) | R(i,3) | Kpub |
+---+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+
0 1 5 37 69 101 133 165 bytes
```
The version byte, ``V``, is ``"\x01"``.
This is followed by the ratchet index, $`i`$, which is encoded as a
big-endian 32-bit integer; the ratchet values $`R_{i,j}`$; and the public
part of the Ed25519 keypair $`K`$.
### Message format
Megolm messages consist of a one byte version, followed by a variable length
payload, a fixed length message authentication code, and a fixed length
signature.
```
+---+------------------------------------+-----------+------------------+
| V | Payload Bytes | MAC Bytes | Signature Bytes |
+---+------------------------------------+-----------+------------------+
0 1 N N+8 N+72 bytes
```
The version byte, ``V``, is ``"\x03"``.
The payload uses a format based on the [Protocol Buffers encoding][]. It
consists of the following key-value pairs:
**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
Message-Index|0x08|Integer|The index of the ratchet, i
Cipher-Text|0x12|String|The cipher-text, Xi, of the message
Within the payload, integers are encoded using a variable length encoding. Each
integer is encoded as a sequence of bytes with the high bit set followed by a
byte with the high bit clear. The seven low bits of each byte store the bits of
the integer. The least significant bits are stored in the first byte.
Strings are encoded as a variable-length integer followed by the string itself.
Each key-value pair is encoded as a variable-length integer giving the tag,
followed by a string or variable-length integer giving the value.
The payload is followed by the MAC. The length of the MAC is determined by the
authenticated encryption algorithm being used (8 bytes in this version of the
protocol). The MAC protects all of the bytes preceding the MAC.
The length of the signature is determined by the signing algorithm being used
(64 bytes in this version of the protocol). The signature covers all of the
bytes preceding the signature.
## Limitations
### Message Replays
A message can be decrypted successfully multiple times. This means that an
attacker can re-send a copy of an old message, and the recipient will treat it
as a new message.
To mitigate this it is recommended that applications track the ratchet indices
they have received and that they reject messages with a ratchet index that
they have already decrypted.
### Lack of Transcript Consistency
In a group conversation, there is no guarantee that all recipients have
received the same messages. For example, if Alice is in a conversation with Bob
and Charlie, she could send different messages to Bob and Charlie, or could
send some messages to Bob but not Charlie, or vice versa.
Solving this is, in general, a hard problem, particularly in a protocol which
does not guarantee in-order message delivery. For now it remains the subject of
future research.
### Lack of Backward Secrecy
[Backward secrecy](https://intensecrypto.org/public/lec_08_hash_functions_part2.html#sec-forward-and-backward-secrecy)
(also called 'future secrecy' or 'post-compromise security') is the property
that if current private keys are compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt
future messages in a given session. In other words, when looking
**backwards** in time at a compromise which has already happened, **current**
messages are still secret.
By itself, Megolm does not possess this property: once the key to a Megolm
session is compromised, the attacker can decrypt any message that was
encrypted using a key derived from the compromised or subsequent ratchet
values.
In order to mitigate this, the application should ensure that Megolm sessions
are not used indefinitely. Instead it should periodically start a new session,
with new keys shared over a secure channel.
<!-- TODO: Can we recommend sensible lifetimes for Megolm sessions? Probably
depends how paranoid we're feeling, but some guidelines might be useful. -->
### Partial Forward Secrecy
[Forward secrecy](https://intensecrypto.org/public/lec_08_hash_functions_part2.html#sec-forward-and-backward-secrecy)
(also called 'perfect forward secrecy') is the property that if the current
private keys are compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt *past* messages in
a given session. In other words, when looking **forwards** in time towards a
potential future compromise, **current** messages will be secret.
In Megolm, each recipient maintains a record of the ratchet value which allows
them to decrypt any messages sent in the session after the corresponding point
in the conversation. If this value is compromised, an attacker can similarly
decrypt past messages which were encrypted by a key derived from the
compromised or subsequent ratchet values. This gives 'partial' forward
secrecy.
To mitigate this issue, the application should offer the user the option to
discard historical conversations, by winding forward any stored ratchet values,
or discarding sessions altogether.
### Dependency on secure channel for key exchange
The design of the Megolm ratchet relies on the availability of a secure
peer-to-peer channel for the exchange of session keys. Any vulnerabilities in
the underlying channel are likely to be amplified when applied to Megolm
session setup.
For example, if the peer-to-peer channel is vulnerable to an unknown key-share
attack, the entire Megolm session become similarly vulnerable. For example:
Alice starts a group chat with Eve, and shares the session keys with Eve. Eve
uses the unknown key-share attack to forward the session keys to Bob, who
believes Alice is starting the session with him. Eve then forwards messages
from the Megolm session to Bob, who again believes they are coming from
Alice. Provided the peer-to-peer channel is not vulnerable to this attack, Bob
will realise that the key-sharing message was forwarded by Eve, and can treat
the Megolm session as a forgery.
A second example: if the peer-to-peer channel is vulnerable to a replay
attack, this can be extended to entire Megolm sessions.
## License
The Megolm specification (this document) is licensed under the Apache License,
Version 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.
[Ed25519]: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
[HMAC-based key derivation function]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
[HKDF-SHA-256]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
[HMAC-SHA-256]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
[SHA-256]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234
[AES-256]: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
[CBC]: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
[PKCS#7]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
[Olm]: https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/olm.md
[Protocol Buffers encoding]: https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/encoding

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@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
.. Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
..
.. Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
.. you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
.. You may obtain a copy of the License at
..
.. http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
..
.. Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
.. distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
.. WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
.. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
.. limitations under the License.
Megolm group ratchet
====================
An AES-based cryptographic ratchet intended for group communications.
.. contents::
Background
----------
The Megolm ratchet is intended for encrypted messaging applications where there
may be a large number of recipients of each message, thus precluding the use of
peer-to-peer encryption systems such as `Olm`_.
It also allows a recipient to decrypt received messages multiple times. For
instance, in client/server applications, a copy of the ciphertext can be stored
on the (untrusted) server, while the client need only store the session keys.
Overview
--------
Each participant in a conversation uses their own outbound session for
encrypting messages. A session consists of a ratchet and an `Ed25519`_ keypair.
Secrecy is provided by the ratchet, which can be wound forwards but not
backwards, and is used to derive a distinct message key for each message.
Authenticity is provided via Ed25519 signatures.
The value of the ratchet, and the public part of the Ed25519 key, are shared
with other participants in the conversation via secure peer-to-peer
channels. Provided that peer-to-peer channel provides authenticity of the
messages to the participants and deniability of the messages to third parties,
the Megolm session will inherit those properties.
The Megolm ratchet algorithm
----------------------------
The Megolm ratchet :math:`R_i` consists of four parts, :math:`R_{i,j}` for
:math:`j \in {0,1,2,3}`. The length of each part depends on the hash function
in use (256 bits for this version of Megolm).
The ratchet is initialised with cryptographically-secure random data, and
advanced as follows:
.. math::
\begin{align}
R_{i,0} &=
\begin{cases}
H_0\left(R_{2^24(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^24n\\
R_{i-1,0} &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\\
R_{i,1} &=
\begin{cases}
H_1\left(R_{2^24(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^24n\\
H_1\left(R_{2^16(m-1),1}\right) &\text{if }\exists m | i = 2^16m\\
R_{i-1,1} &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\\
R_{i,2} &=
\begin{cases}
H_2\left(R_{2^24(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^24n\\
H_2\left(R_{2^16(m-1),1}\right) &\text{if }\exists m | i = 2^16m\\
H_2\left(R_{2^8(p-1),2}\right) &\text{if }\exists p | i = 2^8p\\
R_{i-1,2} &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}\\
R_{i,3} &=
\begin{cases}
H_3\left(R_{2^24(n-1),0}\right) &\text{if }\exists n | i = 2^24n\\
H_3\left(R_{2^16(m-1),1}\right) &\text{if }\exists m | i = 2^16m\\
H_3\left(R_{2^8(p-1),2}\right) &\text{if }\exists p | i = 2^8p\\
H_3\left(R_{i-1,3}\right) &\text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\end{align}
where :math:`H_0`, :math:`H_1`, :math:`H_2`, and :math:`H_3` are different hash
functions. In summary: every :math:`2^8` iterations, :math:`R_{i,3}` is
reseeded from :math:`R_{i,2}`. Every :math:`2^16` iterations, :math:`R_{i,2}`
and :math:`R_{i,3}` are reseeded from :math:`R_{i,1}`. Every :math:`2^24`
iterations, :math:`R_{i,1}`, :math:`R_{i,2}` and :math:`R_{i,3}` are reseeded
from :math:`R_{i,0}`.
The complete ratchet value, :math:`R_{i}`, is hashed to generate the keys used
to encrypt each message. This scheme allows the ratchet to be advanced an
arbitrary amount forwards while needing at most 1020 hash computations. A
client can decrypt chat history onwards from the earliest value of the ratchet
it is aware of, but cannot decrypt history from before that point without
reversing the hash function.
This allows a participant to share its ability to decrypt chat history with
another from a point in the conversation onwards by giving a copy of the
ratchet at that point in the conversation.
The Megolm protocol
-------------------
Session setup
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Each participant in a conversation generates their own Megolm session. A
session consists of three parts:
* a 32 bit counter, :math:`i`.
* an `Ed25519`_ keypair, :math:`K`.
* a ratchet, :math:`R_i`, which consists of four 256-bit values,
:math:`R_{i,j}` for :math:`j \in {0,1,2,3}`.
The counter :math:`i` is initialised to :math:`0`. A new Ed25519 keypair is
generated for :math:`K`. The ratchet is simply initialised with 1024 bits of
cryptographically-secure random data.
A single participant may use multiple sessions over the lifetime of a
conversation. The public part of :math:`K` is used as an identifier to
discriminate between sessions.
Sharing session data
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To allow other participants in the conversation to decrypt messages, the
session data is formatted as described in `Session-sharing format`_. It is then
shared with other participants in the conversation via a secure peer-to-peer
channel (such as that provided by `Olm`_).
When the session data is received from other participants, the recipient first
checks that the signature matches the public key. They then store their own
copy of the counter, ratchet, and public key.
Message encryption
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This version of Megolm uses AES-256_ in CBC_ mode with `PKCS#7`_ padding and
HMAC-SHA-256_ (truncated to 64 bits). The 256 bit AES key, 256 bit HMAC key,
and 128 bit AES IV are derived from the megolm ratchet :math:`R_i`:
.. math::
\begin{align}
AES\_KEY_{i}\;\parallel\;HMAC\_KEY_{i}\;\parallel\;AES\_IV_{i}
&= HKDF\left(0,\,R_{i},\text{"MEGOLM\_KEYS"},\,80\right) \\
\end{align}
where :math:`\parallel` represents string splitting, and
:math:`HKDF\left(salt,\,IKM,\,info,\,L\right)` refers to the `HMAC-based key
derivation function`_ using using `SHA-256`_ as the hash function
(`HKDF-SHA-256`_) with a salt value of :math:`salt`, input key material of
:math:`IKM`, context string :math:`info`, and output keying material length of
:math:`L` bytes.
The plain-text is encrypted with AES-256, using the key :math:`AES\_KEY_{i}`
and the IV :math:`AES\_IV_{i}` to give the cipher-text, :math:`X_{i}`.
The ratchet index :math:`i`, and the cipher-text :math:`X_{i}`, are then packed
into a message as described in `Message format`_. Then the entire message
(including the version bytes and all payload bytes) are passed through
HMAC-SHA-256. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
Finally, the authenticated message is signed using the Ed25519 keypair; the 64
byte signature is appended to the message.
The complete signed message, together with the public part of :math:`K` (acting
as a session identifier), can then be sent over an insecure channel. The
message can then be authenticated and decrypted only by recipients who have
received the session data.
Advancing the ratchet
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
After each message is encrypted, the ratchet is advanced. This is done as
described in `The Megolm ratchet algorithm`_, using the following definitions:
.. math::
\begin{align}
H_0(A) &\equiv HMAC(A,\text{"\textbackslash x00"}) \\
H_1(A) &\equiv HMAC(A,\text{"\textbackslash x01"}) \\
H_2(A) &\equiv HMAC(A,\text{"\textbackslash x02"}) \\
H_3(A) &\equiv HMAC(A,\text{"\textbackslash x03"}) \\
\end{align}
where :math:`HMAC(A, T)` is the HMAC-SHA-256_ of ``T``, using ``A`` as the
key.
For outbound sessions, the updated ratchet and counter are stored in the
session.
In order to maintain the ability to decrypt conversation history, inbound
sessions should store a copy of their earliest known ratchet value (unless they
explicitly want to drop the ability to decrypt that history - see `Partial
Forward Secrecy`_\ ). They may also choose to cache calculated ratchet values,
but the decision of which ratchet states to cache is left to the application.
Data exchange formats
---------------------
Session-sharing format
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Megolm key-sharing format is as follows:
.. code::
+---+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
| V | i | R(i,0) | R(i,1) | R(i,2) | R(i,3) | Kpub | Signature |
+---+----+--------+--------+--------+--------+------+-----------+
0 1 5 37 69 101 133 165 229 bytes
The version byte, ``V``, is ``"\x02"``.
This is followed by the ratchet index, :math:`i`, which is encoded as a
big-endian 32-bit integer; the ratchet values :math:`R_{i,j}`; and the public
part of the Ed25519 keypair :math:`K`.
The data is then signed using the Ed25519 keypair, and the 64-byte signature is
appended.
Message format
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Megolm messages consist of a one byte version, followed by a variable length
payload, a fixed length message authentication code, and a fixed length
signature.
.. code::
+---+------------------------------------+-----------+------------------+
| V | Payload Bytes | MAC Bytes | Signature Bytes |
+---+------------------------------------+-----------+------------------+
0 1 N N+8 N+72 bytes
The version byte, ``V``, is ``"\x03"``.
The payload uses a format based on the `Protocol Buffers encoding`_. It
consists of the following key-value pairs:
============= ===== ======== ================================================
Name Tag Type Meaning
============= ===== ======== ================================================
Message-Index 0x08 Integer The index of the ratchet, :math:`i`
Cipher-Text 0x12 String The cipher-text, :math:`X_{i}`, of the message
============= ===== ======== ================================================
Within the payload, integers are encoded using a variable length encoding. Each
integer is encoded as a sequence of bytes with the high bit set followed by a
byte with the high bit clear. The seven low bits of each byte store the bits of
the integer. The least significant bits are stored in the first byte.
Strings are encoded as a variable-length integer followed by the string itself.
Each key-value pair is encoded as a variable-length integer giving the tag,
followed by a string or variable-length integer giving the value.
The payload is followed by the MAC. The length of the MAC is determined by the
authenticated encryption algorithm being used (8 bytes in this version of the
protocol). The MAC protects all of the bytes preceding the MAC.
The length of the signature is determined by the signing algorithm being used
(64 bytes in this version of the protocol). The signature covers all of the
bytes preceding the signature.
Limitations
-----------
Message Replays
---------------
A message can be decrypted successfully multiple times. This means that an
attacker can re-send a copy of an old message, and the recipient will treat it
as a new message.
To mitigate this it is recommended that applications track the ratchet indices
they have received and that they reject messages with a ratchet index that
they have already decrypted.
Lack of Transcript Consistency
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In a group conversation, there is no guarantee that all recipients have
received the same messages. For example, if Alice is in a conversation with Bob
and Charlie, she could send different messages to Bob and Charlie, or could
send some messages to Bob but not Charlie, or vice versa.
Solving this is, in general, a hard problem, particularly in a protocol which
does not guarantee in-order message delivery. For now it remains the subject of
future research.
Lack of Backward Secrecy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Once the key to a Megolm session is compromised, the attacker can decrypt any
future messages sent via that session.
In order to mitigate this, the application should ensure that Megolm sessions
are not used indefinitely. Instead it should periodically start a new session,
with new keys shared over a secure channel.
.. TODO: Can we recommend sensible lifetimes for Megolm sessions? Probably
depends how paranoid we're feeling, but some guidelines might be useful.
Partial Forward Secrecy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Each recipient maintains a record of the ratchet value which allows them to
decrypt any messages sent in the session after the corresponding point in the
conversation. If this value is compromised, an attacker can similarly decrypt
those past messages.
To mitigate this issue, the application should offer the user the option to
discard historical conversations, by winding forward any stored ratchet values,
or discarding sessions altogether.
Dependency on secure channel for key exchange
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The design of the Megolm ratchet relies on the availability of a secure
peer-to-peer channel for the exchange of session keys. Any vulnerabilities in
the underlying channel are likely to be amplified when applied to Megolm
session setup.
For example, if the peer-to-peer channel is vulnerable to an unknown key-share
attack, the entire Megolm session become similarly vulnerable. For example:
Alice starts a group chat with Eve, and shares the session keys with Eve. Eve
uses the unknown key-share attack to forward the session keys to Bob, who
believes Alice is starting the session with him. Eve then forwards messages
from the Megolm session to Bob, who again believes they are coming from
Alice. Provided the peer-to-peer channel is not vulnerable to this attack, Bob
will realise that the key-sharing message was forwarded by Eve, and can treat
the Megolm session as a forgery.
A second example: if the peer-to-peer channel is vulnerable to a replay
attack, this can be extended to entire Megolm sessions.
License
-------
The Megolm specification (this document) is licensed under the `Apache License,
Version 2.0 <http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0>`_.
.. _`Ed25519`: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
.. _`HMAC-based key derivation function`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
.. _`HKDF-SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
.. _`HMAC-SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
.. _`SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234
.. _`AES-256`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
.. _`CBC`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
.. _`PKCS#7`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
.. _`Olm`: ./olm.html
.. _`Protocol Buffers encoding`: https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/encoding

331
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# Olm: A Cryptographic Ratchet
An implementation of the double cryptographic ratchet described by
https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/.
## Notation
This document uses $`\parallel`$ to represent string concatenation. When
$`\parallel`$ appears on the right hand side of an $`=`$ it means that
the inputs are concatenated. When $`\parallel`$ appears on the left hand
side of an $`=`$ it means that the output is split.
When this document uses $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_A,K_B\right)`$ it means
that each party computes a Diffie-Hellman agreement using their private key
and the remote party's public key.
So party $`A`$ computes $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_B^{public},K_A^{private}\right)`$
and party $`B`$ computes $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_A^{public},K_B^{private}\right)`$.
Where this document uses $`\operatorname{HKDF}\left(salt,IKM,info,L\right)`$ it
refers to the [HMAC-based key derivation function][] with a salt value of
$`salt`$, input key material of $`IKM`$, context string $`info`$,
and output keying material length of $`L`$ bytes.
## The Olm Algorithm
### Initial setup
The setup takes four [Curve25519][] inputs: Identity keys for Alice and Bob,
$`I_A`$ and $`I_B`$, and one-time keys for Alice and Bob,
$`E_A`$ and $`E_B`$. A shared secret, $`S`$, is generated using
[Triple Diffie-Hellman][]. The initial 256 bit root key, $`R_0`$, and 256
bit chain key, $`C_{0,0}`$, are derived from the shared secret using an
HMAC-based Key Derivation Function using [SHA-256][] as the hash function
([HKDF-SHA-256][]) with default salt and ``"OLM_ROOT"`` as the info.
```math
\begin{aligned}
S&=\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)\\
R_0\;\parallel\;C_{0,0}&=
\operatorname{HKDF}\left(0,S,\text{``OLM\_ROOT"},64\right)
\end{aligned}
```
### Advancing the root key
Advancing a root key takes the previous root key, $`R_{i-1}`$, and two
Curve25519 inputs: the previous ratchet key, $`T_{i-1}`$, and the current
ratchet key $`T_i`$. The even ratchet keys are generated by Alice.
The odd ratchet keys are generated by Bob. A shared secret is generated
using Diffie-Hellman on the ratchet keys. The next root key, $`R_i`$, and
chain key, $`C_{i,0}`$, are derived from the shared secret using
[HKDF-SHA-256][] using $`R_{i-1}`$ as the salt and ``"OLM_RATCHET"`` as the
info.
```math
\begin{aligned}
R_i\;\parallel\;C_{i,0}&=
\operatorname{HKDF}\left(
R_{i-1},
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(T_{i-1},T_i\right),
\text{``OLM\_RATCHET"},
64
\right)
\end{aligned}
```
### Advancing the chain key
Advancing a chain key takes the previous chain key, $`C_{i,j-1}`$. The next
chain key, $`C_{i,j}`$, is the [HMAC-SHA-256][] of ``"\x02"`` using the
previous chain key as the key.
```math
\begin{aligned}
C_{i,j}&=\operatorname{HMAC}\left(C_{i,j-1},\text{``\char`\\x02"}\right)
\end{aligned}
```
### Creating a message key
Creating a message key takes the current chain key, $`C_{i,j}`$. The
message key, $`M_{i,j}`$, is the [HMAC-SHA-256][] of ``"\x01"`` using the
current chain key as the key. The message keys where $`i`$ is even are used
by Alice to encrypt messages. The message keys where $`i`$ is odd are used
by Bob to encrypt messages.
```math
\begin{aligned}
M_{i,j}&=\operatorname{HMAC}\left(C_{i,j},\text{``\char`\\x01"}\right)
\end{aligned}
```
## The Olm Protocol
### Creating an outbound session
Bob publishes the public parts of his identity key, $`I_B`$, and some
single-use one-time keys $`E_B`$.
Alice downloads Bob's identity key, $`I_B`$, and a one-time key,
$`E_B`$. She generates a new single-use key, $`E_A`$, and computes a
root key, $`R_0`$, and a chain key $`C_{0,0}`$. She also generates a
new ratchet key $`T_0`$.
### Sending the first pre-key messages
Alice computes a message key, $`M_{0,j}`$, and a new chain key,
$`C_{0,j+1}`$, using the current chain key. She replaces the current chain
key with the new one.
Alice encrypts her plain-text with the message key, $`M_{0,j}`$, using an
authenticated encryption scheme (see below) to get a cipher-text,
$`X_{0,j}`$.
She then sends the following to Bob:
* The public part of her identity key, $`I_A`$
* The public part of her single-use key, $`E_A`$
* The public part of Bob's single-use key, $`E_B`$
* The current chain index, $`j`$
* The public part of her ratchet key, $`T_0`$
* The cipher-text, $`X_{0,j}`$
Alice will continue to send pre-key messages until she receives a message from
Bob.
### Creating an inbound session from a pre-key message
Bob receives a pre-key message as above.
Bob looks up the private part of his single-use key, $`E_B`$. He can now
compute the root key, $`R_0`$, and the chain key, $`C_{0,0}`$, from
$`I_A`$, $`E_A`$, $`I_B`$, and $`E_B`$.
Bob then advances the chain key $`j`$ times, to compute the chain key used
by the message, $`C_{0,j}`$. He now creates the
message key, $`M_{0,j}`$, and attempts to decrypt the cipher-text,
$`X_{0,j}`$. If the cipher-text's authentication is correct then Bob can
discard the private part of his single-use one-time key, $`E_B`$.
Bob stores Alice's initial ratchet key, $`T_0`$, until he wants to
send a message.
### Sending normal messages
Once a message has been received from the other side, a session is considered
established, and a more compact form is used.
To send a message, the user checks if they have a sender chain key,
$`C_{i,j}`$. Alice uses chain keys where $`i`$ is even. Bob uses chain
keys where $`i`$ is odd. If the chain key doesn't exist then a new ratchet
key $`T_i`$ is generated and a new root key $`R_i`$ and chain key
$`C_{i,0}`$ are computed using $`R_{i-1}`$, $`T_{i-1}`$ and
$`T_i`$.
A message key,
$`M_{i,j}`$ is computed from the current chain key, $`C_{i,j}`$, and
the chain key is replaced with the next chain key, $`C_{i,j+1}`$. The
plain-text is encrypted with $`M_{i,j}`$, using an authenticated encryption
scheme (see below) to get a cipher-text, $`X_{i,j}`$.
The user then sends the following to the recipient:
* The current chain index, $`j`$
* The public part of the current ratchet key, $`T_i`$
* The cipher-text, $`X_{i,j}`$
### Receiving messages
The user receives a message as above with the sender's current chain index, $`j`$,
the sender's ratchet key, $`T_i`$, and the cipher-text, $`X_{i,j}`$.
The user checks if they have a receiver chain with the correct
$`i`$ by comparing the ratchet key, $`T_i`$. If the chain doesn't exist
then they compute a new root key, $`R_i`$, and a new receiver chain, with
chain key $`C_{i,0}`$, using $`R_{i-1}`$, $`T_{i-1}`$ and
$`T_i`$.
If the $`j`$ of the message is less than
the current chain index on the receiver then the message may only be decrypted
if the receiver has stored a copy of the message key $`M_{i,j}`$. Otherwise
the receiver computes the chain key, $`C_{i,j}`$. The receiver computes the
message key, $`M_{i,j}`$, from the chain key and attempts to decrypt the
cipher-text, $`X_{i,j}`$.
If the decryption succeeds the receiver updates the chain key for $`T_i`$
with $`C_{i,j+1}`$ and stores the message keys that were skipped in the
process so that they can decode out of order messages. If the receiver created
a new receiver chain then they discard their current sender chain so that
they will create a new chain when they next send a message.
## The Olm Message Format
Olm uses two types of messages. The underlying transport protocol must provide
a means for recipients to distinguish between them.
### Normal Messages
Olm messages start with a one byte version followed by a variable length
payload followed by a fixed length message authentication code.
```
+--------------+------------------------------------+-----------+
| Version Byte | Payload Bytes | MAC Bytes |
+--------------+------------------------------------+-----------+
```
The version byte is ``"\x03"``.
The payload consists of key-value pairs where the keys are integers and the
values are integers and strings. The keys are encoded as a variable length
integer tag where the 3 lowest bits indicates the type of the value:
0 for integers, 2 for strings. If the value is an integer then the tag is
followed by the value encoded as a variable length integer. If the value is
a string then the tag is followed by the length of the string encoded as
a variable length integer followed by the string itself.
Olm uses a variable length encoding for integers. Each integer is encoded as a
sequence of bytes with the high bit set followed by a byte with the high bit
clear. The seven low bits of each byte store the bits of the integer. The least
significant bits are stored in the first byte.
**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
Ratchet-Key|0x0A|String|The public part of the ratchet key, Ti, of the message
Chain-Index|0x10|Integer|The chain index, j, of the message
Cipher-Text|0x22|String|The cipher-text, Xi,j, of the message
The length of the MAC is determined by the authenticated encryption algorithm
being used. (Olm version 1 uses [HMAC-SHA-256][], truncated to 8 bytes). The
MAC protects all of the bytes preceding the MAC.
### Pre-Key Messages
Olm pre-key messages start with a one byte version followed by a variable
length payload.
```
+--------------+------------------------------------+
| Version Byte | Payload Bytes |
+--------------+------------------------------------+
```
The version byte is ``"\x03"``.
The payload uses the same key-value format as for normal messages.
**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
One-Time-Key|0x0A|String|The public part of Bob's single-use key, Eb.
Base-Key|0x12|String|The public part of Alice's single-use key, Ea.
Identity-Key|0x1A|String|The public part of Alice's identity key, Ia.
Message|0x22|String|An embedded Olm message with its own version and MAC.
## Olm Authenticated Encryption
### Version 1
Version 1 of Olm uses [AES-256][] in [CBC][] mode with [PKCS#7][] padding for
encryption and [HMAC-SHA-256][] (truncated to 64 bits) for authentication. The
256 bit AES key, 256 bit HMAC key, and 128 bit AES IV are derived from the
message key using [HKDF-SHA-256][] using the default salt and an info of
``"OLM_KEYS"``.
```math
\begin{aligned}
AES\_KEY_{i,j}\;\parallel\;HMAC\_KEY_{i,j}\;\parallel\;AES\_IV_{i,j}
&= \operatorname{HKDF}\left(0,M_{i,j},\text{``OLM\_KEYS"},80\right)
\end{aligned}
```
The plain-text is encrypted with AES-256, using the key $`AES\_KEY_{i,j}`$
and the IV $`AES\_IV_{i,j}`$ to give the cipher-text, $`X_{i,j}`$.
Then the entire message (including the Version Byte and all Payload Bytes) are
passed through [HMAC-SHA-256][]. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
## Message authentication concerns
To avoid unknown key-share attacks, the application must include identifying
data for the sending and receiving user in the plain-text of (at least) the
pre-key messages. Such data could be a user ID, a telephone number;
alternatively it could be the public part of a keypair which the relevant user
has proven ownership of.
### Example attacks
1. Alice publishes her public [Curve25519][] identity key, $`I_A`$. Eve
publishes the same identity key, claiming it as her own. Bob downloads
Eve's keys, and associates $`I_A`$ with Eve. Alice sends a message to
Bob; Eve intercepts it before forwarding it to Bob. Bob believes the
message came from Eve rather than Alice.
This is prevented if Alice includes her user ID in the plain-text of the
pre-key message, so that Bob can see that the message was sent by Alice
originally.
2. Bob publishes his public [Curve25519][] identity key, $`I_B`$. Eve
publishes the same identity key, claiming it as her own. Alice downloads
Eve's keys, and associates $`I_B`$ with Eve. Alice sends a message to
Eve; Eve cannot decrypt it, but forwards it to Bob. Bob believes the
Alice sent the message to him, wheras Alice intended it to go to Eve.
This is prevented by Alice including the user ID of the intended recpient
(Eve) in the plain-text of the pre-key message. Bob can now tell that the
message was meant for Eve rather than him.
## IPR
The Olm specification (this document) is hereby placed in the public domain.
## Feedback
Can be sent to olm at matrix.org.
## Acknowledgements
The ratchet that Olm implements was designed by Trevor Perrin and Moxie
Marlinspike - details at https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/. Olm is
an entirely new implementation written by the Matrix.org team.
[Curve25519]: http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
[Triple Diffie-Hellman]: https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
[HMAC-based key derivation function]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
[HKDF-SHA-256]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
[HMAC-SHA-256]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
[SHA-256]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234
[AES-256]: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
[CBC]: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
[PKCS#7]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315

View file

@ -1,358 +0,0 @@
Olm: A Cryptographic Ratchet
============================
An implementation of the double cryptographic ratchet described by
https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/.
Notation
--------
This document uses :math:`\parallel` to represent string concatenation. When
:math:`\parallel` appears on the right hand side of an :math:`=` it means that
the inputs are concatenated. When :math:`\parallel` appears on the left hand
side of an :math:`=` it means that the output is split.
When this document uses :math:`ECDH\left(K_A,\,K_B\right)` it means that each
party computes a Diffie-Hellman agreement using their private key and the
remote party's public key.
So party :math:`A` computes :math:`ECDH\left(K_B_public,\,K_A_private\right)`
and party :math:`B` computes :math:`ECDH\left(K_A_public,\,K_B_private\right)`.
Where this document uses :math:`HKDF\left(salt,\,IKM,\,info,\,L\right)` it
refers to the `HMAC-based key derivation function`_ with a salt value of
:math:`salt`, input key material of :math:`IKM`, context string :math:`info`,
and output keying material length of :math:`L` bytes.
The Olm Algorithm
-----------------
Initial setup
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The setup takes four Curve25519_ inputs: Identity keys for Alice and Bob,
:math:`I_A` and :math:`I_B`, and one-time keys for Alice and Bob,
:math:`E_A` and :math:`E_B`. A shared secret, :math:`S`, is generated using
`Triple Diffie-Hellman`_. The initial 256 bit root key, :math:`R_0`, and 256
bit chain key, :math:`C_{0,0}`, are derived from the shared secret using an
HMAC-based Key Derivation Function using SHA-256_ as the hash function
(HKDF-SHA-256_) with default salt and ``"OLM_ROOT"`` as the info.
.. math::
\begin{align}
S&=ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;ECDH\left(E_A,\,I_B\right)\;
\parallel\;ECDH\left(E_A,\,E_B\right)\\
R_0\;\parallel\;C_{0,0}&=
HKDF\left(0,\,S,\,\text{"OLM\_ROOT"},\,64\right)
\end{align}
Advancing the root key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Advancing a root key takes the previous root key, :math:`R_{i-1}`, and two
Curve25519 inputs: the previous ratchet key, :math:`T_{i-1}`, and the current
ratchet key :math:`T_i`. The even ratchet keys are generated by Alice.
The odd ratchet keys are generated by Bob. A shared secret is generated
using Diffie-Hellman on the ratchet keys. The next root key, :math:`R_i`, and
chain key, :math:`C_{i,0}`, are derived from the shared secret using
HKDF-SHA-256_ using :math:`R_{i-1}` as the salt and ``"OLM_RATCHET"`` as the
info.
.. math::
\begin{align}
R_i\;\parallel\;C_{i,0}&=HKDF\left(
R_{i-1},\,
ECDH\left(T_{i-1},\,T_i\right),\,
\text{"OLM\_RATCHET"},\,
64
\right)
\end{align}
Advancing the chain key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Advancing a chain key takes the previous chain key, :math:`C_{i,j-1}`. The next
chain key, :math:`C_{i,j}`, is the HMAC-SHA-256_ of ``"\x02"`` using the
previous chain key as the key.
.. math::
\begin{align}
C_{i,j}&=HMAC\left(C_{i,j-1},\,\text{"\textbackslash x02"}\right)
\end{align}
Creating a message key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Creating a message key takes the current chain key, :math:`C_{i,j}`. The
message key, :math:`M_{i,j}`, is the HMAC-SHA-256_ of ``"\x01"`` using the
current chain key as the key. The message keys where :math:`i` is even are used
by Alice to encrypt messages. The message keys where :math:`i` is odd are used
by Bob to encrypt messages.
.. math::
\begin{align}
M_{i,j}&=HMAC\left(C_{i,j},\,\text{"\textbackslash x01"}\right)
\end{align}
The Olm Protocol
----------------
Creating an outbound session
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Bob publishes the public parts of his identity key, :math:`I_B`, and some
single-use one-time keys :math:`E_B`.
Alice downloads Bob's identity key, :math:`I_B`, and a one-time key,
:math:`E_B`. She generates a new single-use key, :math:`E_A`, and computes a
root key, :math:`R_0`, and a chain key :math:`C_{0,0}`. She also generates a
new ratchet key :math:`T_0`.
Sending the first pre-key messages
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Alice computes a message key, :math:`M_{0,j}`, and a new chain key,
:math:`C_{0,j+1}`, using the current chain key. She replaces the current chain
key with the new one.
Alice encrypts her plain-text with the message key, :math:`M_{0,j}`, using an
authenticated encryption scheme (see below) to get a cipher-text,
:math:`X_{0,j}`.
She then sends the following to Bob:
* The public part of her identity key, :math:`I_A`
* The public part of her single-use key, :math:`E_A`
* The public part of Bob's single-use key, :math:`E_B`
* The current chain index, :math:`j`
* The public part of her ratchet key, :math:`T_0`
* The cipher-text, :math:`X_{0,j}`
Alice will continue to send pre-key messages until she receives a message from
Bob.
Creating an inbound session from a pre-key message
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Bob receives a pre-key message as above.
Bob looks up the private part of his single-use key, :math:`E_B`. He can now
compute the root key, :math:`R_0`, and the chain key, :math:`C_{0,0}`, from
:math:`I_A`, :math:`E_A`, :math:`I_B`, and :math:`E_B`.
Bob then advances the chain key :math:`j` times, to compute the chain key used
by the message, :math:`C_{0,j}`. He now creates the
message key, :math:`M_{0,j}`, and attempts to decrypt the cipher-text,
:math:`X_{0,j}`. If the cipher-text's authentication is correct then Bob can
discard the private part of his single-use one-time key, :math:`E_B`.
Bob stores Alice's initial ratchet key, :math:`T_0`, until he wants to
send a message.
Sending normal messages
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Once a message has been received from the other side, a session is considered
established, and a more compact form is used.
To send a message, the user checks if they have a sender chain key,
:math:`C_{i,j}`. Alice uses chain keys where :math:`i` is even. Bob uses chain
keys where :math:`i` is odd. If the chain key doesn't exist then a new ratchet
key :math:`T_i` is generated and a new root key :math:`R_i` and chain key
:math:`C_{i,0}` are computed using :math:`R_{i-1}`, :math:`T_{i-1}` and
:math:`T_i`.
A message key,
:math:`M_{i,j}` is computed from the current chain key, :math:`C_{i,j}`, and
the chain key is replaced with the next chain key, :math:`C_{i,j+1}`. The
plain-text is encrypted with :math:`M_{i,j}`, using an authenticated encryption
scheme (see below) to get a cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`.
The user then sends the following to the recipient:
* The current chain index, :math:`j`
* The public part of the current ratchet key, :math:`T_i`
* The cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`
Receiving messages
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The user receives a message as above with the sender's current chain index, :math:`j`,
the sender's ratchet key, :math:`T_i`, and the cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`.
The user checks if they have a receiver chain with the correct
:math:`i` by comparing the ratchet key, :math:`T_i`. If the chain doesn't exist
then they compute a new root key, :math:`R_i`, and a new receiver chain, with
chain key :math:`C_{i,0}`, using :math:`R_{i-1}`, :math:`T_{i-1}` and
:math:`T_i`.
If the :math:`j` of the message is less than
the current chain index on the receiver then the message may only be decrypted
if the receiver has stored a copy of the message key :math:`M_{i,j}`. Otherwise
the receiver computes the chain key, :math:`C_{i,j}`. The receiver computes the
message key, :math:`M_{i,j}`, from the chain key and attempts to decrypt the
cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`.
If the decryption succeeds the receiver updates the chain key for :math:`T_i`
with :math:`C_{i,j+1}` and stores the message keys that were skipped in the
process so that they can decode out of order messages. If the receiver created
a new receiver chain then they discard their current sender chain so that
they will create a new chain when they next send a message.
The Olm Message Format
----------------------
Olm uses two types of messages. The underlying transport protocol must provide
a means for recipients to distinguish between them.
Normal Messages
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olm messages start with a one byte version followed by a variable length
payload followed by a fixed length message authentication code.
.. code::
+--------------+------------------------------------+-----------+
| Version Byte | Payload Bytes | MAC Bytes |
+--------------+------------------------------------+-----------+
The version byte is ``"\x03"``.
The payload consists of key-value pairs where the keys are integers and the
values are integers and strings. The keys are encoded as a variable length
integer tag where the 3 lowest bits indicates the type of the value:
0 for integers, 2 for strings. If the value is an integer then the tag is
followed by the value encoded as a variable length integer. If the value is
a string then the tag is followed by the length of the string encoded as
a variable length integer followed by the string itself.
Olm uses a variable length encoding for integers. Each integer is encoded as a
sequence of bytes with the high bit set followed by a byte with the high bit
clear. The seven low bits of each byte store the bits of the integer. The least
significant bits are stored in the first byte.
=========== ===== ======== ================================================
Name Tag Type Meaning
=========== ===== ======== ================================================
Ratchet-Key 0x0A String The public part of the ratchet key, :math:`T_{i}`,
of the message
Chain-Index 0x10 Integer The chain index, :math:`j`, of the message
Cipher-Text 0x22 String The cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`, of the message
=========== ===== ======== ================================================
The length of the MAC is determined by the authenticated encryption algorithm
being used. (Olm version 1 uses HMAC-SHA-256, truncated to 8 bytes). The
MAC protects all of the bytes preceding the MAC.
Pre-Key Messages
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Olm pre-key messages start with a one byte version followed by a variable
length payload.
.. code::
+--------------+------------------------------------+
| Version Byte | Payload Bytes |
+--------------+------------------------------------+
The version byte is ``"\x03"``.
The payload uses the same key-value format as for normal messages.
============ ===== ======== ================================================
Name Tag Type Meaning
============ ===== ======== ================================================
One-Time-Key 0x0A String The public part of Bob's single-use key,
:math:`E_b`.
Base-Key 0x12 String The public part of Alice's single-use key,
:math:`E_a`.
Identity-Key 0x1A String The public part of Alice's identity key,
:math:`I_a`.
Message 0x22 String An embedded Olm message with its own version and
MAC.
============ ===== ======== ================================================
Olm Authenticated Encryption
----------------------------
Version 1
~~~~~~~~~
Version 1 of Olm uses AES-256_ in CBC_ mode with `PKCS#7`_ padding for
encryption and HMAC-SHA-256_ (truncated to 64 bits) for authentication. The
256 bit AES key, 256 bit HMAC key, and 128 bit AES IV are derived from the
message key using HKDF-SHA-256_ using the default salt and an info of
``"OLM_KEYS"``.
.. math::
\begin{align}
AES\_KEY_{i,j}\;\parallel\;HMAC\_KEY_{i,j}\;\parallel\;AES\_IV_{i,j}
&= HKDF\left(0,\,M_{i,j},\text{"OLM\_KEYS"},\,80\right) \\
\end{align}
The plain-text is encrypted with AES-256, using the key :math:`AES\_KEY_{i,j}`
and the IV :math:`AES\_IV_{i,j}` to give the cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`.
Then the entire message (including the Version Byte and all Payload Bytes) are
passed through HMAC-SHA-256. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
Message authentication concerns
-------------------------------
To avoid unknown key-share attacks, the application must include identifying
data for the sending and receiving user in the plain-text of (at least) the
pre-key messages. Such data could be a user ID, a telephone number;
alternatively it could be the public part of a keypair which the relevant user
has proven ownership of.
.. admonition:: Example attacks
1. Alice publishes her public Curve25519 identity key, :math:`I_A`. Eve
publishes the same identity key, claiming it as her own. Bob downloads
Eve's keys, and associates :math:`I_A` with Eve. Alice sends a message to
Bob; Eve intercepts it before forwarding it to Bob. Bob believes the
message came from Eve rather than Alice.
This is prevented if Alice includes her user ID in the plain-text of the
pre-key message, so that Bob can see that the message was sent by Alice
originally.
2. Bob publishes his public Curve25519 identity key, :math:`I_B`. Eve
publishes the same identity key, claiming it as her own. Alice downloads
Eve's keys, and associates :math:`I_B` with Eve. Alice sends a message to
Eve; Eve cannot decrypt it, but forwards it to Bob. Bob believes the
Alice sent the message to him, wheras Alice intended it to go to Eve.
This is prevented by Alice including the user ID of the intended recpient
(Eve) in the plain-text of the pre-key message. Bob can now tell that the
message was meant for Eve rather than him.
IPR
---
The Olm specification (this document) is hereby placed in the public domain.
Feedback
--------
Can be sent to olm at matrix.org.
Acknowledgements
----------------
The ratchet that Olm implements was designed by Trevor Perrin and Moxie
Marlinspike - details at https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/. Olm is
an entirely new implementation written by the Matrix.org team.
.. _`Curve25519`: http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
.. _`Triple Diffie-Hellman`: https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
.. _`HMAC-based key derivation function`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
.. _`HKDF-SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
.. _`HMAC-SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
.. _`SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234
.. _`AES-256`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
.. _`CBC`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
.. _`PKCS#7`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315

View file

@ -1,20 +1,4 @@
.. Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
..
.. Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
.. you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
.. You may obtain a copy of the License at
..
.. http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
..
.. Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
.. distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
.. WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
.. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
.. limitations under the License.
Signature keys and user identity in libolm
==========================================
# Signature keys and user identity in libolm
The use of any public-key based cryptography system such as Olm presents the
need for our users Alice and Bob to verify that they are in fact communicating
@ -23,13 +7,13 @@ out-of-band process in which Alice and Bob verify that they have the correct
public keys for each other. For example, this might be done via physical
presence or via a voice call.
In the basic `Olm <olm.html>`_ protocol, it is sufficient to compare the public
In the basic [Olm][] protocol, it is sufficient to compare the public
Curve25519 identity keys. As a naive example, Alice would meet Bob and ensure
that the identity key she downloaded from the key server matched that shown by
his device. This prevents the eavesdropper Eve from decrypting any messages
sent from Alice to Bob, or from masquerading as Bob to send messages to Alice:
she has neither Alice's nor Bob's private identity key, so cannot successfully
complete the triple-DH calculation to compute the shared secret, :math:`S`,
complete the triple-DH calculation to compute the shared secret, $`S`$,
which in turn prevents her decrypting intercepted messages, or from creating
new messages with valid MACs. Obviously, for protection to be complete, Bob
must similarly verify Alice's key.
@ -41,7 +25,7 @@ one-time keys. Curve25519 keys are intended for use in DH calculations, and
their use to calculate signatures is non-trivial.
The solution adopted in this library is to generate a signing key for each
user. This is an `Ed25519`_ keypair, which is used to calculate a signature on
user. This is an [Ed25519][] keypair, which is used to calculate a signature on
an object including both the public Ed25519 signing key and the public
Curve25519 identity key. It is then the **public Ed25519 signing key** which is
used as the device fingerprint which Alice and Bob verify with each other.
@ -50,8 +34,7 @@ By verifying the signatures on the key object, Alice and Bob then get the same
level of assurance about the ownership of the Curve25519 identity keys as if
they had compared those directly.
Signing one-time keys
---------------------
## Signing one-time keys
The Olm protocol requires users to publish a set of one-time keys to a key
server. To establish an Olm session, the originator downloads a key for the
@ -60,19 +43,21 @@ is left to the application. There are both advantages and disadvantages to
doing so.
Consider the scenario where one-time keys are unsigned. Alice wants to initiate
an Olm session with Bob. Bob uploads his one-time keys, :math:`E_B`, but Eve
replaces them with ones she controls, :math:`E_E`. Alice downloads one of the
compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret :math:`S`,
an Olm session with Bob. Bob uploads his one-time keys, $`E_B`$, but Eve
replaces them with ones she controls, $`E_E`$. Alice downloads one of the
compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
where:
.. math::
S = ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;ECDH\left(E_A,\,I_B\right)\;
\parallel\;ECDH\left(E_A,\,E_E\right)
```math
S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right)
```
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
either :math:`E_A` nor :math:`I_B`, so cannot calculate
:math:`ECDH\left(E_A,\,I_B\right)`. However, suppose she later compromises
Bob's identity key :math:`I_B`. This would give her the ability to decrypt any
either $`E_A`$ nor $`I_B`$, so cannot calculate
$`ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)`$. However, suppose she later compromises
Bob's identity key $`I_B`$. This would give her the ability to decrypt any
pre-key messages sent to Bob using the compromised one-time keys, and is thus a
problematic loss of forward secrecy. If Bob signs his keys with his Ed25519
signing key (and Alice verifies the signature before using them), this problem
@ -81,38 +66,39 @@ is avoided.
On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
.. math::
S = ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;ECDH\left(E_A,\,I_B\right)\;
\parallel\;ECDH\left(E_A,\,E_B\right)
```math
S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)
```
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of :math:`E_A` and
:math:`E_B`, and construct a transcript of a conversation which looks like it
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and
$`E_B`$, and construct a transcript of a conversation which looks like it
was between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob can therefore plausibly deny their
partition in any conversation even if they are both forced to divulge their
participation in any conversation even if they are both forced to divulge their
private identity keys, since it is impossible to prove that the transcript was
a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
If :math:`E_B` is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
because the ability to calculate :math:`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)` requires
knowledge of the private parts of either :math:`I_A` (proving Alice's
involvement) or :math:`E_B` (proving Bob's involvement, via the
because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires
knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's
involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob
were involved.
In conclusion, applications should consider whether to sign one-time keys based
on the trade-off between forward secrecy and deniability.
License
-------
## License
This document is licensed under the `Apache License, Version 2.0
<http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0>`_.
This document is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.
Feedback
--------
## Feedback
Questions and feedback can be sent to olm at matrix.org.
.. _`Ed25519`: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
[Ed25519]: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
[Olm]: https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/olm.md

View file

@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import re
import json
expr = re.compile(r"(olm_[^( ]*)\(")
expr = re.compile(r"(_*olm_[^( ]*)\(")
exports = set()
exports = {'_free', '_malloc'}
for f in sys.argv[1:]:
with open(f) as fp:

60
flake.lock Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
{
"nodes": {
"flake-utils": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1659877975,
"narHash": "sha256-zllb8aq3YO3h8B/U0/J1WBgAL8EX5yWf5pMj3G0NAmc=",
"owner": "numtide",
"repo": "flake-utils",
"rev": "c0e246b9b83f637f4681389ecabcb2681b4f3af0",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "numtide",
"repo": "flake-utils",
"type": "github"
}
},
"nixpkgs": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1664871473,
"narHash": "sha256-1LzbW6G6Uz8akWiOdlIi435GAm1ct5jF5tovw/9to0o=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "b7a6fde153d9470afdb6aa1da51c4117f03b84ed",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "NixOS",
"ref": "nixos-unstable",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"type": "github"
}
},
"npmlock2nix": {
"flake": false,
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1654775747,
"narHash": "sha256-9pXHDpIjmsK5390wmpGHu9aA4QOPpegPBvThHeBlef4=",
"owner": "nix-community",
"repo": "npmlock2nix",
"rev": "5c4f247688fc91d665df65f71c81e0726621aaa8",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "nix-community",
"repo": "npmlock2nix",
"type": "github"
}
},
"root": {
"inputs": {
"flake-utils": "flake-utils",
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs",
"npmlock2nix": "npmlock2nix"
}
}
},
"root": "root",
"version": 7
}

40
flake.nix Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
{
description = "An implementation of the Double Ratchet cryptographic ratchet";
inputs.nixpkgs.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-unstable";
# We can't use the current stable release because of
# https://github.com/emscripten-core/emscripten/issues/16913
inputs.flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
inputs.npmlock2nix = {
url = "github:nix-community/npmlock2nix";
flake = false;
};
outputs = { self, nixpkgs, flake-utils, npmlock2nix }:
let
localOverlay = import ./nix/overlay.nix;
pkgsForSystem = system: import nixpkgs {
inherit system;
overlays = [
(final: prev: {
npmlock2nix = final.callPackage npmlock2nix {};
node_modules = final.npmlock2nix.node_modules { src = ./javascript; };
})
localOverlay
];
};
in (
# some systems cause issues, e.g. i686-linux is unsupported by gradle,
# which causes "nix flake check" to fail. Investigate more later, but for
# now, we will just allow x86_64-linux
flake-utils.lib.eachSystem [ "x86_64-linux" "x86_64-darwin" "aarch64-darwin" ] (system: rec {
legacyPackages = pkgsForSystem system;
checks = {
inherit (legacyPackages) olm-gcc-cmake olm-clang-cmake olm-gcc-make;
};
packages = {
javascript = legacyPackages.olm-javascript;
};
}
));
}

View file

@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
#include "olm/olm.hh"
#include "fuzzing.hh"
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
size_t ignored;
if (argc <= 2) {
const char * message = "Usage: decrypt <pickle_key> <group_session>\n";
ignored = write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
exit(3);
}
const char * key = argv[1];
size_t key_length = strlen(key);
int session_fd = check_errno(
"Error opening session file", open(argv[2], O_RDONLY)
);
uint8_t *session_buffer;
ssize_t session_length = check_errno(
"Error reading session file", read_file(session_fd, &session_buffer)
);
int message_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
uint8_t * message_buffer;
ssize_t message_length = check_errno(
"Error reading message file", read_file(message_fd, &message_buffer)
);
uint8_t * tmp_buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(message_length);
memcpy(tmp_buffer, message_buffer, message_length);
uint8_t session_memory[olm_inbound_group_session_size()];
OlmInboundGroupSession * session = olm_inbound_group_session(session_memory);
check_error(
olm_inbound_group_session_last_error,
session,
"Error unpickling session",
olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session(
session, key, key_length, session_buffer, session_length
)
);
size_t max_length = check_error(
olm_inbound_group_session_last_error,
session,
"Error getting plaintext length",
olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
session, tmp_buffer, message_length
)
);
uint8_t plaintext[max_length];
uint32_t ratchet_index;
size_t length = check_error(
olm_inbound_group_session_last_error,
session,
"Error decrypting message",
olm_group_decrypt(
session,
message_buffer, message_length,
plaintext, max_length, &ratchet_index
)
);
ignored = write(STDOUT_FILENO, plaintext, length);
ignored = write(STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
return ignored;
}

View file

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
#include "olm/account.hh"
#include "fuzzing.hh"
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
int pickle_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
uint8_t * pickle_buffer;
ssize_t pickle_length = check_errno(
"Error reading pickle file", read_file(pickle_fd, &pickle_buffer)
);
olm::Account * account = new olm::Account;
unpickle(pickle_buffer, pickle_buffer + pickle_length, *account);
free(pickle_buffer);
delete account;
}

10
fuzzing/README.md Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# Directory structure
- `fuzzers/`: Sources for the fuzzing harnesses.
- `corpora/`: Contains the fuzzing corpora and assorted tools. The corpora are
filed under a directory with the same name as the fuzzing harness. Each of
those directories also contains the following:
- `in/`: Contains the actual corpus test cases.
- `tools/`: Any tools useful for that particular harness. A good example
would be a binary which generates seed test cases.

View file

@ -11,4 +11,6 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
decode_message(*reader, message_buffer, message_length, 8);
free(message_buffer);
delete reader;
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View file

@ -3,11 +3,10 @@
#include "fuzzing.hh"
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
size_t ignored;
if (argc <= 3) {
const char * message = "Usage: decrypt: <session_key> <session_file>"
" <message_type>\n";
ignored = write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
exit(3);
}
@ -59,7 +58,12 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
)
);
ignored = write(STDOUT_FILENO, plaintext, length);
ignored = write(STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
return ignored;
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, plaintext, length);
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
free(session_buffer);
free(message_buffer);
free(tmp_buffer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
#include "olm/olm.hh"
#include "fuzzing.hh"
#ifndef __AFL_FUZZ_TESTCASE_LEN
ssize_t fuzz_len;
#define __AFL_FUZZ_TESTCASE_LEN fuzz_len
unsigned char fuzz_buf[1024000];
#define __AFL_FUZZ_TESTCASE_BUF fuzz_buf
#define __AFL_FUZZ_INIT() void sync(void);
#define __AFL_LOOP(x) ((fuzz_len = read(0, fuzz_buf, sizeof(fuzz_buf))) > 0 ? 1 : 0)
#define __AFL_INIT() sync()
#endif
__AFL_FUZZ_INIT();
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
if (argc <= 2) {
const char * message = "Usage: decrypt <pickle_key> <group_session>\n";
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
exit(3);
}
const char * key = argv[1];
size_t key_length = strlen(key);
int session_fd = check_errno(
"Error opening session file", open(argv[2], O_RDONLY)
);
uint8_t *session_buffer;
ssize_t session_length = check_errno(
"Error reading session file", read_file(session_fd, &session_buffer)
);
uint8_t session_memory[olm_inbound_group_session_size()];
OlmInboundGroupSession * session = olm_inbound_group_session(session_memory);
check_error(
olm_inbound_group_session_last_error,
session,
"Error unpickling session",
olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session(
session, key, key_length, session_buffer, session_length
)
);
#ifdef __AFL_HAVE_MANUAL_CONTROL
__AFL_INIT();
#endif
size_t test_case_buf_len = 1024;
uint8_t * message_buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(test_case_buf_len);
uint8_t * tmp_buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(test_case_buf_len);
while (__AFL_LOOP(10000)) {
size_t message_length = __AFL_FUZZ_TESTCASE_LEN;
if (message_length > test_case_buf_len) {
message_buffer = (uint8_t *)realloc(message_buffer, message_length);
tmp_buffer = (uint8_t *)realloc(tmp_buffer, message_length);
if (!message_buffer || !tmp_buffer) return 1;
}
memcpy(message_buffer, __AFL_FUZZ_TESTCASE_BUF, message_length);
memcpy(tmp_buffer, message_buffer, message_length);
size_t max_length = check_error(
olm_inbound_group_session_last_error,
session,
"Error getting plaintext length",
olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
session, tmp_buffer, message_length
)
);
uint8_t plaintext[max_length];
uint32_t ratchet_index;
size_t length = check_error(
olm_inbound_group_session_last_error,
session,
"Error decrypting message",
olm_group_decrypt(
session,
message_buffer, message_length,
plaintext, max_length, &ratchet_index
)
);
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, plaintext, length);
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
}
free(session_buffer);
free(message_buffer);
free(tmp_buffer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
#include "fuzzing.hh"
#include "olm/account.hh"
#include "olm/olm.h"
size_t fuzz_unpickle_account(
OlmAccount * account, void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
) {
olm::Account & object = *reinterpret_cast<olm::Account *>(account);
std::uint8_t * const pos = reinterpret_cast<std::uint8_t *>(pickled);
std::uint8_t * const end = pos + pickled_length;
if (!unpickle(pos, end, object)) {
if (object.last_error == OlmErrorCode::OLM_SUCCESS) {
object.last_error = OlmErrorCode::OLM_CORRUPTED_PICKLE;
}
return std::size_t(-1);
}
return pickled_length;
}
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
int pickle_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
uint8_t * pickle_buffer;
ssize_t pickle_length = check_errno(
"Error reading pickle file", read_file(pickle_fd, &pickle_buffer));
void * account_buf = malloc(olm_account_size());
if (!account_buf) {
return 3;
}
OlmAccount * account = olm_account(account_buf);
check_error(olm_account_last_error, account, "Error unpickling account",
fuzz_unpickle_account(account, pickle_buffer, pickle_length));
free(pickle_buffer);
free(account);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
#include <olm/outbound_group_session.h>
#include "fuzzing.h"
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
if (argc != 1) {
printf("Usage: %s <input_file\n", argv[0]);
exit(3);
}
void *session_buffer = malloc(olm_outbound_group_session_size());
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session = olm_outbound_group_session(session_buffer);
int pickle_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
uint8_t *pickle_buffer;
ssize_t pickle_length = check_errno("Error reading message file",
read_file(pickle_fd, &pickle_buffer));
check_outbound_group_session(
session, "Error unpickling outbound group session",
olm_unpickle_outbound_group_session(session, "", 0, pickle_buffer,
pickle_length));
free(session_buffer);
free(pickle_buffer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View file

@ -11,4 +11,6 @@ int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
unpickle(pickle_buffer, pickle_buffer + pickle_length, *session);
free(pickle_buffer);
delete session;
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
#include "olm/olm.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define OLM_FUZZING 1
ssize_t read_file(
int fd,
uint8_t **buffer
) {
size_t buffer_size = 1;
size_t buffer_pos = 0;
uint8_t * current_buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(buffer_size);
if (!current_buffer) return -1;
while (1) {
ssize_t count = read(
fd, current_buffer + buffer_pos, buffer_size - buffer_pos
);
if (count < 0) break; // A read error happened, so just fail immediately.
if (count == 0) {
// Nothing more left to read. We downsize the buffer to fit the
// data exactly, unless no data was read at all, in which case we
// skip the downsizing.
if (buffer_pos != 0) {
current_buffer = (uint8_t *) realloc(current_buffer, buffer_pos);
if (!current_buffer) break;
}
// The read was successful so we return the allocated buffer.
*buffer = current_buffer;
return buffer_pos;
}
buffer_pos += count;
// We've reached capacity, so enlarge the buffer.
if (buffer_pos == buffer_size) {
buffer_size *= 2;
uint8_t * new_buffer = (uint8_t *) realloc(current_buffer, buffer_size);
if (!new_buffer) break;
current_buffer = new_buffer;
}
}
free(current_buffer);
return -1;
}
ssize_t check_errno(
const char * message,
ssize_t value
) {
if (value == (ssize_t)-1) {
perror(message);
exit(1);
}
return value;
}
size_t check_error(
const char * message,
const char * olm_message,
size_t value
) {
if (value == olm_error()) {
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, ": ", 2);
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, olm_message, strlen(olm_message));
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\n", 1);
exit(2);
}
return value;
}
size_t check_session(
OlmSession * session,
const char * message,
size_t value
) {
return check_error(message, olm_session_last_error(session), value);
}
size_t check_outbound_group_session(
OlmOutboundGroupSession * session,
const char * message,
size_t value
) {
return check_error(message, olm_outbound_group_session_last_error(session), value);
}

View file

@ -15,28 +15,43 @@ ssize_t read_file(
uint8_t **buffer
) {
size_t buffer_size = 4096;
uint8_t * current_buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(buffer_size);
if (current_buffer == NULL) return -1;
size_t buffer_pos = 0;
uint8_t * current_buffer = (uint8_t *) malloc(buffer_size);
if (!current_buffer) return -1;
while (1) {
ssize_t count = read(
fd, current_buffer + buffer_pos, buffer_size - buffer_pos
);
if (count < 0) break;
if (count < 0) break; // A read error happened, so just fail immediately.
if (count == 0) {
uint8_t * return_buffer = (uint8_t *) realloc(current_buffer, buffer_pos);
if (return_buffer == NULL) break;
*buffer = return_buffer;
// Nothing more left to read. We downsize the buffer to fit the
// data exactly, unless no data was read at all, in which case we
// skip the downsizing.
if (buffer_pos != 0) {
current_buffer = (uint8_t *) realloc(current_buffer, buffer_pos);
if (!current_buffer) break;
}
// The read was successful so we return the allocated buffer.
*buffer = current_buffer;
return buffer_pos;
}
buffer_pos += count;
// We've reached capacity, so enlarge the buffer.
if (buffer_pos == buffer_size) {
buffer_size *= 2;
uint8_t * new_buffer = (uint8_t *) realloc(current_buffer, buffer_size);
if (new_buffer == NULL) break;
if (!new_buffer) break;
current_buffer = new_buffer;
}
}
free(current_buffer);
return -1;
}
@ -62,13 +77,12 @@ size_t check_error(
) {
if (value == olm_error()) {
const char * olm_message = f(object);
ssize_t ignored;
ignored = write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
ignored = write(STDERR_FILENO, ": ", 2);
ignored = write(STDERR_FILENO, olm_message, strlen(olm_message));
ignored = write(STDERR_FILENO, "\n", 1);
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, message, strlen(message));
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, ": ", 2);
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, olm_message, strlen(olm_message));
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\n", 1);
exit(2);
return ignored;
}
return value;
}

118
fuzzing/start_fuzzers.sh Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
#!/usr/bin/bash
# Needs to be started in tmux.
script_dir() {
dirname "$(readlink -f "$0")"
}
fuzzer_dir() {
printf '%s/fuzzers\n' "$(script_dir)"
}
fuzzer_list() {
find "$(fuzzer_dir)" -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name '*.cpp' -or -name '*.c' \) -printf '%P\n' \
| while read -r fuzzer; do
fuzzer="${fuzzer#fuzz_}"
printf '%s\n' "${fuzzer%.c*}"
done
}
usage() {
printf '%s: HARNESS FUZZER\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
printf ' HARNESS ∈ {\n'
# We want word-splitting here so that each fuzzer ends up as a separate
# argument.
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
printf '%30s,\n' $(fuzzer_list | tr '\n' ' ')
printf ' }\n'
printf ' FUZZER ∈ {afl, afl++}\n'
}
if [[ $# -ne 2 ]]; then
usage
exit 1
fi
case "$2" in
afl++)
export AFL_PATH=/home/dkasak/code/projects/afl/afl++
export AFL_AUTORESUME=1
AFL_ARGS_FUZZER0="-D"
AFL_ARGS_FUZZER1="-L 0"
AFL_ARGS_FUZZER2="-p rare"
AFL_ARGS_FUZZER3="-p fast"
AFL_ARGS_FUZZER4="-p exploit"
AFL_ARGS_FUZZER5="-p explore"
;;
afl)
export AFL_PATH=/usr/bin
;;
*)
printf 'Unknown fuzzer: %s\n' "$2"
exit 1
;;
esac
export AFL=$AFL_PATH/afl-fuzz
export AFL_TMPDIR=/tmp
case "$1" in
group_decrypt)
FUZZER_ARG1="fuzzing/$1/pickled-inbound-group-session.txt"
;;
decrypt)
FUZZER_ARG1="fuzzing/$1/pickled-session.txt"
FUZZER_ARG2="1"
;;
decode_message)
;;
unpickle_session)
;;
unpickle_account)
;;
unpickle_account_test)
;;
unpickle_megolm_outbound)
;;
*)
printf 'Unknown harness: %s\n' "$1"
exit 1
;;
esac
cd "$(script_dir)" || exit 1
# Fuzzer args are deliberately not quoted below so that word-splitting happens.
# This is used so that they expand into nothing in cases where they are missing
# or to expand into multiple arguments from a string definition.
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tmux new-window -d -n "M" -- \
"$AFL" -i "corpora/$1/in" -o "corpora/$1/out" -M i0 "$AFL_ARGS_FUZZER0" \
-- "../build/fuzzers/fuzz_$1" $FUZZER_ARG1 $FUZZER_ARG2
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tmux new-window -d -n "S1" -- \
"$AFL" -i "corpora/$1/in" -o "corpora/$1/out" -S i1 "$AFL_ARGS_FUZZER1" \
-- "../build/fuzzers/fuzz_$1" $FUZZER_ARG1 $FUZZER_ARG2
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tmux new-window -d -n "S2" -- \
"$AFL" -i "corpora/$1/in" -o "corpora/$1/out" -S i2 $AFL_ARGS_FUZZER2 \
-- "../build/fuzzers/fuzz_$1" $FUZZER_ARG1 $FUZZER_ARG2
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tmux new-window -d -n "S3" -- \
"$AFL" -i "corpora/$1/in" -o "corpora/$1/out" -S i3 $AFL_ARGS_FUZZER3 \
-- "../build/fuzzers/fuzz_$1" $FUZZER_ARG1 $FUZZER_ARG2
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tmux new-window -d -n "S4" -- \
"$AFL" -i "corpora/$1/in" -o "corpora/$1/out" -S i4 $AFL_ARGS_FUZZER4 \
-- "../build/fuzzers/fuzz_$1_asan" $FUZZER_ARG1 $FUZZER_ARG2
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tmux new-window -d -n "S5" -- \
"$AFL" -i "corpora/$1/in" -o "corpora/$1/out" -S i5 $AFL_ARGS_FUZZER5 \
-- "../build/fuzzers/fuzz_$1" $FUZZER_ARG1 $FUZZER_ARG2

17
gitlab-math.lua Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
function Math(el)
if el.mathtype == "InlineMath" then
if el.text:sub(1,1) == '`' and el.text:sub(#el.text) == '`' then
local text = el.text:sub(2,#el.text-1)
return pandoc.Math(el.mathtype, text)
else
local cont = pandoc.read(el.text)
return { pandoc.Str("$") } .. cont.blocks[1].content .. { pandoc.Str("$") }
end
end
end
function CodeBlock(el)
if el.classes[1] == "math" then
return pandoc.Para({ pandoc.Math("DisplayMath", el.text) })
end
end

4
include/module.modulemap Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
module libolm {
header "olm/olm.h"
export *
}

View file

@ -43,11 +43,14 @@ struct Account {
Account();
IdentityKeys identity_keys;
List<OneTimeKey, MAX_ONE_TIME_KEYS> one_time_keys;
std::uint8_t num_fallback_keys;
OneTimeKey current_fallback_key;
OneTimeKey prev_fallback_key;
std::uint32_t next_one_time_key_id;
OlmErrorCode last_error;
/** Number of random bytes needed to create a new account */
std::size_t new_account_random_length();
std::size_t new_account_random_length() const;
/** Create a new account. Returns std::size_t(-1) on error. If the number of
* random bytes is too small then last_error will be NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM */
@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ struct Account {
);
/** Number of bytes needed to output the identity keys for this account */
std::size_t get_identity_json_length();
std::size_t get_identity_json_length() const;
/** Output the identity keys for this account as JSON in the following
* format:
@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ struct Account {
/**
* The length of an ed25519 signature in bytes.
*/
std::size_t signature_length();
std::size_t signature_length() const;
/**
* Signs a message with the ed25519 key for this account.
@ -86,7 +89,7 @@ struct Account {
);
/** Number of bytes needed to output the one time keys for this account */
std::size_t get_one_time_keys_json_length();
std::size_t get_one_time_keys_json_length() const;
/** Output the one time keys that haven't been published yet as JSON:
*
@ -104,18 +107,20 @@ struct Account {
std::uint8_t * one_time_json, std::size_t one_time_json_length
);
/** Mark the current list of one_time_keys as being published. They
* will no longer be returned by get_one_time_keys_json_length(). */
/** Mark the current list of one_time_keys and the current fallback key as
* being published. The current one time keys will no longer be returned by
* get_one_time_keys_json() and the current fallback key will no longer be
* returned by get_unpublished_fallback_key_json(). */
std::size_t mark_keys_as_published();
/** The largest number of one time keys this account can store. */
std::size_t max_number_of_one_time_keys();
std::size_t max_number_of_one_time_keys() const;
/** The number of random bytes needed to generate a given number of new one
* time keys. */
std::size_t generate_one_time_keys_random_length(
std::size_t number_of_keys
);
) const;
/** Generates a number of new one time keys. If the total number of keys
* stored by this account exceeds max_number_of_one_time_keys() then the
@ -126,6 +131,49 @@ struct Account {
std::uint8_t const * random, std::size_t random_length
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to generate a fallback key. */
std::size_t generate_fallback_key_random_length() const;
/** Generates a new fallback key. Returns std::size_t(-1) on error. If the
* number of random bytes is too small then last_error will be
* NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM */
std::size_t generate_fallback_key(
std::uint8_t const * random, std::size_t random_length
);
/** Number of bytes needed to output the fallback keys for this account */
std::size_t get_fallback_key_json_length() const;
/** Deprecated: use get_unpublished_fallback_key_json instead */
std::size_t get_fallback_key_json(
std::uint8_t * fallback_json, std::size_t fallback_json_length
);
/** Number of bytes needed to output the unpublished fallback keys for this
* account */
std::size_t get_unpublished_fallback_key_json_length() const;
/** Output the fallback key as JSON:
*
* {"curve25519":
* ["<6 byte key id>":"<43 base64 characters>"
* ,"<6 byte key id>":"<43 base64 characters>"
* ...
* ]
* }
*
* if there is a fallback key and it has not been published yet.
*
* Returns the size of the JSON written or std::size_t(-1) on error.
* If the buffer is too small last_error will be OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
*/
std::size_t get_unpublished_fallback_key_json(
std::uint8_t * fallback_json, std::size_t fallback_json_length
);
/** Forget about the old fallback key */
void forget_old_fallback_key();
/** Lookup a one time key with the given public key */
OneTimeKey const * lookup_key(
_olm_curve25519_public_key const & public_key

View file

@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -30,7 +34,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* The number of bytes of unpadded base64 needed to encode a length of input.
*/
size_t _olm_encode_base64_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_encode_base64_length(
size_t input_length
);
@ -42,7 +46,7 @@ size_t _olm_encode_base64_length(
*
* Returns number of bytes encoded
*/
size_t _olm_encode_base64(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_encode_base64(
uint8_t const * input, size_t input_length,
uint8_t * output
);
@ -51,7 +55,7 @@ size_t _olm_encode_base64(
* The number of bytes of raw data a length of unpadded base64 will encode to.
* Returns size_t(-1) if the length is not a valid length for base64.
*/
size_t _olm_decode_base64_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_decode_base64_length(
size_t input_length
);
@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ size_t _olm_decode_base64_length(
*
* Returns number of bytes decoded
*/
size_t _olm_decode_base64(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_decode_base64(
uint8_t const * input, size_t input_length,
uint8_t * output
);

View file

@ -18,12 +18,16 @@
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
namespace olm {
/**
* The number of bytes of unpadded base64 needed to encode a length of input.
*/
std::size_t encode_base64_length(
OLM_EXPORT std::size_t encode_base64_length(
std::size_t input_length
);
@ -33,7 +37,7 @@ std::size_t encode_base64_length(
* The input can overlap with the last three quarters of the output buffer.
* That is, the input pointer may be output + output_length - input_length.
*/
std::uint8_t * encode_base64(
OLM_EXPORT std::uint8_t * encode_base64(
std::uint8_t const * input, std::size_t input_length,
std::uint8_t * output
);
@ -42,7 +46,7 @@ std::uint8_t * encode_base64(
* The number of bytes of raw data a length of unpadded base64 will encode to.
* Returns std::size_t(-1) if the length is not a valid length for base64.
*/
std::size_t decode_base64_length(
OLM_EXPORT std::size_t decode_base64_length(
std::size_t input_length
);
@ -51,8 +55,12 @@ std::size_t decode_base64_length(
* Writes decode_base64_length(input_length) bytes to the output buffer.
* The output can overlap with the first three quarters of the input buffer.
* That is, the input pointers and output pointer may be the same.
*
* Returns the number of bytes of raw data the base64 input decoded to. If the
* input length supplied is not a valid length for base64, returns
* std::size_t(-1) and does not decode.
*/
std::uint8_t const * decode_base64(
OLM_EXPORT std::size_t decode_base64(
std::uint8_t const * input, std::size_t input_length,
std::uint8_t * output
);

View file

@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -111,7 +115,7 @@ struct _olm_cipher_aes_sha_256 {
size_t kdf_info_length;
};
extern const struct _olm_cipher_ops _olm_cipher_aes_sha_256_ops;
OLM_EXPORT extern const struct _olm_cipher_ops _olm_cipher_aes_sha_256_ops;
/**
* get an initializer for an instance of struct _olm_cipher_aes_sha_256.

View file

@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
#ifndef OLM_CRYPTO_H_
#define OLM_CRYPTO_H_
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@ -94,13 +98,13 @@ struct _olm_ed25519_key_pair {
/** The length of output the aes_encrypt_cbc function will write */
size_t _olm_crypto_aes_encrypt_cbc_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_crypto_aes_encrypt_cbc_length(
size_t input_length
);
/** Encrypts the input using AES256 in CBC mode with PKCS#7 padding.
* The output buffer must be big enough to hold the output including padding */
void _olm_crypto_aes_encrypt_cbc(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_aes_encrypt_cbc(
const struct _olm_aes256_key *key,
const struct _olm_aes256_iv *iv,
const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length,
@ -111,7 +115,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_aes_encrypt_cbc(
* least the same size as the input buffer. Returns the length of the plaintext
* without padding on success or std::size_t(-1) if the padding is invalid.
*/
size_t _olm_crypto_aes_decrypt_cbc(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_crypto_aes_decrypt_cbc(
const struct _olm_aes256_key *key,
const struct _olm_aes256_iv *iv,
uint8_t const * input, size_t input_length,
@ -121,7 +125,7 @@ size_t _olm_crypto_aes_decrypt_cbc(
/** Computes SHA-256 of the input. The output buffer must be a least
* SHA256_OUTPUT_LENGTH (32) bytes long. */
void _olm_crypto_sha256(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_sha256(
uint8_t const * input, size_t input_length,
uint8_t * output
);
@ -130,7 +134,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_sha256(
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
* Computes HMAC-SHA-256 of the input for the key. The output buffer must
* be at least SHA256_OUTPUT_LENGTH (32) bytes long. */
void _olm_crypto_hmac_sha256(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_hmac_sha256(
uint8_t const * key, size_t key_length,
uint8_t const * input, size_t input_length,
uint8_t * output
@ -140,7 +144,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_hmac_sha256(
/** HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
* Derives key material from the input bytes. */
void _olm_crypto_hkdf_sha256(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_hkdf_sha256(
uint8_t const * input, size_t input_length,
uint8_t const * info, size_t info_length,
uint8_t const * salt, size_t salt_length,
@ -151,7 +155,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_hkdf_sha256(
/** Generate a curve25519 key pair
* random_32_bytes should be CURVE25519_RANDOM_LENGTH (32) bytes long.
*/
void _olm_crypto_curve25519_generate_key(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_curve25519_generate_key(
uint8_t const * random_32_bytes,
struct _olm_curve25519_key_pair *output
);
@ -160,7 +164,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_curve25519_generate_key(
/** Create a shared secret using our private key and their public key.
* The output buffer must be at least CURVE25519_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH (32) bytes long.
*/
void _olm_crypto_curve25519_shared_secret(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_curve25519_shared_secret(
const struct _olm_curve25519_key_pair *our_key,
const struct _olm_curve25519_public_key *their_key,
uint8_t * output
@ -169,7 +173,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_curve25519_shared_secret(
/** Generate an ed25519 key pair
* random_32_bytes should be ED25519_RANDOM_LENGTH (32) bytes long.
*/
void _olm_crypto_ed25519_generate_key(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_ed25519_generate_key(
uint8_t const * random_bytes,
struct _olm_ed25519_key_pair *output
);
@ -178,7 +182,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_ed25519_generate_key(
*
* The output buffer must be at least ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH (64) bytes
* long. */
void _olm_crypto_ed25519_sign(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_crypto_ed25519_sign(
const struct _olm_ed25519_key_pair *our_key,
const uint8_t * message, size_t message_length,
uint8_t * output
@ -187,7 +191,7 @@ void _olm_crypto_ed25519_sign(
/** Verify an ed25519 signature
* The signature input buffer must be ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH (64) bytes long.
* Returns non-zero if the signature is valid. */
int _olm_crypto_ed25519_verify(
OLM_EXPORT int _olm_crypto_ed25519_verify(
const struct _olm_ed25519_public_key *their_key,
const uint8_t * message, size_t message_length,
const uint8_t * signature

View file

@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#ifndef OLM_ERROR_H_
#define OLM_ERROR_H_
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -53,17 +55,23 @@ enum OlmErrorCode {
OLM_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL = 15,
// Not an error code, just here to pad out the enum past 16 because
// otherwise the compiler warns about a redunant check. If you're
// adding an error code, replace this one!
OLM_ERROR_NOT_INVENTED_YET = 16,
/**
* SAS doesn't have their key set.
*/
OLM_SAS_THEIR_KEY_NOT_SET = 16,
/**
* The pickled object was successfully decoded, but the unpickling still failed
* because it had some extraneous junk data at the end.
*/
OLM_PICKLE_EXTRA_DATA = 17,
/* remember to update the list of string constants in error.c when updating
* this list. */
};
/** get a string representation of the given error code. */
const char * _olm_error_to_string(enum OlmErrorCode error);
OLM_EXPORT const char * _olm_error_to_string(enum OlmErrorCode error);
#ifdef __cplusplus
} // extern "C"

View file

@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "olm/error.h"
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -25,31 +29,38 @@ extern "C" {
typedef struct OlmInboundGroupSession OlmInboundGroupSession;
/** get the size of an inbound group session, in bytes. */
size_t olm_inbound_group_session_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_inbound_group_session_size(void);
/**
* Initialise an inbound group session object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory should be at least olm_inbound_group_session_size()
* bytes.
*/
OlmInboundGroupSession * olm_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT OlmInboundGroupSession * olm_inbound_group_session(
void *memory
);
/**
* A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* group session */
const char *olm_inbound_group_session_last_error(
OLM_EXPORT const char *olm_inbound_group_session_last_error(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
/**
* An error code describing the most recent error to happen to a group
* session */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_inbound_group_session_last_error_code(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this group session */
size_t olm_clear_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_inbound_group_session(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
/** Returns the number of bytes needed to store an inbound group session */
size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session_length(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -61,7 +72,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session_length(
* is smaller than olm_pickle_inbound_group_session_length() then
* olm_inbound_group_session_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL"
*/
size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -77,7 +88,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session(
* olm_inbound_group_session_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64". The input
* pickled buffer is destroyed
*/
size_t olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ size_t olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session(
* * OLM_INVALID_BASE64 if the session_key is not valid base64
* * OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY if the session_key is invalid
*/
size_t olm_init_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_init_inbound_group_session(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
/* base64-encoded keys */
uint8_t const * session_key, size_t session_key_length
@ -109,7 +120,7 @@ size_t olm_init_inbound_group_session(
* * OLM_INVALID_BASE64 if the session_key is not valid base64
* * OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY if the session_key is invalid
*/
size_t olm_import_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_import_inbound_group_session(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
/* base64-encoded keys; note that it will be overwritten with the base64-decoded
data. */
@ -126,7 +137,7 @@ size_t olm_import_inbound_group_session(
*
* Returns olm_error() on failure.
*/
size_t olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t * message, size_t message_length
);
@ -150,7 +161,7 @@ size_t olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
* message's index (ie, it was sent before the session key was shared with
* us)
*/
size_t olm_group_decrypt(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_group_decrypt(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
/* input; note that it will be overwritten with the base64-decoded
@ -166,7 +177,7 @@ size_t olm_group_decrypt(
/**
* Get the number of bytes returned by olm_inbound_group_session_id()
*/
size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id_length(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -178,7 +189,7 @@ size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id_length(
* last_error will be OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the id buffer was too
* small.
*/
size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t * id, size_t id_length
);
@ -186,7 +197,7 @@ size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id(
/**
* Get the first message index we know how to decrypt.
*/
uint32_t olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(
OLM_EXPORT uint32_t olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -199,14 +210,14 @@ uint32_t olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index(
*
* This is mainly intended for the unit tests, currently.
*/
int olm_inbound_group_session_is_verified(
OLM_EXPORT int olm_inbound_group_session_is_verified(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
/**
* Get the number of bytes returned by olm_export_inbound_group_session()
*/
size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session_length(
const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -222,7 +233,7 @@ size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session_length(
* given index (ie, it was sent before the session key was shared with
* us)
*/
size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session(
OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t * key, size_t key_length, uint32_t message_index
);

View file

@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ public:
return *this;
}
T * this_pos = _data;
T * const other_pos = other._data;
const T * other_pos = other._data;
while (other_pos != other._end) {
*this_pos = *other;
*this_pos = *other_pos;
++this_pos;
++other_pos;
}

View file

@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -59,25 +63,25 @@ extern const struct _olm_cipher *megolm_cipher;
* initialize the megolm ratchet. random_data should be at least
* MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH bytes of randomness.
*/
void megolm_init(Megolm *megolm, uint8_t const *random_data, uint32_t counter);
OLM_EXPORT void megolm_init(Megolm *megolm, uint8_t const *random_data, uint32_t counter);
/** Returns the number of bytes needed to store a megolm */
size_t megolm_pickle_length(const Megolm *megolm);
OLM_EXPORT size_t megolm_pickle_length(const Megolm *megolm);
/**
* Pickle the megolm. Returns a pointer to the next free space in the buffer.
*/
uint8_t * megolm_pickle(const Megolm *megolm, uint8_t *pos);
OLM_EXPORT uint8_t * megolm_pickle(const Megolm *megolm, uint8_t *pos);
/**
* Unpickle the megolm. Returns a pointer to the next item in the buffer.
*/
const uint8_t * megolm_unpickle(Megolm *megolm, const uint8_t *pos,
OLM_EXPORT const uint8_t * megolm_unpickle(Megolm *megolm, const uint8_t *pos,
const uint8_t *end);
/** advance the ratchet by one step */
void megolm_advance(Megolm *megolm);
OLM_EXPORT void megolm_advance(Megolm *megolm);
/**
* get the key data in the ratchet. The returned data is
@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ void megolm_advance(Megolm *megolm);
#define megolm_get_data(megolm) ((const uint8_t *)((megolm)->data))
/** advance the ratchet to a given count */
void megolm_advance_to(Megolm *megolm, uint32_t advance_to);
OLM_EXPORT void megolm_advance_to(Megolm *megolm, uint32_t advance_to);
#ifdef __cplusplus
} // extern "C"

View file

@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stddef.h>
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -34,7 +38,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* The length of the buffer needed to hold a group message.
*/
size_t _olm_encode_group_message_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_encode_group_message_length(
uint32_t chain_index,
size_t ciphertext_length,
size_t mac_length,
@ -55,7 +59,7 @@ size_t _olm_encode_group_message_length(
*
* Returns the size of the message, up to the MAC.
*/
size_t _olm_encode_group_message(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_encode_group_message(
uint8_t version,
uint32_t message_index,
size_t ciphertext_length,
@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ struct _OlmDecodeGroupMessageResults {
/**
* Reads the message headers from the input buffer.
*/
void _olm_decode_group_message(
OLM_EXPORT void _olm_decode_group_message(
const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length,
size_t mac_length, size_t signature_length,

View file

@ -27,13 +27,16 @@
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstdint>
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
namespace olm {
/**
* The length of the buffer needed to hold a message.
*/
std::size_t encode_message_length(
OLM_EXPORT std::size_t encode_message_length(
std::uint32_t counter,
std::size_t ratchet_key_length,
std::size_t ciphertext_length,
@ -61,7 +64,7 @@ struct MessageReader {
* Writes the message headers into the output buffer.
* Populates the writer struct with pointers into the output buffer.
*/
void encode_message(
OLM_EXPORT void encode_message(
MessageWriter & writer,
std::uint8_t version,
std::uint32_t counter,
@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ void encode_message(
* Reads the message headers from the input buffer.
* Populates the reader struct with pointers into the input buffer.
*/
void decode_message(
OLM_EXPORT void decode_message(
MessageReader & reader,
std::uint8_t const * input, std::size_t input_length,
std::size_t mac_length

View file

@ -19,9 +19,12 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "olm/error.h"
#include "olm/inbound_group_session.h"
#include "olm/outbound_group_session.h"
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -36,79 +39,94 @@ typedef struct OlmUtility OlmUtility;
/** Get the version number of the library.
* Arguments will be updated if non-null.
*/
void olm_get_library_version(uint8_t *major, uint8_t *minor, uint8_t *patch);
OLM_EXPORT void olm_get_library_version(uint8_t *major, uint8_t *minor, uint8_t *patch);
/** The size of an account object in bytes */
size_t olm_account_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_size(void);
/** The size of a session object in bytes */
size_t olm_session_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_session_size(void);
/** The size of a utility object in bytes */
size_t olm_utility_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_utility_size(void);
/** Initialise an account object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory must be at least olm_account_size() bytes */
OlmAccount * olm_account(
OLM_EXPORT OlmAccount * olm_account(
void * memory
);
/** Initialise a session object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory must be at least olm_session_size() bytes */
OlmSession * olm_session(
OLM_EXPORT OlmSession * olm_session(
void * memory
);
/** Initialise a utility object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory must be at least olm_utility_size() bytes */
OlmUtility * olm_utility(
OLM_EXPORT OlmUtility * olm_utility(
void * memory
);
/** The value that olm will return from a function if there was an error */
size_t olm_error(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_error(void);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to an
* account */
const char * olm_account_last_error(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_account_last_error(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** An error code describing the most recent error to happen to an account */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_account_last_error_code(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* session */
const char * olm_session_last_error(
OlmSession * session
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_session_last_error(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** An error code describing the most recent error to happen to a session */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_session_last_error_code(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* utility */
const char * olm_utility_last_error(
OlmUtility * utility
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_utility_last_error(
OlmUtility const * utility
);
/** An error code describing the most recent error to happen to a utility */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_utility_last_error_code(
OlmUtility const * utility
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this account */
size_t olm_clear_account(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_account(
OlmAccount * account
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this session */
size_t olm_clear_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_session(
OlmSession * session
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this utility */
size_t olm_clear_utility(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_utility(
OlmUtility * utility
);
/** Returns the number of bytes needed to store an account */
size_t olm_pickle_account_length(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_account_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Returns the number of bytes needed to store a session */
size_t olm_pickle_session_length(
OlmSession * session
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_session_length(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** Stores an account as a base64 string. Encrypts the account using the
@ -116,7 +134,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_session_length(
* Returns olm_error() on failure. If the pickle output buffer
* is smaller than olm_pickle_account_length() then
* olm_account_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL" */
size_t olm_pickle_account(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_account(
OlmAccount * account,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -127,7 +145,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_account(
* Returns olm_error() on failure. If the pickle output buffer
* is smaller than olm_pickle_session_length() then
* olm_session_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL" */
size_t olm_pickle_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_session(
OlmSession * session,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -139,7 +157,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_session(
* will be "BAD_ACCOUNT_KEY". If the base64 couldn't be decoded then
* olm_account_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64". The input pickled
* buffer is destroyed */
size_t olm_unpickle_account(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_unpickle_account(
OlmAccount * account,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -151,57 +169,57 @@ size_t olm_unpickle_account(
* will be "BAD_ACCOUNT_KEY". If the base64 couldn't be decoded then
* olm_session_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64". The input pickled
* buffer is destroyed */
size_t olm_unpickle_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_unpickle_session(
OlmSession * session,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to create an account.*/
size_t olm_create_account_random_length(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_account_random_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Creates a new account. Returns olm_error() on failure. If there weren't
* enough random bytes then olm_account_last_error() will be
* "NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM" */
size_t olm_create_account(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_account(
OlmAccount * account,
void * random, size_t random_length
);
/** The size of the output buffer needed to hold the identity keys */
size_t olm_account_identity_keys_length(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_identity_keys_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Writes the public parts of the identity keys for the account into the
* identity_keys output buffer. Returns olm_error() on failure. If the
* identity_keys buffer was too small then olm_account_last_error() will be
* "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". */
size_t olm_account_identity_keys(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_identity_keys(
OlmAccount * account,
void * identity_keys, size_t identity_key_length
);
/** The length of an ed25519 signature encoded as base64. */
size_t olm_account_signature_length(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_signature_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Signs a message with the ed25519 key for this account. Returns olm_error()
* on failure. If the signature buffer was too small then
* olm_account_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL" */
size_t olm_account_sign(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_sign(
OlmAccount * account,
void const * message, size_t message_length,
void * signature, size_t signature_length
);
/** The size of the output buffer needed to hold the one time keys */
size_t olm_account_one_time_keys_length(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_one_time_keys_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Writes the public parts of the unpublished one time keys for the account
@ -222,25 +240,31 @@ size_t olm_account_one_time_keys_length(
* <p>
* If the one_time_keys buffer was too small then olm_account_last_error()
* will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". */
size_t olm_account_one_time_keys(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_one_time_keys(
OlmAccount * account,
void * one_time_keys, size_t one_time_keys_length
);
/** Marks the current set of one time keys as being published. */
size_t olm_account_mark_keys_as_published(
/** Marks the current set of one time keys and fallback key as being published
* Once marked as published, the one time keys will no longer be returned by
* olm_account_one_time_keys(), and the fallback key will no longer be returned
* by olm_account_unpublished_fallback_key().
*
* Returns the number of one-time keys that were marked as published. Note that
* this count does not include the fallback key. */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_mark_keys_as_published(
OlmAccount * account
);
/** The largest number of one time keys this account can store. */
size_t olm_account_max_number_of_one_time_keys(
OlmAccount * account
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_max_number_of_one_time_keys(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to generate a given number of new one
* time keys. */
size_t olm_account_generate_one_time_keys_random_length(
OlmAccount * account,
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_generate_one_time_keys_random_length(
OlmAccount const * account,
size_t number_of_keys
);
@ -248,15 +272,63 @@ size_t olm_account_generate_one_time_keys_random_length(
* by this account exceeds max_number_of_one_time_keys() then the old keys are
* discarded. Returns olm_error() on error. If the number of random bytes is
* too small then olm_account_last_error() will be "NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM". */
size_t olm_account_generate_one_time_keys(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_generate_one_time_keys(
OlmAccount * account,
size_t number_of_keys,
void * random, size_t random_length
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to generate a fallback key. */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_generate_fallback_key_random_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Generates a new fallback key. Only one previous fallback key is
* stored. Returns olm_error() on error. If the number of random bytes is too
* small then olm_account_last_error() will be "NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM". */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_generate_fallback_key(
OlmAccount * account,
void * random, size_t random_length
);
/** The number of bytes needed to hold the fallback key as returned by
* olm_account_fallback_key. */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_fallback_key_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Deprecated: use olm_account_unpublished_fallback_key instead */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_fallback_key(
OlmAccount * account,
void * fallback_key, size_t fallback_key_size
);
/** The number of bytes needed to hold the unpublished fallback key as returned
* by olm_account_unpublished fallback_key. */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_unpublished_fallback_key_length(
OlmAccount const * account
);
/** Returns the fallback key (if present, and if unpublished) into the
* fallback_key buffer */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_account_unpublished_fallback_key(
OlmAccount * account,
void * fallback_key, size_t fallback_key_size
);
/** Forget about the old fallback key. This should be called once you are
* reasonably certain that you will not receive any more messages that use
* the old fallback key (e.g. 5 minutes after the new fallback key has been
* published).
*/
OLM_EXPORT void olm_account_forget_old_fallback_key(
OlmAccount * account
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to create an outbound session */
size_t olm_create_outbound_session_random_length(
OlmSession * session
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_outbound_session_random_length(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** Creates a new out-bound session for sending messages to a given identity_key
@ -264,9 +336,9 @@ size_t olm_create_outbound_session_random_length(
* decoded as base64 then olm_session_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64"
* If there weren't enough random bytes then olm_session_last_error() will
* be "NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM". */
size_t olm_create_outbound_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_outbound_session(
OlmSession * session,
OlmAccount * account,
OlmAccount const * account,
void const * their_identity_key, size_t their_identity_key_length,
void const * their_one_time_key, size_t their_one_time_key_length,
void * random, size_t random_length
@ -277,24 +349,19 @@ size_t olm_create_outbound_session(
* couldn't be decoded then olm_session_last_error will be "INVALID_BASE64".
* If the message was for an unsupported protocol version then
* olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION". If the message
* couldn't be decoded then then olm_session_last_error() will be
* couldn't be decoded then olm_session_last_error() will be
* "BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT". If the message refers to an unknown one time
* key then olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_KEY_ID". */
size_t olm_create_inbound_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_inbound_session(
OlmSession * session,
OlmAccount * account,
void * one_time_key_message, size_t message_length
);
/** Create a new in-bound session for sending/receiving messages from an
* incoming PRE_KEY message. Returns olm_error() on failure. If the base64
* couldn't be decoded then olm_session_last_error will be "INVALID_BASE64".
* If the message was for an unsupported protocol version then
* olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION". If the message
* couldn't be decoded then then olm_session_last_error() will be
* "BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT". If the message refers to an unknown one time
* key then olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_KEY_ID". */
size_t olm_create_inbound_session_from(
/** Same as olm_create_inbound_session, but ensures that the identity key
* in the pre-key message matches the expected identity key, supplied via the
* `their_identity_key` parameter. Fails early if there is no match. */
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_inbound_session_from(
OlmSession * session,
OlmAccount * account,
void const * their_identity_key, size_t their_identity_key_length,
@ -302,22 +369,31 @@ size_t olm_create_inbound_session_from(
);
/** The length of the buffer needed to return the id for this session. */
size_t olm_session_id_length(
OlmSession * session
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_session_id_length(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** An identifier for this session. Will be the same for both ends of the
* conversation. If the id buffer is too small then olm_session_last_error()
* will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". */
size_t olm_session_id(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_session_id(
OlmSession * session,
void * id, size_t id_length
);
int olm_session_has_received_message(
OlmSession *session
OLM_EXPORT int olm_session_has_received_message(
OlmSession const *session
);
/**
* Write a null-terminated string describing the internal state of an olm
* session to the buffer provided for debugging and logging purposes. If the
* buffer is not large enough to hold the entire string, it will be truncated
* and will end with "...". A buffer length of 600 will be enough to hold any
* output.
*/
OLM_EXPORT void olm_session_describe(OlmSession * session, char *buf, size_t buflen);
/** Checks if the PRE_KEY message is for this in-bound session. This can happen
* if multiple messages are sent to this account before this account sends a
* message in reply. The one_time_key_message buffer is destroyed. Returns 1 if
@ -327,7 +403,7 @@ int olm_session_has_received_message(
* unsupported protocol version then olm_session_last_error() will be
* "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION". If the message couldn't be decoded then then
* olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT". */
size_t olm_matches_inbound_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_matches_inbound_session(
OlmSession * session,
void * one_time_key_message, size_t message_length
);
@ -341,7 +417,7 @@ size_t olm_matches_inbound_session(
* unsupported protocol version then olm_session_last_error() will be
* "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION". If the message couldn't be decoded then then
* olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT". */
size_t olm_matches_inbound_session_from(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_matches_inbound_session_from(
OlmSession * session,
void const * their_identity_key, size_t their_identity_key_length,
void * one_time_key_message, size_t message_length
@ -350,7 +426,7 @@ size_t olm_matches_inbound_session_from(
/** Removes the one time keys that the session used from the account. Returns
* olm_error() on failure. If the account doesn't have any matching one time
* keys then olm_account_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_KEY_ID". */
size_t olm_remove_one_time_keys(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_remove_one_time_keys(
OlmAccount * account,
OlmSession * session
);
@ -359,19 +435,19 @@ size_t olm_remove_one_time_keys(
* OLM_MESSAGE_TYPE_PRE_KEY if the message will be a PRE_KEY message.
* Returns OLM_MESSAGE_TYPE_MESSAGE if the message will be a normal message.
* Returns olm_error on failure. */
size_t olm_encrypt_message_type(
OlmSession * session
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_encrypt_message_type(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to encrypt the next message. */
size_t olm_encrypt_random_length(
OlmSession * session
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_encrypt_random_length(
OlmSession const * session
);
/** The size of the next message in bytes for the given number of plain-text
* bytes. */
size_t olm_encrypt_message_length(
OlmSession * session,
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_encrypt_message_length(
OlmSession const * session,
size_t plaintext_length
);
@ -381,7 +457,7 @@ size_t olm_encrypt_message_length(
* olm_session_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". If there
* weren't enough random bytes then olm_session_last_error() will be
* "NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM". */
size_t olm_encrypt(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_encrypt(
OlmSession * session,
void const * plaintext, size_t plaintext_length,
void * random, size_t random_length,
@ -396,7 +472,7 @@ size_t olm_encrypt(
* protocol then olm_session_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION".
* If the message couldn't be decoded then olm_session_last_error() will be
* "BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT". */
size_t olm_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
OlmSession * session,
size_t message_type,
void * message, size_t message_length
@ -413,7 +489,7 @@ size_t olm_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
* olm_session_last_error() will be BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT".
* If the MAC on the message was invalid then olm_session_last_error() will
* be "BAD_MESSAGE_MAC". */
size_t olm_decrypt(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_decrypt(
OlmSession * session,
size_t message_type,
void * message, size_t message_length,
@ -421,23 +497,23 @@ size_t olm_decrypt(
);
/** The length of the buffer needed to hold the SHA-256 hash. */
size_t olm_sha256_length(
OlmUtility * utility
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sha256_length(
OlmUtility const * utility
);
/** Calculates the SHA-256 hash of the input and encodes it as base64. If the
* output buffer is smaller than olm_sha256_length() then
* olm_utility_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". */
size_t olm_sha256(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sha256(
OlmUtility * utility,
void const * input, size_t input_length,
void * output, size_t output_length
);
/** Verify an ed25519 signature. If the key was too small then
* olm_session_last_error will be "INVALID_BASE64". If the signature was invalid
* olm_utility_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64". If the signature was invalid
* then olm_utility_last_error() will be "BAD_MESSAGE_MAC". */
size_t olm_ed25519_verify(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_ed25519_verify(
OlmUtility * utility,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void const * message, size_t message_length,

42
include/olm/olm_export.h Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
#ifndef OLM_EXPORT_H
#define OLM_EXPORT_H
#ifdef OLM_STATIC_DEFINE
# define OLM_EXPORT
# define OLM_NO_EXPORT
#else
# ifndef OLM_EXPORT
# ifdef olm_EXPORTS
/* We are building this library */
# define OLM_EXPORT
# else
/* We are using this library */
# define OLM_EXPORT
# endif
# endif
# ifndef OLM_NO_EXPORT
# define OLM_NO_EXPORT
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OLM_DEPRECATED
# define OLM_DEPRECATED __attribute__ ((__deprecated__))
#endif
#ifndef OLM_DEPRECATED_EXPORT
# define OLM_DEPRECATED_EXPORT OLM_EXPORT OLM_DEPRECATED
#endif
#ifndef OLM_DEPRECATED_NO_EXPORT
# define OLM_DEPRECATED_NO_EXPORT OLM_NO_EXPORT OLM_DEPRECATED
#endif
#if 0 /* DEFINE_NO_DEPRECATED */
# ifndef OLM_NO_DEPRECATED
# define OLM_NO_DEPRECATED
# endif
#endif
#endif /* OLM_EXPORT_H */

View file

@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "olm/error.h"
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -25,31 +29,38 @@ extern "C" {
typedef struct OlmOutboundGroupSession OlmOutboundGroupSession;
/** get the size of an outbound group session, in bytes. */
size_t olm_outbound_group_session_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_outbound_group_session_size(void);
/**
* Initialise an outbound group session object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory should be at least olm_outbound_group_session_size()
* bytes.
*/
OlmOutboundGroupSession * olm_outbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT OlmOutboundGroupSession * olm_outbound_group_session(
void *memory
);
/**
* A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* group session */
const char *olm_outbound_group_session_last_error(
OLM_EXPORT const char *olm_outbound_group_session_last_error(
const OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
/**
* An error code describing the most recent error to happen to a group
* session */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_outbound_group_session_last_error_code(
const OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this group session */
size_t olm_clear_outbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_outbound_group_session(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
/** Returns the number of bytes needed to store an outbound group session */
size_t olm_pickle_outbound_group_session_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_outbound_group_session_length(
const OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -61,7 +72,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_outbound_group_session_length(
* is smaller than olm_pickle_outbound_group_session_length() then
* olm_outbound_group_session_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL"
*/
size_t olm_pickle_outbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_outbound_group_session(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -77,7 +88,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_outbound_group_session(
* olm_outbound_group_session_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64". The input
* pickled buffer is destroyed
*/
size_t olm_unpickle_outbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_unpickle_outbound_group_session(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -85,7 +96,7 @@ size_t olm_unpickle_outbound_group_session(
/** The number of random bytes needed to create an outbound group session */
size_t olm_init_outbound_group_session_random_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_init_outbound_group_session_random_length(
const OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ size_t olm_init_outbound_group_session_random_length(
* failure last_error will be set with an error code. The last_error will be
* NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM if the number of random bytes was too small.
*/
size_t olm_init_outbound_group_session(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_init_outbound_group_session(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t *random, size_t random_length
);
@ -102,7 +113,7 @@ size_t olm_init_outbound_group_session(
/**
* The number of bytes that will be created by encrypting a message
*/
size_t olm_group_encrypt_message_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_group_encrypt_message_length(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
size_t plaintext_length
);
@ -113,7 +124,7 @@ size_t olm_group_encrypt_message_length(
* error code. The last_error will be OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output
* buffer is too small.
*/
size_t olm_group_encrypt(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_group_encrypt(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t const * plaintext, size_t plaintext_length,
uint8_t * message, size_t message_length
@ -123,7 +134,7 @@ size_t olm_group_encrypt(
/**
* Get the number of bytes returned by olm_outbound_group_session_id()
*/
size_t olm_outbound_group_session_id_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_outbound_group_session_id_length(
const OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -135,7 +146,7 @@ size_t olm_outbound_group_session_id_length(
* last_error will be OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the id buffer was too
* small.
*/
size_t olm_outbound_group_session_id(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_outbound_group_session_id(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t * id, size_t id_length
);
@ -146,14 +157,14 @@ size_t olm_outbound_group_session_id(
* Each message is sent with an increasing index; this returns the index for
* the next message.
*/
uint32_t olm_outbound_group_session_message_index(
OLM_EXPORT uint32_t olm_outbound_group_session_message_index(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
/**
* Get the number of bytes returned by olm_outbound_group_session_key()
*/
size_t olm_outbound_group_session_key_length(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_outbound_group_session_key_length(
const OlmOutboundGroupSession *session
);
@ -167,7 +178,7 @@ size_t olm_outbound_group_session_key_length(
* failure. On failure last_error will be set with an error code. The
* last_error will be OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the buffer was too small.
*/
size_t olm_outbound_group_session_key(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_outbound_group_session_key(
OlmOutboundGroupSession *session,
uint8_t * key, size_t key_length
);

View file

@ -15,8 +15,25 @@
#ifndef OLM_PICKLE_H_
#define OLM_PICKLE_H_
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* Convenience macro for checking the return value of internal unpickling
* functions and returning early on failure. */
#ifndef UNPICKLE_OK
#define UNPICKLE_OK(x) do { if (!(x)) return NULL; } while(0)
#endif
/* Convenience macro for failing on corrupted pickles from public
* API unpickling functions. */
#define FAIL_ON_CORRUPTED_PICKLE(pos, session) \
do { \
if (!pos) { \
session->last_error = OLM_CORRUPTED_PICKLE; \
return (size_t)-1; \
} \
} while(0)
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -59,7 +76,7 @@ uint8_t * _olm_pickle_ed25519_public_key(
);
/** Unpickle the ed25519 public key. Returns a pointer to the next item in the
* buffer. */
* buffer on success, NULL on error. */
const uint8_t * _olm_unpickle_ed25519_public_key(
const uint8_t *pos, const uint8_t *end,
struct _olm_ed25519_public_key * value
@ -77,7 +94,7 @@ uint8_t * _olm_pickle_ed25519_key_pair(
);
/** Unpickle the ed25519 key pair. Returns a pointer to the next item in the
* buffer. */
* buffer on success, NULL on error. */
const uint8_t * _olm_unpickle_ed25519_key_pair(
const uint8_t *pos, const uint8_t *end,
struct _olm_ed25519_key_pair * value

View file

@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
#include <cstring>
#include <cstdint>
/* Convenience macro for checking the return value of internal unpickling
* functions and returning early on failure. */
#ifndef UNPICKLE_OK
#define UNPICKLE_OK(x) do { if (!(x)) return nullptr; } while(0)
#endif
namespace olm {
inline std::size_t pickle_length(
@ -40,6 +46,23 @@ std::uint8_t const * unpickle(
);
inline std::size_t pickle_length(
const std::uint8_t & value
) {
return 1;
}
std::uint8_t * pickle(
std::uint8_t * pos,
std::uint8_t value
);
std::uint8_t const * unpickle(
std::uint8_t const * pos, std::uint8_t const * end,
std::uint8_t & value
);
inline std::size_t pickle_length(
const bool & value
) {
@ -88,11 +111,21 @@ std::uint8_t const * unpickle(
olm::List<T, max_size> & list
) {
std::uint32_t size;
pos = unpickle(pos, end, size);
if (!pos) {
return nullptr;
}
while (size-- && pos != end) {
T * value = list.insert(list.end());
pos = unpickle(pos, end, *value);
if (!pos) {
return nullptr;
}
}
return pos;
}

View file

@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
#include "olm/error.h"
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* Get the number of bytes needed to encode a pickle of the length given
*/
size_t _olm_enc_output_length(size_t raw_length);
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_enc_output_length(size_t raw_length);
/**
* Get the point in the output buffer that the raw pickle should be written to.
@ -41,7 +45,7 @@ size_t _olm_enc_output_length(size_t raw_length);
* base-64 encoding would otherwise overwrite the end of the input before it
* was encoded.)
*/
uint8_t *_olm_enc_output_pos(uint8_t * output, size_t raw_length);
OLM_EXPORT uint8_t *_olm_enc_output_pos(uint8_t * output, size_t raw_length);
/**
* Encrypt and encode the given pickle in-situ.
@ -51,7 +55,7 @@ size_t _olm_enc_output_length(size_t raw_length);
*
* Returns the number of bytes in the encoded pickle.
*/
size_t _olm_enc_output(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_enc_output(
uint8_t const * key, size_t key_length,
uint8_t *pickle, size_t raw_length
);
@ -62,7 +66,7 @@ size_t _olm_enc_output(
* Returns the number of bytes in the decoded pickle, or olm_error() on error,
* in which case *last_error will be updated, if last_error is non-NULL.
*/
size_t _olm_enc_input(
OLM_EXPORT size_t _olm_enc_input(
uint8_t const * key, size_t key_length,
uint8_t * input, size_t b64_length,
enum OlmErrorCode * last_error

View file

@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "olm/error.h"
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -26,49 +30,55 @@ extern "C" {
typedef struct OlmPkEncryption OlmPkEncryption;
/* The size of an encryption object in bytes */
size_t olm_pk_encryption_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_encryption_size(void);
/** Initialise an encryption object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory must be at least olm_pk_encryption_size() bytes */
OlmPkEncryption *olm_pk_encryption(
OLM_EXPORT OlmPkEncryption *olm_pk_encryption(
void * memory
);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to an
* encryption object */
const char * olm_pk_encryption_last_error(
OlmPkEncryption * encryption
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_pk_encryption_last_error(
const OlmPkEncryption * encryption
);
/** An error code describing the most recent error to happen to an encryption
* object */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_pk_encryption_last_error_code(
const OlmPkEncryption * encryption
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this encryption object */
size_t olm_clear_pk_encryption(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_pk_encryption(
OlmPkEncryption *encryption
);
/** Set the recipient's public key for encrypting to */
size_t olm_pk_encryption_set_recipient_key(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_encryption_set_recipient_key(
OlmPkEncryption *encryption,
void const *public_key, size_t public_key_length
);
/** Get the length of the ciphertext that will correspond to a plaintext of the
* given length. */
size_t olm_pk_ciphertext_length(
OlmPkEncryption *encryption,
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_ciphertext_length(
const OlmPkEncryption *encryption,
size_t plaintext_length
);
/** Get the length of the message authentication code. */
size_t olm_pk_mac_length(
OlmPkEncryption *encryption
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_mac_length(
const OlmPkEncryption *encryption
);
/** Get the length of a public or ephemeral key */
size_t olm_pk_key_length(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_key_length(void);
/** The number of random bytes needed to encrypt a message. */
size_t olm_pk_encrypt_random_length(
OlmPkEncryption *encryption
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_encrypt_random_length(
const OlmPkEncryption *encryption
);
/** Encrypt a plaintext for the recipient set using
@ -81,7 +91,7 @@ size_t olm_pk_encrypt_random_length(
* ephemeral_key buffers were too small then olm_pk_encryption_last_error()
* will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". If there weren't enough random bytes then
* olm_pk_encryption_last_error() will be "OLM_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". */
size_t olm_pk_encrypt(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_encrypt(
OlmPkEncryption *encryption,
void const * plaintext, size_t plaintext_length,
void * ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length,
@ -93,32 +103,38 @@ size_t olm_pk_encrypt(
typedef struct OlmPkDecryption OlmPkDecryption;
/* The size of a decryption object in bytes */
size_t olm_pk_decryption_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_decryption_size(void);
/** Initialise a decryption object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory must be at least olm_pk_decryption_size() bytes */
OlmPkDecryption *olm_pk_decryption(
OLM_EXPORT OlmPkDecryption *olm_pk_decryption(
void * memory
);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* decription object */
const char * olm_pk_decryption_last_error(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_pk_decryption_last_error(
const OlmPkDecryption * decryption
);
/** An error code describing the most recent error to happen to a decription
* object */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_pk_decryption_last_error_code(
const OlmPkDecryption * decryption
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this decryption object */
size_t olm_clear_pk_decryption(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_pk_decryption(
OlmPkDecryption *decryption
);
/** Get the number of bytes required to store an olm private key
*/
size_t olm_pk_private_key_length(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_private_key_length(void);
/** DEPRECATED: Use olm_pk_private_key_length()
*/
size_t olm_pk_generate_key_random_length(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_generate_key_random_length(void);
/** Initialise the key from the private part of a key as returned by
* olm_pk_get_private_key(). The associated public key will be written to the
@ -130,7 +146,7 @@ size_t olm_pk_generate_key_random_length(void);
* Note that the pubkey is a base64 encoded string, but the private key is
* an unencoded byte array
*/
size_t olm_pk_key_from_private(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_key_from_private(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
void * pubkey, size_t pubkey_length,
const void * privkey, size_t privkey_length
@ -138,23 +154,23 @@ size_t olm_pk_key_from_private(
/** DEPRECATED: Use olm_pk_key_from_private
*/
size_t olm_pk_generate_key(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_generate_key(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
void * pubkey, size_t pubkey_length,
const void * privkey, size_t privkey_length
);
/** Returns the number of bytes needed to store a decryption object. */
size_t olm_pickle_pk_decryption_length(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_pk_decryption_length(
const OlmPkDecryption * decryption
);
/** Stores decryption object as a base64 string. Encrypts the object using the
* supplied key. Returns the length of the pickled object on success.
* Returns olm_error() on failure. If the pickle output buffer
* is smaller than olm_pickle_account_length() then
* is smaller than olm_pickle_pk_decryption_length() then
* olm_pk_decryption_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL" */
size_t olm_pickle_pk_decryption(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pickle_pk_decryption(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void *pickled, size_t pickled_length
@ -167,7 +183,7 @@ size_t olm_pickle_pk_decryption(
* will be "BAD_ACCOUNT_KEY". If the base64 couldn't be decoded then
* olm_pk_decryption_last_error() will be "INVALID_BASE64". The input pickled
* buffer is destroyed */
size_t olm_unpickle_pk_decryption(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_unpickle_pk_decryption(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
void const * key, size_t key_length,
void *pickled, size_t pickled_length,
@ -176,8 +192,8 @@ size_t olm_unpickle_pk_decryption(
/** Get the length of the plaintext that will correspond to a ciphertext of the
* given length. */
size_t olm_pk_max_plaintext_length(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_max_plaintext_length(
const OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
size_t ciphertext_length
);
@ -186,7 +202,7 @@ size_t olm_pk_max_plaintext_length(
* arguments. Returns the length of the plaintext on success. Returns
* olm_error() on failure. If the plaintext buffer is too small then
* olm_pk_encryption_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL". */
size_t olm_pk_decrypt(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_decrypt(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
void const * ephemeral_key, size_t ephemeral_key_length,
void const * mac, size_t mac_length,
@ -202,7 +218,7 @@ size_t olm_pk_decrypt(
* and olm_pk_encryption_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL".
* Returns the number of bytes written.
*/
size_t olm_pk_get_private_key(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_get_private_key(
OlmPkDecryption * decryption,
void *private_key, size_t private_key_length
);
@ -210,22 +226,28 @@ size_t olm_pk_get_private_key(
typedef struct OlmPkSigning OlmPkSigning;
/* The size of a signing object in bytes */
size_t olm_pk_signing_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_signing_size(void);
/** Initialise a signing object using the supplied memory
* The supplied memory must be at least olm_pk_signing_size() bytes */
OlmPkSigning *olm_pk_signing(
OLM_EXPORT OlmPkSigning *olm_pk_signing(
void * memory
);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* signing object */
const char * olm_pk_signing_last_error(
OlmPkSigning * sign
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_pk_signing_last_error(
const OlmPkSigning * sign
);
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to a
* signing object */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_pk_signing_last_error_code(
const OlmPkSigning * sign
);
/** Clears the memory used to back this signing object */
size_t olm_clear_pk_signing(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_pk_signing(
OlmPkSigning *sign
);
@ -237,7 +259,7 @@ size_t olm_clear_pk_signing(
* buffer is too small then olm_pk_signing_last_error() will be
* "INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL".
*/
size_t olm_pk_signing_key_from_seed(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_signing_key_from_seed(
OlmPkSigning * sign,
void * pubkey, size_t pubkey_length,
const void * seed, size_t seed_length
@ -246,24 +268,24 @@ size_t olm_pk_signing_key_from_seed(
/**
* The size required for the seed for initialising a signing object.
*/
size_t olm_pk_signing_seed_length(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_signing_seed_length(void);
/**
* The size of the public key of a signing object.
*/
size_t olm_pk_signing_public_key_length(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_signing_public_key_length(void);
/**
* The size of a signature created by a signing object.
*/
size_t olm_pk_signature_length(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_signature_length(void);
/**
* Sign a message. The signature will be written to the signature
* buffer. Returns olm_error() on failure. If the signature buffer is too
* small, olm_pk_signing_last_error() will be "OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL".
*/
size_t olm_pk_sign(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_pk_sign(
OlmPkSigning *sign,
uint8_t const * message, size_t message_length,
uint8_t * signature, size_t signature_length

View file

@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
#include "olm/list.hh"
#include "olm/error.h"
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
struct _olm_cipher;
namespace olm {
@ -72,7 +76,7 @@ struct KdfInfo {
};
struct Ratchet {
struct OLM_EXPORT Ratchet {
Ratchet(
KdfInfo const & kdf_info,
@ -94,7 +98,7 @@ struct Ratchet {
/** The sender chain is used to send messages. Each time a new ephemeral
* key is received from the remote server we generate a new sender chain
* with a new empheral key when we next send a message. */
* with a new ephemeral key when we next send a message. */
List<SenderChain, 1> sender_chain;
/** The receiver chain is used to decrypt received messages. We store the
@ -124,12 +128,12 @@ struct Ratchet {
* a given message length. */
std::size_t encrypt_output_length(
std::size_t plaintext_length
);
) const;
/** The number of bytes of random data the encrypt method will need to
* encrypt a message. This will be 32 bytes if the session needs to
* generate a new ephemeral key, or will be 0 bytes otherwise.*/
std::size_t encrypt_random_length();
std::size_t encrypt_random_length() const;
/** Encrypt some plain-text. Returns the length of the encrypted message
* or std::size_t(-1) on failure. On failure last_error will be set with

View file

@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include "olm/error.h"
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -33,27 +37,33 @@ typedef struct OlmSAS OlmSAS;
/** A null terminated string describing the most recent error to happen to an
* SAS object. */
const char * olm_sas_last_error(
OlmSAS * sas
OLM_EXPORT const char * olm_sas_last_error(
const OlmSAS * sas
);
/** An error code describing the most recent error to happen to an SAS
* object. */
OLM_EXPORT enum OlmErrorCode olm_sas_last_error_code(
const OlmSAS * sas
);
/** The size of an SAS object in bytes. */
size_t olm_sas_size(void);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_size(void);
/** Initialize an SAS object using the supplied memory.
* The supplied memory must be at least `olm_sas_size()` bytes. */
OlmSAS * olm_sas(
OLM_EXPORT OlmSAS * olm_sas(
void * memory
);
/** Clears the memory used to back an SAS object. */
size_t olm_clear_sas(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_clear_sas(
OlmSAS * sas
);
/** The number of random bytes needed to create an SAS object. */
size_t olm_create_sas_random_length(
OlmSAS * sas
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_sas_random_length(
const OlmSAS * sas
);
/** Creates a new SAS object.
@ -67,13 +77,13 @@ size_t olm_create_sas_random_length(
* @return `olm_error()` on failure. If there weren't enough random bytes then
* `olm_sas_last_error()` will be `NOT_ENOUGH_RANDOM`.
*/
size_t olm_create_sas(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_create_sas(
OlmSAS * sas,
void * random, size_t random_length
);
/** The size of a public key in bytes. */
size_t olm_sas_pubkey_length(OlmSAS * sas);
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_pubkey_length(const OlmSAS * sas);
/** Get the public key for the SAS object.
*
@ -85,7 +95,7 @@ size_t olm_sas_pubkey_length(OlmSAS * sas);
* @return `olm_error()` on failure. If the `pubkey` buffer is too small, then
* `olm_sas_last_error()` will be `OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL`.
*/
size_t olm_sas_get_pubkey(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_get_pubkey(
OlmSAS * sas,
void * pubkey, size_t pubkey_length
);
@ -100,11 +110,20 @@ size_t olm_sas_get_pubkey(
* @return `olm_error()` on failure. If the `their_key` buffer is too small,
* then `olm_sas_last_error()` will be `INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL`.
*/
size_t olm_sas_set_their_key(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_set_their_key(
OlmSAS *sas,
void * their_key, size_t their_key_length
);
/** Checks if their key was set.
*
* @param[in] sas the SAS object.
*
*/
OLM_EXPORT int olm_sas_is_their_key_set(
const OlmSAS *sas
);
/** Generate bytes to use for the short authentication string.
*
* @param[in] sas the SAS object.
@ -114,8 +133,11 @@ size_t olm_sas_set_their_key(
* @param[out] output the output buffer.
* @param[in] output_length the size of the output buffer. For hex-based SAS
* as in the Matrix spec, this will be 5.
*
* @return `olm_error()` on failure. If their key wasn't set then
* `olm_sas_last_error()` will be `SAS_THEIR_KEY_NOT_SET`.
*/
size_t olm_sas_generate_bytes(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_generate_bytes(
OlmSAS * sas,
const void * info, size_t info_length,
void * output, size_t output_length
@ -123,8 +145,8 @@ size_t olm_sas_generate_bytes(
/** The size of the message authentication code generated by
* olm_sas_calculate_mac()`. */
size_t olm_sas_mac_length(
OlmSAS *sas
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_mac_length(
const OlmSAS *sas
);
/** Generate a message authentication code (MAC) based on the shared secret.
@ -142,7 +164,16 @@ size_t olm_sas_mac_length(
* @return `olm_error()` on failure. If the `mac` buffer is too small, then
* `olm_sas_last_error()` will be `OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL`.
*/
size_t olm_sas_calculate_mac(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_calculate_mac(
OlmSAS * sas,
const void * input, size_t input_length,
const void * info, size_t info_length,
void * mac, size_t mac_length
);
// A version of the calculate mac function that produces base64 strings that are
// compatible with other base64 implementations.
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_calculate_mac_fixed_base64(
OlmSAS * sas,
const void * input, size_t input_length,
const void * info, size_t info_length,
@ -150,7 +181,7 @@ size_t olm_sas_calculate_mac(
);
// for compatibility with an old version of Riot
size_t olm_sas_calculate_mac_long_kdf(
OLM_EXPORT size_t olm_sas_calculate_mac_long_kdf(
OlmSAS * sas,
const void * input, size_t input_length,
const void * info, size_t info_length,

View file

@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
#include "olm/ratchet.hh"
// Note: exports in this file are only for unit tests. Nobody else should be
// using this externally
#include "olm/olm_export.h"
namespace olm {
struct Account;
@ -26,7 +30,7 @@ enum struct MessageType {
MESSAGE = 1,
};
struct Session {
struct OLM_EXPORT Session {
Session();
@ -41,7 +45,7 @@ struct Session {
/** The number of random bytes that are needed to create a new outbound
* session. This will be 64 bytes since two ephemeral keys are needed. */
std::size_t new_outbound_session_random_length();
std::size_t new_outbound_session_random_length() const;
/** Start a new outbound session. Returns std::size_t(-1) on failure. On
* failure last_error will be set with an error code. The last_error will be
@ -64,7 +68,7 @@ struct Session {
);
/** The number of bytes written by session_id() */
std::size_t session_id_length();
std::size_t session_id_length() const;
/** An identifier for this session. Generated by hashing the public keys
* used to create the session. Returns the length of the session id on
@ -84,21 +88,21 @@ struct Session {
bool matches_inbound_session(
_olm_curve25519_public_key const * their_identity_key,
std::uint8_t const * pre_key_message, std::size_t message_length
);
) const;
/** Whether the next message will be a pre-key message or a normal message.
* An outbound session will send pre-key messages until it receives a
* message with a ratchet key. */
MessageType encrypt_message_type();
MessageType encrypt_message_type() const;
std::size_t encrypt_message_length(
std::size_t plaintext_length
);
) const;
/** The number of bytes of random data the encrypt method will need to
* encrypt a message. This will be 32 bytes if the session needs to
* generate a new ephemeral key, or will be 0 bytes otherwise. */
std::size_t encrypt_random_length();
std::size_t encrypt_random_length() const;
/** Encrypt some plain-text. Returns the length of the encrypted message
* or std::size_t(-1) on failure. On failure last_error will be set with
@ -131,6 +135,14 @@ struct Session {
std::uint8_t const * message, std::size_t message_length,
std::uint8_t * plaintext, std::size_t max_plaintext_length
);
/**
* Write a string describing this session and its state (not including the
* private key) into the buffer provided.
*
* Takes a buffer to write to and the length of that buffer
*/
void describe(char *buf, size_t buflen);
};
@ -145,7 +157,7 @@ std::uint8_t * pickle(
);
std::uint8_t const * unpickle(
OLM_EXPORT std::uint8_t const * unpickle(
std::uint8_t const * pos, std::uint8_t const * end,
Session & value
);

View file

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct Utility {
OlmErrorCode last_error;
/** The length of a SHA-256 hash in bytes. */
std::size_t sha256_length();
std::size_t sha256_length() const;
/** Compute a SHA-256 hash. Returns the length of the SHA-256 hash in bytes
* on success. Returns std::size_t(-1) on failure. On failure last_error

29
javascript/.gitlab-ci.yml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
default:
image: docker.io/emscripten/emsdk:latest
stages:
- build
- test
build:js:
stage: build
script:
- ln -sf $(which python3) /usr/local/bin/python
- make js
artifacts:
paths:
- build/javascript
- javascript/olm.js
- javascript/olm.wasm
- javascript/olm_legacy.js
- javascript/index.d.ts
- javascript/exported_functions.json
test:js:
stage: test
needs:
- build:js
script:
- pushd javascript
- npm i
- npm run test

View file

@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
Olm
===
Note: before using any of the olm functions, you must call `Olm.init()`, and
wait for the promise to resolve, otherwise you will get errors like:
`Uncaught TypeError: Olm.Account is not a constructor`
If you get errors about failure to compile the wasm file, it is likely that Olm
is not locating the wasm file properly. You can tell Olm where the wasm file
is by passing a `locateFile` parameter to `Olm.init()`, for example:
`Olm.init({locateFile: () => pathToWasmFile})`.
Example:
var alice = new Olm.Account();

View file

@ -57,5 +57,56 @@
<div class="user_progress"></div>
</div>
<div id="user3" class="user">
<h1>User 3</h1>
<textarea class="user_plain_input"></textarea>
<button class="user_encrypt">Encrypt</button>
<h2>Outgoing</h2>
<h3>One-to-one output</h3>
<div class="user_cipher_output"></div>
<h3>Group output</h3>
<div class="group_output"></div>
<h2>Incoming</h2>
<h3>One-to-one Received</h3>
<div class="user_cipher_input"></div>
<h3>Group received</h3>
<div class="group_input"></div>
<h2>Tasks</h2>
<div class="user_progress"></div>
</div>
<div id="user4" class="user">
<h1>User 4</h1>
<textarea class="user_plain_input"></textarea>
<button class="user_encrypt">Encrypt</button>
<h2>Outgoing</h2>
<h3>One-to-one output</h3>
<div class="user_cipher_output"></div>
<h3>Group output</h3>
<div class="group_output"></div>
<h2>Incoming</h2>
<h3>One-to-one Received</h3>
<div class="user_cipher_input"></div>
<h3>Group received</h3>
<div class="group_input"></div>
<h2>Tasks</h2>
<div class="user_progress"></div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

View file

@ -167,20 +167,13 @@ DemoUser.prototype.getIdKeys = function() {
return JSON.parse(this.olmAccount.identity_keys());
};
DemoUser.prototype.generateKeys = function(callback) {
var self = this;
this.addTask("generate one time key", function(done) {
self.olmAccount.generate_one_time_keys(1);
done();
}, callback);
};
DemoUser.prototype.getOneTimeKey = function() {
var self = this;
var keys = JSON.parse(self.olmAccount.one_time_keys())
.curve25519;
self.olmAccount.generate_one_time_keys(1);
var keys = JSON.parse(self.olmAccount.one_time_keys()).curve25519;
for (key_id in keys) {
if (keys.hasOwnProperty(key_id)) {
self.olmAccount.mark_keys_as_published();
return keys[key_id];
}
}
@ -478,15 +471,36 @@ function initUserDiv(demoUser, div) {
function startDemo() {
var user1 = new DemoUser();
initUserDiv(user1, document.getElementById("user1"));
user1.generateKeys();
var user2 = new DemoUser();
initUserDiv(user2, document.getElementById("user2"));
user2.generateKeys();
var user3 = new DemoUser();
initUserDiv(user3, document.getElementById("user3"));
var user4 = new DemoUser();
initUserDiv(user4, document.getElementById("user4"));
user1.addPeer(user2.remoteOps);
user1.addPeer(user3.remoteOps);
user1.addPeer(user4.remoteOps);
user2.addPeer(user1.remoteOps);
user2.addPeer(user3.remoteOps);
user2.addPeer(user4.remoteOps);
user3.addPeer(user1.remoteOps);
user3.addPeer(user2.remoteOps);
user3.addPeer(user4.remoteOps);
user4.addPeer(user1.remoteOps);
user4.addPeer(user2.remoteOps);
user4.addPeer(user3.remoteOps);
}
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", startDemo, false);
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
Olm.init().then(function() {
startDemo();
});
}, false);

View file

@ -2,7 +2,13 @@
<head>
<script src="../olm.js"></script>
<script>
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function (event) {
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
Olm.init().then(function() {
demo();
});
}, false);
function demo() {
function progress(who, message) {
var message_element = document.createElement("pre");
var progress = document.getElementById(who + "_progress");
@ -109,7 +115,7 @@ document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function (event) {
glue_encrypt("bob", "alice", b_session);
glue_decrypt("alice", a_session);
});
}, false);
}
</script>
<body>

142
javascript/index.d.ts vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
/*
Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
export as namespace Olm;
declare class Account {
constructor();
free(): void;
create(): void;
identity_keys(): string;
sign(message: string | Uint8Array): string;
one_time_keys(): string;
mark_keys_as_published(): void;
max_number_of_one_time_keys(): number;
generate_one_time_keys(number_of_keys: number): void;
remove_one_time_keys(session: Session): void;
generate_fallback_key(): void;
fallback_key(): string;
unpublished_fallback_key(): string;
forget_old_fallback_key(): void;
pickle(key: string | Uint8Array): string;
unpickle(key: string | Uint8Array, pickle: string): void;
}
declare class Session {
constructor();
free(): void;
pickle(key: string | Uint8Array): string;
unpickle(key: string | Uint8Array, pickle: string): void;
create_outbound(
account: Account, their_identity_key: string, their_one_time_key: string,
): void;
create_inbound(account: Account, one_time_key_message: string): void;
create_inbound_from(
account: Account, identity_key: string, one_time_key_message: string,
): void;
session_id(): string;
has_received_message(): boolean;
matches_inbound(one_time_key_message: string): boolean;
matches_inbound_from(identity_key: string, one_time_key_message: string): boolean;
encrypt(plaintext: string): {
type: 0 | 1; // 0: PreKey, 1: Message
body: string;
};
decrypt(message_type: number, message: string): string;
describe(): string;
}
declare class Utility {
constructor();
free(): void;
sha256(input: string | Uint8Array): string;
ed25519_verify(key: string, message: string | Uint8Array, signature: string): void;
}
declare class InboundGroupSession {
constructor();
free(): void;
pickle(key: string | Uint8Array): string;
unpickle(key: string | Uint8Array, pickle: string): void;
create(session_key: string): string;
import_session(session_key: string): string;
decrypt(message: string): {
message_index: number;
plaintext: string;
};
session_id(): string;
first_known_index(): number;
export_session(message_index: number): string;
}
declare class OutboundGroupSession {
constructor();
free(): void;
pickle(key: string | Uint8Array): string;
unpickle(key: string | Uint8Array, pickle: string): void;
create(): void;
encrypt(plaintext: string): string;
session_id(): string;
session_key(): string;
message_index(): number;
}
declare class PkEncryption {
constructor();
free(): void;
set_recipient_key(key: string): void;
encrypt(plaintext: string): {
ciphertext: string;
mac: string;
ephemeral: string;
};
}
declare class PkDecryption {
constructor();
free(): void;
init_with_private_key(key: Uint8Array): string;
generate_key(): string;
get_private_key(): Uint8Array;
pickle(key: string | Uint8Array): string;
unpickle(key: string | Uint8Array, pickle: string): string;
decrypt(ephemeral_key: string, mac: string, ciphertext: string): string;
}
declare class PkSigning {
constructor();
free(): void;
init_with_seed(seed: Uint8Array): string;
generate_seed(): Uint8Array;
sign(message: string): string;
}
declare class SAS {
constructor();
free(): void;
get_pubkey(): string;
set_their_key(their_key: string): void;
generate_bytes(info: string, length: number): Uint8Array;
calculate_mac(input: string, info: string): string;
calculate_mac_fixed_base64(input: string, info: string): string;
calculate_mac_long_kdf(input: string, info: string): string;
}
export function init(opts?: object): Promise<void>;
export function get_library_version(): [number, number, number];
export const PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH: number;

View file

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
/** @constructor */
function InboundGroupSession() {
var size = Module['_olm_inbound_group_session_size']();
this.buf = malloc(size);

View file

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
/** @constructor */
function OutboundGroupSession() {
var size = Module['_olm_outbound_group_session_size']();
this.buf = malloc(size);
@ -67,9 +68,14 @@ OutboundGroupSession.prototype['create'] = restore_stack(function() {
Module['_olm_init_outbound_group_session_random_length']
)(this.ptr);
var random = random_stack(random_length);
outbound_group_session_method(Module['_olm_init_outbound_group_session'])(
this.ptr, random, random_length
);
try {
outbound_group_session_method(Module['_olm_init_outbound_group_session'])(
this.ptr, random, random_length
);
} finally {
// clear the random buffer
bzero(random, random_length);
}
});
OutboundGroupSession.prototype['encrypt'] = function(plaintext) {

View file

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
/** @constructor */
function PkEncryption() {
var size = Module['_olm_pk_encryption_size']();
this.buf = malloc(size);
@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ PkEncryption.prototype['encrypt'] = restore_stack(function(
});
/** @constructor */
function PkDecryption() {
var size = Module['_olm_pk_decryption_size']();
this.buf = malloc(size);
@ -273,6 +275,7 @@ PkDecryption.prototype['decrypt'] = restore_stack(function (
})
/** @constructor */
function PkSigning() {
var size = Module['_olm_pk_signing_size']();
this.buf = malloc(size);

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