olm::decode_base64 now returns the length of the raw decoded data on
success. When given input with an invalid base64 length, it fails early
(before decoding any input) and returns -1.
This also makes the C function _olm_decode_base64 an actual binding of
olm::decode_base64 instead of a wrapper with slightly different
behaviour.
The library can now be installed using CMake v3.0+.
Below is an example configuration.
1. Generate configuation
cmake -H. -Bbuild
-GNinja
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release // The default profile.
-DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr/local/
-DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=ON
-DOLM_TESTS=1
-DOLM_FUZZERS=1
2. Build & install the targets
cmake --build build --config Release --target install
3. Run the tests
cd build/test && ctest .
The library can also be used as a dependency with CMake using
find_package(Olm::Olm REQUIRED)
target_link_libraries(my_exe Olm::Olm)
Signed-off-by: Konstantinos Sideris <sideris.konstantin@gmail.com>
Change interface to allow the app to get the private part of the
key and instantiate a decryption object from just the private part
of the key.
Changes the function generating a key from random bytes to be
initialising a key with a private key (because it's exactly the
same thing). Exports & imports private key parts as ArrayBuffer at
JS level rather than base64 assuming we are moving that way in
general.
make olm_pickle_* return the lengths of the base64-encoded pickles, rather than
the raw pickle. (From the application's POV, the format of the pickle is
opaque: it doesn't even know that it is base64-encoded. So returning the length
of the raw pickle is particularly unhelpful.)
Some clients expect the session id to be globally unique,
so allowing the end devices to pick the session id will cause
problems.
Include the current ratchet index with the initial keys, this decreases
the risk that the client will supply the wrong index causing problems.
Sign the initial keys with the ratchet ed25519 key, this reduces the
risk of a client claiming a session that they didn't create.
Add ed25519 keys to the inbound and outbound sessions, and use them to sign and
verify megolm messages.
We just stuff the ed25519 public key in alongside the megolm session key (and
add a version byte), to save adding more boilerplate to the JS/python/etc
layers.
We were using olm::KEY_LENGTH for everything under the sun which happened to be
32 bytes long, and making a bunch of assumptions in the process. Create a bunch
of new constants (as C #defines rather than C++ consts so that I can use them
in another forthcoming refactor).
Ed25519 private keys, it turns out, have 64 bytes, not 32.
We were previously generating only 32 bytes (which is all that is required to
generate the public key), and then using the public key as the upper 32 bytes
when generating the per-message session key. This meant that everything
appeared to work, but the security of the private key was severely compromised.
By way of fixes:
* Use the correct algorithm for generating the Ed25519 private key, and store
all 512 bits of it.
* Update the account pickle format and refuse to load the old format (since we
should consider it compromised).
* Bump the library version, and add a function to retrieve the library
version, so that applications can verify that they are linked against a
fixed version of the library.
* Remove the curve25519_{sign, verify} functions which were unused and of
dubious quality.
Keeping track of the chain index is a useful thing to do, but is only required
if we've enabled diagnostics. Extend the session pickle format to make a space
for it, so that pickles can be transferred between the logging_enabled branch
and the master branch without loss of information.
Also add some tests for session pickling which explicitly check that we can
unpickle both formats of pickle.
This was introduced when I was experimenting with support for logging progress
in Olm. That is now relegated to the logging_enabled branch, so this should
probably be removed.
This also fixes the incompatibility of session pickles from the current master
branch with those from olm 0.1.0.
Putting the session_id inside the packed message body makes it hard to extract
so that we can decide which session to use. We don't think there is any
advantage to having thes sesion_id protected by the HMACs, so we're going to
move it to the JSON framing.
Give a load of internal symbols "_olm_" prefixes. This better delineates the
public and private interfaces in the module, and helps avoid internal symbols
leaking out and possibly being abused.
