Merge branch 'matthew/define-secrecy' into 'master'
explicitly define backward & forward secrecy See merge request matrix-org/olm!3
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1 changed files with 23 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -267,8 +267,17 @@ future research.
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### Lack of Backward Secrecy
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Once the key to a Megolm session is compromised, the attacker can decrypt any
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future messages sent via that session.
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[Backward secrecy](https://intensecrypto.org/public/lec_08_hash_functions_part2.html#sec-forward-and-backward-secrecy)
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(also called 'future secrecy' or 'post-compromise security') is the property
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that if current private keys are compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt
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future messages in a given session. In other words, when looking
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**backwards** in time at a compromise which has already happened, **current**
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messages are still secret.
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By itself, Megolm does not possess this property: once the key to a Megolm
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session is compromised, the attacker can decrypt any message that was
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encrypted using a key derived from the compromised or subsequent ratchet
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values.
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In order to mitigate this, the application should ensure that Megolm sessions
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are not used indefinitely. Instead it should periodically start a new session,
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@ -279,10 +288,18 @@ with new keys shared over a secure channel.
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### Partial Forward Secrecy
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Each recipient maintains a record of the ratchet value which allows them to
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decrypt any messages sent in the session after the corresponding point in the
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conversation. If this value is compromised, an attacker can similarly decrypt
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those past messages.
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[Forward secrecy](https://intensecrypto.org/public/lec_08_hash_functions_part2.html#sec-forward-and-backward-secrecy)
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(also called 'perfect forward secrecy') is the property that if the current
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private keys are compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt *past* messages in
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a given session. In other words, when looking **forwards** in time towards a
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potential future compromise, **current** messages will be secret.
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In Megolm, each recipient maintains a record of the ratchet value which allows
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them to decrypt any messages sent in the session after the corresponding point
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in the conversation. If this value is compromised, an attacker can similarly
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decrypt past messages which were encrypted by a key derived from the
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compromised or subsequent ratchet values. This gives 'partial' forward
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secrecy.
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To mitigate this issue, the application should offer the user the option to
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discard historical conversations, by winding forward any stored ratchet values,
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