Ed25519 private keys, it turns out, have 64 bytes, not 32.
We were previously generating only 32 bytes (which is all that is required to
generate the public key), and then using the public key as the upper 32 bytes
when generating the per-message session key. This meant that everything
appeared to work, but the security of the private key was severely compromised.
By way of fixes:
* Use the correct algorithm for generating the Ed25519 private key, and store
all 512 bits of it.
* Update the account pickle format and refuse to load the old format (since we
should consider it compromised).
* Bump the library version, and add a function to retrieve the library
version, so that applications can verify that they are linked against a
fixed version of the library.
* Remove the curve25519_{sign, verify} functions which were unused and of
dubious quality.
This makes the user able to use the familiar `make install` syntax, and
allows overriding of the default directories using the DESTDIR and
PREFIX variables, for example:
make DESTDIR=packaging PREFIX=/usr install
This provides users of this library the guarantee that the ABI will
stay stable when MAJOR will reach 1, and will stay backwards compatible
for the entire duration of the 1.x.y branch.
It does require the maintainers to always update the version in the
Makefile at every ABI change.
sha256.c and aes.c contain conflicting declarations, so we need to compile them
as separate units. This requires a bit more Makefile-shuffling; the build
directory now includes 'src' or 'lib' as appropriate, and we just mkdir -p
before each compilation.
We want to stop aes_* and sha_* functions leaking out of our .so, as well as
internal _olm_* symbols.
This also means we need to link the unit tests against the objects. Possibly we
should distinguish between unit tests and integration tests.
Now that we have C and C++, we need to split the compile and link steps
(because we need different flags for the C and C++ files), so this is
easier with a Makefile.
