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Update signing.md to use operatorname

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Richard van der Hoff 2019-11-08 14:11:05 +00:00
parent 0469065855
commit 930c467754
1 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions
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docs/signing.md
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@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
where: where:
```math ```math
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\; S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right) \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right)
``` ```
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows: deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
```math ```math
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\; S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right) \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)
``` ```
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation, show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
because the ability to calculate $`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)`$ requires because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires
knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's
involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob